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Abstract 
Cold War architecture reveals narratives of both faith and fatalism. American federal agencies, 
such as the Department of Defense and NASA, financed the creation of command and control 
centers that operated in digital, real-time environments during the postwar years. 
Contemporaneous advances in communications technology and computer systems enabled the 
construction of these spaces, and their architecture reflects presumed national security needs 
during the Cold War. This dissertation explores the design of these control rooms as new 
technologies and uncovers how these spaces—and their varying levels of public visibility—
served as symbols of military authority and political policy. These Cold War artifacts embody 
commitment to a centralized headquarters, which would fade in the following years. Four case 
studies develop my argument. These sites are: (1) NASA’s Mission Control Center in Houston, 
(2) the Strategic Air Command headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, (3) the North 
American Air Defense Command’s Combat Operations Center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado 
and (4) the “Blue Cube” at Onizuka Air Force Station near Sunnyvale, California. Due to the 
goals of the agencies financing these spaces—such as advocating the policy of deterrence and 
boasting their ability to control air and space—the resultant command and control centers were 
politically and socioculturally charged artifacts. Through employing innovative design 
techniques, along with media portrayals of these spaces, the American government attempted to 
use command centers to appease domestic Cold War fears while at the same time deterring the 
enemy, with varying degrees of efficacy. My investigation of these spaces showcases how 
historians can use physical manifestations of political and military ambitions to better understand 
the past.  
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CHAPTER 1. Controlling the Cold War 
 
Under Control: Constructing the Nerve Centers of the Cold War traces the history of 
command and control centers in Cold War America in an effort to understand how these 
spaces were conceived, utilized, and perceived. Today these rooms are iconic and 
ubiquitous, their design a fait accompli, but they were non-existent until the second half 
of the twentieth century. For many Americans, their first glimpse of a computer-
supported control center was via television, of NASA’s Mission Control Center in 
Houston during the Apollo missions. Organization men donning headsets faced large 
display screens from behind tiered consoles and successfully supported the landing of 
men on the Moon. Designers had determined that this was the most efficient spatial 
configuration for remotely monitoring spaceflight, and largely due to the successes 
facilitated from this space, later engineers and managers would agree. Since that time, 
this model has been appropriated by so many other industries—military, commercial, 
educational, and so on—that the arrangement of furniture, computers, and other 
equipment in such a space has become taken for granted as the ideal layout. Proof of its 
efficacy and persisting replication of the model, however, does not explain how and why 
designers initially conceived of and created this space. 
These spaces are architectural expressions of a particular era, which enables a 
narrative in the history of technology that is largely overlooked. These physical 
constructs embodied meanings—be they political or otherwise—and conveyed messages 
to workers within the space and to those viewing the space from the outside. In other 
words, these spaces were both socially constructed and societally impactful, making their 
examination a means of better understanding the people that constructed them. A number 
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of architectural historians (in particular) argue that the end-products of architectural 
efforts are microcosms of the values of society at large.1 American Cold War command 
centers are exemplary artifacts to study in order to understand this production, as they (1) 
occupied definable physical spaces composed of networked machines, allowing for 
examination not only of the room as a space but also as an artifact, (2) integrated cutting-
edge computer and communications technology, and (3) were developed in direct 
response to the particular needs of military and political leaders during the Cold War. It is 
also relevant that both NASA and the Air Force were relatively new agencies forging 
their institutional identities and authority through utilization of new technologies, and 
such imperatives permeate the character of these centers. 
In addition to these characteristics, what differentiates Cold War spaces of 
command and control from war rooms or operations rooms of the past (for example, 
Winston Churchill’s Cabinet War Rooms) is that they were non-redundant hubs for 
global networks. They highlight the belief that one could survey and direct activities 
across the entire planet from a centralized headquarters. New technologies enabled a 
distinctly modern dynamic in the command center; commanders did not simply monitor a 
local battlefield, but they endeavored to survey and react globally. These rooms speak to 
the challenge of living in an era under the threat of the atomic bomb. The tendency 
toward centralization was eventually dropped in favor of decentralization. In the late 
                                                 
 
1 Carla Yanni, The Architecture of Madness: Insane Asylums in the United States (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota, 2007), 1; 5; 8; Annabel Jane Wharton, Building the Cold War: Hilton 
International Hotels and Modern Architecture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Simon 
Richards, Architect Knows Best: Environmental Determinism in Architecture Culture from 1956 to the 
Present (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2012), 148, 126. Psychologists also argue that 
spaces can be created that influence people in particular ways. See Sally Augustin, Place Advantage: 
Applied Psychology for Interior Architecture (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2009). 
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1950s, however, the existence of these centers proves that American military officials 
believed that pursing means of global surveillance, the creation of a massive deterrent 
force of bombers and nuclear weapons, and sites for monitoring global threats that were 
“hardened” against nuclear attack were keys to either surviving until the Cold War ended, 
or quickly retaliating once it started.2 A number of command room from the Cold War era 
might come to mind. For example, Royal Air Force command centers and other 
Command Information Centers (CIC) utilized similar design principles, but lacked the 
advanced electronics equipment, user interfaces, and embedded systems that are 
characteristic of the spaces discussed here. These sites are also national or geographically 
wide-ranging in scope, as opposed to air traffic control centers, FEMA control centers, 
missile silos, or command centers that direct the operations aboard one vessel (for 
example, a submarine). Finally, Cold War spaces of command and control were the key 
nodes in their network. Despite the later movement toward decentralization, these 
headquarters served as centralized bastions of military strength. They were not just 
technologically innovative and shared a similar aesthetic; the motivations behind their 
design were based on promoting the command center—not just the objects that it 
commanded—as a sign of national strength. 
Much as Thomas Hughes argued that national power systems are evolving 
cultural artifacts and “embody the physical, intellectual, and symbolic resources of the 
society that constructs them,” Cold War command centers reflected the national zeitgeist 
                                                 
 
2 As an example of the movement toward decentralization, current military intelligence systems 
are widely dispersed. See David. E. Pearson, The World Wide Military Command and Control System 
(Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Air University Press, 2000).  
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of the United States military and American political leaders during the middle of the 
twentieth century.3 Paul Edwards observed that the development of control rooms 
embodied, “Cold War nuclear anxiety, quantitatively oriented ‘scientific’ administrative 
techniques, and the global objectives of U.S. military power.”4 He argued that mid-
century electronics development catalyzed a movement toward centralization and created 
a closed-world discourse, because computers “allowed practical construction of central 
real-time military control systems on a gigantic scale.” These spaces “facilitated the 
metaphorical understanding of world politics as a sort of system subject to technological 
management.”5  
American command and control centers served as analogous constructions of 
reassurance that the United States was prepared to defend its borders, attack its enemies, 
and save its people. Within a short period of time, however, these centralized systems 
were no longer seen as being the technological answer to avoiding global holocaust. In 
fact, quite a few media portrayals questioned the ability of these command and control 
behemoths to deliver on their promise to deter the Soviet Union, and some critics even 
suggested that the mere existence of these spaces escalated tensions and made nuclear 
attack more likely. These case studies describe how and why these environments were 
both byproducts of their designers’ intent, as well as symbols appropriated by others. 
                                                 
 
3 Thomas Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 2. 
4 Paul N. Edwards, The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War 
America (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 6. 
5 Ibid., 7. 
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NASA’s Mission Control Center in Houston, which began operations in 1964, 
might be the most familiar of these command and control centers. The original Mercury 
Control Room at Cape Canaveral was in desperate need of updating to support the 
Gemini and Apollo missions. Due to the new technological capability to monitor 
launches and spaceflight further away from the launchpad, a new site could be selected at 
a geographically distant location. Houston was selected due to its proximity to required 
resources (as well as due to some congressional pork-barreling), and the center came 
online to support Gemini 4. The new control space was named the Mission Control 
Operations Room, but was more commonly known as the Mission Control Center (MCC) 
or simply, Mission Control. It held some design features in common with the Mercury 
Control Center: operators sat at consoles that faced a large map that depicted the orbital 
path of a space vehicle using a motorized icon that traversed the screen. At Mission 
Control Houston, however, these movements were shown digitally and in real time, 
utilizing on-site, state-of-the-art computer systems. This structure was designed by Philco 
contractors and their subcontractor, IBM. Examining the construction of this space 
showcases the roles of contractors in the creation of the most well-known command and 
control room in American history. Those involved did not necessarily design Mission 
Control Houston with its potential for symbolism in mind, yet it became the face of the 
American space program, more so than NASA headquarters in Washington, DC.  
Architectural historian Nicolas de Monchaux provocatively dissected a material object in 
Spacesuit, in which he observes that Cold War command and control centers represented 
the imperatives of their era: 
the multiscreen control spaces of midcentury had their beginnings in America’s 
postwar nuclear defense. Developed in symbiosis with the virtual spaces of 
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aircraft and spacecraft simulators, these multiscreen theaters would have their 
public apogee in the stage-set of Apollo’s Mission Control—a two-word phrase 
inseparable from the architecture of the space race....6  
 
Certainly, Mission Control became the public face of NASA, and this visibility led to the 
replication of its aesthetic in the following years. Monchaux, however, situates this space 
in a lineage of combat centers and situation rooms, and Mission Control and the other 
centers examined here were not mere war rooms. They were digital, global command and 
control centers that served as symbols of military and political authority, and should be 
examined as particularly Cold War spaces of command and control.  Even their name 
was a novel pairing; “command and control” was new to the lexicon. These two terms 
were not married until the 1960s, but quickly became inseparable. Later, communications 
and information would be added to the duo, creating the acronym, C3I.7  
The Strategic Air Command (SAC) Headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base in 
Nebraska, also known as Building 500, was an architectural expression of command and 
control. SAC was established in 1946 to monitor (and possibly deliver) the Air Force’s 
supply of nuclear weapons, but the Command came into its own when Curtis LeMay 
became the Commander-In-Chief Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC) in 1948. LeMay 
took a largely disorganized assemblage of personnel and planes and turned it into one of 
the most efficient military branches. When updating the operation, LeMay requested a 
new headquarters, and argued that it should be constructed underground, hardened 
against nuclear attack. After a few years of lobbying, construction began in 1955 and 
                                                 
 
6 Nicholas de Monchaux, Spacesuit: Fashioning Apollo (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 273. 
7 Ibid., 131. 
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operations began at HQ SAC in 1957. Buried forty-six feet underground, men on cherry-
pickers mapped information such as weather conditions and fleet locations on huge 
plotting boards and wall maps, and operators sat at consoles facing these displays. An 
IBM 704 provided information and supported communications. The Strategic Air 
Command headquarters epitomized utilization of advanced technology, and through 
LeMay’s dedication to efficiency and maintenance of a global network, it projected an 
image of rationality and military strength. At the risk of hyperbole, the architecture of HQ 
SAC served just as effectively in deterring enemy aggression as the bombers and missiles 
it directed. At the very least, this space reflected and embodied common mentalities of 
the era, such as the policy of deterrence. The Strategic Air Command’s regular air 
demonstrations, record-setting competition showings, and underground control room 
exemplified an operation that was well under control.  
Historical study of the connection between advanced technologies and assertions 
of control is not without precedent.  In Miriam Levin’s edited volume, Cultures of 
Control, contributors examine “technologies… [as] material culture whose design is 
intimately related to special historical contexts” and which are constructed in ways that 
assert or structure authority.8 Thomas Hughes contends that these authors “show that 
‘control’ and ‘technology’ have similar connotations and are nearly interchangeable.”9 
The history of command and control centers supports this argument; these spaces were 
assembled of advanced technologies designed to achieve a primary Cold War ambition—
                                                 
 
8 Miriam Levin, “Preface,” in Miriam R, Levin ed., Cultures of Control (London, UK: Harwood 
Academic Publishers, 2000). 
9 Thomas P. Hughes, “Introduction,” in Levin, ed., Cultures of Control, 1. 
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control in the skies and beyond. They were also more than mere containers of assembled 
technologies, but were new, holistic technologies within themselves; their underlying 
architecture contributed to a movement toward a systems approach in the postwar period. 
Hughes argues that technologies that facilitated information-gathering and sorting 
became crucial as large systems, such as the networks that powered these command and 
control centers, grew increasingly complex.10  The communication systems implemented 
in the control rooms examined here are highlighted due to their contributions to this 
transition to a global communications network. 
The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), now the North American 
Aerospace Defense Command and headquartered near Colorado Springs on Peterson Air 
Force Base, was operationally connected to the Strategic Air Command, but shares 
commonalities with all of the spaces examined here. After World War II, American 
military leaders initiated the creation of an air defense network to protect against enemy 
bombers, which led to the creation of the Air Defense Command at Ent Air Force Base in 
Colorado in the early 1950s. Soon after, air defense became the responsibility of a multi-
service unified command, the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD), also located 
at Ent AFB. In 1956, CONAD asked the US Air Force to construct an underground 
Combat Operations Center for the Command, one similar to the new Strategic Air 
Command headquarters, but this request went unfulfilled. In the meantime, the United 
States and Canada signed the NORAD Agreement, and established the North American 
Air Defense Command at Ent AFB in September 1957. The following year, 
                                                 
 
10 Hughes, “Introduction,” in Levin, ed., Cultures of Control, 6-7. 
 
9 
CINCNORAD General Earle E. Partridge told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he needed a 
remote Combat Operations Center that would need to be able to withstand thermonuclear 
attack, and his request was approved. Excavation of nearby Cheyenne Mountain began in 
1961, and the Combat Operations Center moved from Ent AFB into a complex of 
buildings resting on shock-absorbing springs buried within Cheyenne Mountain in 1966. 
NORAD’s job was to watch the skies for incoming weapons, warn the Strategic Air 
Command (and other interested parties) of any suspicious observations, and defend 
against an attack. NORAD had surface-to-air missiles and fighter interceptors at its 
disposal in the event that it needed to intercept bombers; massive retaliation was the job 
of the Strategic Air Command. 
Most histories start before the time of the Combat Operations Center, and focus 
on the system that provided the basis for the one implemented in Colorado Springs. That 
is, the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system, a computer-based air 
defense system developed by MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory (whose spinoff, the MITRE 
Corporation, would later design NORAD’s Combat Operations Center).11 By the time of 
its deployment in 1958, the SAGE system was largely obsolete, as it had been designed 
to detect incoming bombers and not the ICBMs which had become the dominant threat. 
SAGE’s command, control, and communications system, however, provided the model 
for later air defense and air traffic control networks, and this system introduced the 
                                                 
 
11 Edwards, 75. The story of SAGE has been told by other scholars. See Kent C. Redmond and 
Thomas M. Smith, From Whirlwind to MITRE: The R&D Story of the SAGE Air Defense Computer 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), and Robert R. Everett, Charles A. Zraket, and Herbert D. Benington, 
“SAGE—A Data-Processing System for Air Defense,” Annals of the History of Computing, Volume 5, 
Number 4, October 1983, 330-339. The MITRE Corporation was chartered by Congress in 1958 as a 
private, not-for-profit corporation to provide technical and engineering guidance to the federal government. 
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technology necessary for such systems to work: digital computers capable of real-time 
information-processing.12 
Hughes argues that the importance of SAGE lies in the fact that it “exemplifies 
the collective management structure now labeled the military-industrial complex,” a 
structure which explains “the present-day preeminence of the United States in the 
creation of large systems.”13 He asserts that the developments in systems engineering, and 
in systems analysis and research, needed to create such structures “generated a 
managerial revolution comparable to that brought about earlier by Taylor’s scientific 
management.”14 Paul Edwards also emphasizes the significance of SAGE, asserting that it 
was “far more than a weapons system. It was a dream, a myth, a metaphor for total 
defense, a technology of closed-world discourse.”15 Edwards utilizes the SAGE story to 
develop his “closed world” thesis, in which he argues that “the key theme [in the closed 
world]…was global surveillance and control through high-technology military power. 
Computers made the closed world work simultaneously as technology, as political 
system, and as ideological mirage.”16 Edwards notes that in the 1950s, “the Air Force 
command traditionalists who had opposed the computerized air defense system either 
became, or were replaced by, the most vigorous proponents of centralized, computerized 
warfare anywhere in the American armed services.” 
                                                 
 
12 Thomas Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998), 30; 66. 
13 Ibid., 4-5. 
14 Ibid., 9. 
15 Edwards, 111. 
16 Ibid., 1. 
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One reason this happened was because leaders realized that missiles, which could 
reach targets far more quickly than airplanes and could not be intercepted, would become 
the dominant delivery system. Only systems that could process massive amounts of 
information in real time would provide the information necessary to guard against attack 
and/or retaliate. In response to this threat, new, centralized command and control systems 
were constructed. SAGE provided the model for such centers, including the NORAD 
system—425L—which connected to distant early warning systems originally used by 
SAGE (among other data-gathering sites).17 As noted by Hughes: “The command, 
control, and communications system that interconnected SAGE facilities, for instance, 
became the model for the Air Force’s massive system for connecting far-flung bomber 
bases and headquarters into a single network.”18 Command and control systems were 
inspired by the SAGE structure, but surpassed its technological capabilities and 
necessitated their own built environments. In addition, although experiments dealing with 
human factors and systems engineering took place in SAGE defense centers, they became 
more prevalent as the military increased its dependence on electronic communications, 
digital displays, and the use of computers.19 The NORAD Combat Operations Center 
provides a useful case study for understanding how computerized command and control 
                                                 
 
17 Ibid., 106-107. “The new command and control systems, or L-systems as they were officially 
designated, covered a wide variety of functions. A sampling might include the following: continental air 
defense (SAGE, 416L), traffic control and landing (431L), weather observation (433L), intelligence 
handling (438L), ballistic missile warning (BMEWS, 474L), air communications (480L), and satellite 
surveillance (496L). Unfortunately, the several L-systems were not conceived according to any sort of 
master plan, nor was their early development marked by a coordinated approach. In short, there was no 
guarantee that they would operate compatibly.” MITRE: The First Twenty Years (MITRE, 1979), 33. 
18 Hughes, Rescuing, 15; 66. 
19 Henry McIlvaine Parsons, Man-Machine System Experiments (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1972), 9. 
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came to be adopted and accepted by both military and civilian organizations during the 
Cold War. According to anthropologist Joseph Masco, the COC was “the most advanced 
bunker facility of its time and perfectly illustrates the passions of the Cold War nuclear 
project” due to the massive investment in its infrastructure to support (or, ostensibly, 
deter) nuclear war. Echoing Edwards, Masco asserts that during the time of its 
construction, the military’s concept of command and control—that is, one that surveys 
the world as a “collection of data points on technologically mediated screens”—became a 
predominant civilian view as well, which enabled the normalization of a permanent war 
economy in the United States.20   
The “Big Blue Cube” was a spy satellite surveillance building, part of the Air 
Force Satellite Control Facility, in what is now Silicon Valley.  The letters “AFSCF” 
designated its attachment to the base, and it was highly visible from neighboring 
freeways 237 and 101, not to mention from overhead. Three parabolic dish antennas 
gathered data from tracking stations and displayed it to operators within this massive, 
windowless, concrete box painted Air Force Blue. It was from this site that military 
satellites were monitored by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) from 1961 to 
2007, most notably, for the Corona program (cover name, Discoverer), but it also 
supported many Shuttle missions that had DoD imperatives tacked onto their 
assignments. Its distinct architecture—one both emphasizing boldness and suggesting 
top-secret operations—instigated years of speculation as to the exact activities conducted 
within the building. The Satellite Control Facility was very secretive about the particulars 
                                                 
 
20 Joseph Masco, “Life Underground: Building the Bunker Society,” Anthropology Now, Vol. 1, 
No. 2, Special Atomic Issue (September 2009), 17. 
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of its activities, and the majority of its buildings were under high security, projecting an 
image of both fear of and fortification from espionage. The Blue Cube’s unusual shape 
and color drew attention to its mission of surveillance and defense. It also served as a 
decoy; its blatant display and association with military activities forces eyes upon it (and 
not elsewhere), and perhaps that was the intention of its builders. Either way, its highly 
visible structure is an instance of constructing provocative architecture behind closed 
gates to meet image-making objectives. 
This case study differs from the others in a few ways. Unlike HQ SAC and the 
NORAD COC, the Blue Cube and other buildings of the Satellite Test Center (STC, the 
Sunnyvale component of the Satellite Control Facility) were built above ground—at least 
more than 100 feet of them were. Also, although the STC buildings were concrete and 
looked “hard,” they were not promoted as “hardened” against nuclear attack as were the 
other spaces. Instead, the spy satellites were the objects that were hardened. This could 
mean encasing the satellite’s components in sheet metal, coating lenses so that they were 
laser-resistant, or using gallium arsenide in place of silicon parts.21 New strategies aimed 
to mitigate damage through redundancy and object-hardening, in an effort to prevent the 
total collapse of a system that had become vital to national security. Yet this space was as 
tightly guarded as the others. Clearance was so high to enter this site that in 1968 even 
Vice-President Hubert Humphrey was once denied access. In addition, virtually no 
photographs of the interior of the building (which has since been torn down) have been 
made available to the public. Examination of the Satellite Test Center considers how this 
                                                 
 
21 William E. Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York: Random 
House, 1986), 260. 
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Cold War site was incredibly secretive as to its operations, yet flaunted its existence with 
conspicuous architecture. 
These four sites were chosen for a number of reasons. The same contractors 
designed and built them. They were constructed at roughly the same time, and without 
obvious precedents. For the purpose of uncovering Cold War attitudes, the window is 
suitable; the secrecy of the design specifications of the earliest of these centers, the 
Strategic Air Command, renders the time differential in construction essentially 
meaningless. In addition, each of these command centers played a role in the Cold War, 
some by boosting American morale and showcasing ingenuity (NASA), and others 
through classified endeavors, such as gathering intelligence (the Blue Cube). Where they 
differ, however, also makes these apt selections. These spaces can be plotted along a 
spectrum of public visibility. NASA operations at the Mission Control Center in Houston 
were publicized as completely transparent. That was part of the agency’s appeal. This 
was not the way the Soviet space program operated; American taxpayers had the right to 
see their funds at work and thus the space program (purportedly) operated with full 
disclosure to its constituents. This act was deliberate and carried with it many implicit 
promises, mostly of a reassuring variety. Yet the ostensibly civilian space program has 
always had ties to the military, and its assertions of openness and public transparency 
should be regarded with more skepticism than they have typically received.22 
Moving along the spectrum, and into military territory, the headquarters of the 
Strategic Air Command boasted of its capabilities and allowed photographs of its facility. 
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Its location in Nebraska, out of the reach of Soviet bombers, indicates an isolation 
deemed necessary for an important military base (or target). Going into the era of the 
ICBM, however, the inland location was no longer safe from enemy attack, so Curtis 
LeMay lobbied to have a new command post built underground. Secrecy permeated the 
project, yet the SAC public relations machine was still at work, promoting the command 
and control center as a technological marvel while also denying access to potential critics. 
For example, Curtis LeMay gave the producers of the 1963 film A Gathering of Eagles, 
in which Colonel Jim Cardwell (played by Rock Hudson) whips an inefficient SAC base 
into shape, unprecedented access to SAC facilities.23 In contrast, Stanley Kubrick’s 
satirical Dr. Strangelove: Or How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love the Bomb, 
which depicts a trigger-happy SAC General-gone-mad who sets World War Three into 
motion, had to rely on stock footage of B-52s, and its set designer, Ken Adams, did not 
have any access to SAC facilities. When asked if he had based his war room design on a 
real place, Adams replied, “I don’t know what government facilities look like!”24  Even 
without the access, however, Adams managed to get the aesthetic right; he had even 
wanted the war room to be split-level, which would have more closely resembled HQ 
                                                 
 
23 Film has been proven as an effective means of uncovering prevailing public ideas. See H. Bruce 
Franklin, War Stars: The Superweapon and the American Imagination (New York, NY: Oxford University 
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SAC (if not the Situation Room), but Kubrick vetoed the idea.25 This is all to say that 
even without having access to actual facilities, the presumed layout was already in the 
public consciousness through press releases and media portrayals. These films, in turn, 
served as inspiration when SAC was updated over the years in attempts to meet the 
technological standards of its fictionalized image.26  
The NORAD Combat Operations Center, buried within Cheyenne Mountain in 
Colorado, had placed a literal, granite barrier between the site and outsiders. Its exact 
operations and means of conducting them were highly secretive and its computer systems 
classified, yet anyone who cared to read a newspaper knew of the center’s existence and 
was vaguely aware of its purpose. In fact, as soon as NORAD formed in 1958, the 
Command publicly promoted itself as the organization that tracks Santa Claus across the 
skies. As the story goes, a 1955 ad in the local Colorado Spring paper gave a phone 
number and instructed kids to call and talk to Santa, but the number printed was 
incorrect, and actually connected children with the CONAD operations center. Since 
1958, NORAD has taken this responsibility as its own, and fields more than 70,000 
annual calls to Santa, as well as maintains a Twitter account that posts his global 
whereabouts on Christmas Eve.27 Beginning in the 1970s, NORAD opened the Cheyenne 
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Mountain Complex to tours, although that option disappeared in the wake of the attacks 
of September 11, 2001. 
The NORAD COC has also featured prominently in popular culture. For just a 
few examples: the Cheyenne Mountain Complex was the target of rock missiles from 
Luna, the rebellious moon colony in Robert Heinlein’s 1966 novel, The Moon is a Harsh 
Mistress. In an episode of the animated series South Park, one of the characters has a 
Trapper Keeper notebook that becomes sentient and travels to Cheyenne Mountain to 
absorb NORAD’s supercomputer, wreaking devastation along the way. Cheyenne 
Mountain was the primary backdrop for the 1980s cult classic Wargames, in which a 
teenager accidentally hacks into the NORAD system and starts playing the game 
“GLOBAL THERMONUCLEAR WAR,” which he later finds out is real.28 Wargames 
portrays the COC as high-tech yet vulnerable, although its real-life counterpart was 
thought too old-fashioned to be accurately depicted in the film. A large portion of the 
movie is staged in a Hollywoodized version of the Combat Operations Center. This is 
unsurprising, as the control room often serves as “the public face of an otherwise 
invisible empire,” one which commands authority while also encouraging speculation as 
to exact operations.29 Command control centers were often imagined to be more 
sophisticated than their reality. In fact, Wargames screenwriters noted in a director’s 
commentary of the film that they had to make the COC set look more technologically 
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sophisticated and futuristic than the real one in order to meet public expectations. A 
commander of the Air Force Cyberspace Command who was once stationed at NORAD 
saw the movie and recalled wondering, “῾Gee, where can we get such cool-looking 
displays?’…It required us to all of a sudden say, ῾If it really can look like this, why 
doesn't it?’"30 After significant updating of the COC, a journalist visited the site in 2009 
and described the layout to his readers as “recognizable from the movie Wargames and 
the Stargate TV series.”31 
Lastly, the Blue Cube is largely absent from popular culture, which is telling in 
itself.32 The Air Force, however, never obscured its existence. If the US military or CIA 
actually wanted to keep secret installations secret during the Cold War, perhaps we have 
yet to be made aware of a truly classified project from the Cold War era. The gradations 
of concealment shown here, however, showcase the paradox faced by military and 
political leaders when deciding how much of each site to unveil. For example, if you 
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really do not want a command center to get nuked, instead of locating the command 
center in a hardened site, you could just make sure no one knew about it. The Blue Cube 
remained relatively unknown until the 1990s and exists in historical obscurity today, 
which suggests that spaces could be made more secret than others. Even the Blue Cube, 
however, was a known space and its memorable architecture actually drew attention to its 
location. So while secrecy was a strategic option, there are no examples of truly secret 
command and control centers from this period that have subsequently been declassified 
and come to light, at least for now. These spaces, ranging along a spectrum of 
concealment, highlight the irony of secrecy in an open political system.  
The built environment created to facilitate the nation’s improving air and space 
systems dramatically changed the American landscape. These spaces are cultural markers 
of the Cold War, and their designs allow us to discover which images were being 
projected in the fight for global leadership. For example, the brutalism of Cold War 
buildings—particularly prevalent in Southwest Washington, DC—reminds residents of a 
past time when retreat to an underground fallout shelter seemed like a real possibility. 
These spaces are cold and severe, “characterized as they are by bold, rectilinear masses in 
exposed, rough concrete.”33 Similarly, command and control center architectural forms 
produced cultural meanings and reflected contemporary anxieties. 
Parallels exist between Cold War command and control centers and civil defense 
initiatives. The “headquarters” aesthetic might have been so pervasive, in fact, that it 
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fueled the proliferation of smaller HQs (shelters).34 This is not what actually happened, 
and one can deduce a number of possibilities for why this was not the case. Perhaps the 
public had faith in the ability of command centers to deter the enemy (because if a first-
strike were launched against the United States, the response capability was to launch a 
massive retaliatory attack, not to intercept an incoming weapon). Or perhaps people 
doubted the efficacy of the threat of Mutually Assured Destruction and, further, did not 
believe in the possibility of surviving a nuclear attack, even if one got into a fallout 
shelter. Judging from satirical popular culture responses to the Soviet denotation of an 
atomic bomb, hardly anyone believed that “duck and cover” offered protection from a 
nearby nuclear blast (and forget a direct hit). The public found itself caught between 
feelings of faith in the military and “skepticism of its protective power.”35 
Kenneth Rose outlined the situation in One Nation Underground, in which he 
argues that the public did not buy into the government’s shelter program. The Gaither 
Report had recommended building a national system of shelters, but the Eisenhower 
administration’s policy advocated a DIY approach (or, Do It If You Like). Under 
President John Kennedy, however, federally orchestrated civil defense became a 
priority.36 Americans appeared willing to fight a war with the Soviet Union, but they were 
hesitant to take measures to protect themselves, such as construct fallout shelters.37 Less 
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than half a percent (0.4%) of Americans constructed fallout shelters. Even though shelter 
construction initially received support from the popular press, such as Life magazine, the 
fallout shelters quickly came under attack, and these bunkers became “popular objects of 
vilification.”38 Secret bunkers for politicians were built, such as under the Greenbrier 
resort in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia but, like their military counterparts, 
which housed aircraft and ordnance, these shelters were hardly secret. The public saw 
shelter-building as war-mongering, another element prolonging the arms race, and the 
moral implications of possible shelter life led to these spaces becoming a metaphor for 
shame and barbarism.39 These conceptions were mirrored in the 1961 Twilight Zone 
episode, “The Shelter,” in which neighbors turn on one another after a Civil Defense 
announcement of impending nuclear attack. The family members who own the shelter 
lock themselves inside, only to have friends beat down the door in a hysterical effort to 
find safety. When the warning turns out to be false, the intruding neighbors are both 
relieved and ashamed. Writer of the episode Rod Serling later said that although he had 
considered building a fallout shelter, he decided against it: “It’s my feeling now that if we 
survive, what are we surviving for? What kind of a world do we go into?  Ya know, if it’s 
rumble and poison water, and inedible food, and my kids have to live like wild beasts, 
I’m not particularly sure I want to survive in that kind of a world.”40 
Many Americans feared that technology had gotten out of control, but their 
leaders reassured them with promises of “good” technology:  
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More frequently, as in the years after 1947, it has been those in the Pentagon, the 
think tanks, the military industries, and the White House who have played upon 
our fear to win us over to their conviction that somewhere down an endlessly 
receding road—or somewhere out in space—exists the definitive technological 
solution that will free us of our fear at least and make us safe and secure in a 
nuclear world.41 
 
Further advances in technology and communications were employed to try to compensate 
for the collective anxiety Americans experienced while living in an age of nuclear 
weapons, but not everyone believed that more technology was the solution. Rose 
challenges a popular notion that Americans in the postwar years were a “simpler” people 
who naively believed that the government—or a DIY fallout shelter—would save them 
from nuclear Armageddon. The reality, as Rose argues, is that most Americans knew 
exactly what time is was, but expressed their fatalism in different ways than we might do 
today.42  Thomas Pynchon, the Boeing-tech-writer-turned-American-novelist noted that in 
his writing, 
Our common nightmare The Bomb is there too…There was nothing ever 
subliminal about it, then or now. Except for that succession of the criminally 
insane who have enjoyed power since 1945, including the power to do something 
about it, most of the rest of us poor sheep have always been stuck with simple, 
standard fear. I think we all have tried to deal with this slow escalation of our 
helplessness and terror in the few ways open to us, from not thinking about it to 
going crazy from it.43 
 
In fact, the true purpose of fallout shelters was largely psychological, as the “presence of 
shelters, complete with food, water, and clothing, gives a sense of security to the 
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people…[and]…merely constructing shelters was a useful exercise in promoting 
discipline and therefore in maintaining social order and cohesion. The motivations for 
building the immense bunkers…[had] little or nothing to do with the belief that the 
structures [would] make a real difference in the event of nuclear war.”44 As with the 
global command and control centers, image-making was a key response to assuaging 
Cold War anxiety.  
By the 1970s, fear of technology had reached new heights. The film Colossus: 
The Forbin Project (1970) depicts two war-mongering, sentient computers that are no 
longer under human control. The command and control room is depicted as a space in 
which people are powerless to stop these unhinged machines. One reason that confidence 
in centralized command and control of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems had 
waned is because their guardians had become the potential bringers of destruction. Over 
the years, there were a number of broken arrows, or accidental events that involved 
nuclear weapons but that did not create the risk of nuclear war, as well as potential 
Pinnacle or NUCFLASH false alarms, which could have resulted in a nuclear 
confrontation. A number of authors and journalists have penned (often somewhat 
sensationalist) accounts of how truly out of control nuclear weapons development and 
deployment was during the Cold War era.45 For example, Cheyenne Mountain systems 
generated false missile warnings on more than one occasion. In 1979, a computer 
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communications failure sent out warning signals to USAF command posts worldwide.46 
This happened again on 2 June 1980, when a technician loaded a test tape but forgot to 
switch the system status to “bypass.” Both times Pacific Air Forces had nuclear bombers 
in the air. SAC did not follow procedure (that is, it did not set massive retaliation into 
effect), because officers knew that these were false alarms; SAC had its own sensor 
reports that did not match those of NORAD. Thankfully, human operators could 
determine that the warnings were inaccurate, but such mistakes held a real possibility for 
global disaster, which fueled American collective anxiety over the bomb. 
As a result of declining confidence, centralization was being quickly abandoned 
in favor of widely dispersed and redundant command centers; there was a collective loss 
of faith in the effectiveness of global control from one location. Over time, each of these 
control centers was replaced or its responsibilities diminished. Jennifer Light’s central 
argument in From Warfare to Welfare is another example of the transition period 
discussed here, one in which massive, expensive, centralized systems experienced a loss 
of confidence from both the military and the American public. As she writes, “Beginning 
in the mid-1960s, the Vietnam War and the Apollo Program became symbolic targets for 
city planners and managers who argued that society’s spending priorities were misplaced 
during an era of urban crises at home.”47 This was the beginning of détente, and the 
forcefully sold, government-packaged reassurance of Cold War defense centers was no 
                                                 
 
46 Matthew Hansen, “Inside bunker, SAC crew feared WWIII was on its way,” Omaha.com, 8 
June 2014, accessed 8 January 2016 http://www.omaha.com/eedition/sunrise/articles/inside-bunker-sac-
crew-feared-wwiii-was-on-its-way/article_2ad53a3d-03a6-54b0-a46c-0a4fa330027f.html 
47 Jennifer S. Light, From Warfare to Welfare: Defense Intellectuals and Urban Problems in Cold 
War America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 2; 4. 
 
25 
longer seen as essential. Certainly, these spaces began to be represented in different—less 
triumphalist, even satirical—terms in popular media, pointing to an eventual widespread 
skepticism of centralized American military structures. 
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CHAPTER 2. Innovating NASA’s Mission Control Center 
 
Secrecy Classification: OFFICIAL 
 
“All in all it was quite an undertaking. The Mission Control center had three floors, each 
about 200 ft. on a side and each stuffed with equipment that was substantially completely 
interconnected throughout the building and through radio, television and phone lines to 
most of the rest of the world.” 
 
“Continuing on with what the floors of the Mission Control Centers looked like, on each 
floor, surrounding its centrally located [Mission Control Operations Room], were special 
rooms where the assisting teams for each flight controller were located….All in all, it was 
a honeycomb of small offices all wired together and all sucking data from the same 
source with separate straws. It was our job to make it all work.” 
 
- Walter LaBerge, Manager of Philco Houston Operations1 
 
 
NASA's Mission Control Center in Houston epitomized how modern computing and 
communications technologies enabled exploration of previously inaccessible 
environments in the middle of the twentieth century. The Mission Control Center, or 
MCC, began directing spaceflight operations in 1964, and its architectural design soon 
became a template for any organization that wished to project an image of confidence and 
technological savvy. Operators at workstations retrieved data from the most advanced 
technological tracking systems of the day in real time, and massive screens filled with 
aggregate data faced these stations to help facilitate complex missions. This aesthetic has 
its roots in NASA and military command and control room predecessors, such as the 
headquarters of the Strategic Air Command; however, the construction of the MCC 
                                                 
 
1 Unpublished memoirs of Walter LaBerge, For My Children, 1996.  
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also required new design approaches particular to the needs of the space organization, 
which were innovated by NASA staff and contractors.2  The MCC in Houston became the 
most recognizable of these spaces, solidifying this command center archetype in public 
consciousness. 
The MCC also served as a symbol of political and military authority during the 
Cold War. When considering the economic impact and legacy of the American 
spaceflight program, it becomes clear that its value cannot simply be expressed in fiscal 
terms. Instead, it needs to be measured in terms of the prestige, faith, trust, and hope for 
the future its organizational structure and technological acumen instilled in the American 
public. The modernist, efficient styling of the Mission Control Center allayed domestic 
fears while showcasing engineering prowess. Its architecture both symbolized and 
physically embodied the nation's potential to triumph over the USSR through its support 
of spaceflight feats of technological sophistication. These demonstrations also carried 
more implicit threats. As is true today, to innovate in aerospace technologies strongly 
correlates with a nation's economic, political, and military dominance. While no one at 
NASA ordered that the MCC be designed specifically with these goals in mind, its public 
relations team was happy to provide photos of the Center to the media which highlighted 
NASA’s confidence and wizardry. This attention increased the value of the center in 
                                                 
 
2 Tracing the lineage from the very first inception of what one might regard a “war room” or 
“control room” or “operations room” would require a book-length investigation. My intention is not 
dismiss the fact that prior examples of spaces of control existed; these prototypes and archetypes certainly 
had bearing on the composition of the spaces examined here. What is new about these spaces, and what 
was not present until the middle of the twentieth century, was the ability for a headquarters to speak to far-
flung subcommand units and issue orders in real time. This ability required and resulted in the architecture 
discussed here. This investigation is not about the evolution of the war room but of the novel emergence of 
a type of space that embodied a particular ideology in addition to its ostensibly primary functions. 
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terms beyond its operational functions. The MCC became a three-dimensional 
advertisement for a new organization dependent on political support and taxpayer dollars. 
 
Figure 1. Operators monitor consoles and large displays at the front of the room during Apollo 8. Source: NASA 
 
Literature on NASA’s Mission Control Center in Houston focuses almost 
exclusively on how people within the room supported spaceflights.3 Certainly, the 
achievement of landing a man on the moon, the dramatic rescue of three astronauts 
during the life-threatening circumstances of Apollo 13, and other accomplishments 
deserve attention. Ground controllers proved that support from Earth could save lives in 
space, and historians should recount these instances. This approach, however, neglects 
                                                 
 
3 One author examines ground facilities of NASA, ESA, and JPL, but is concerned with how these 
places facilitated spaceflight, not their sociocultural impact. See Michael Peter Johnson, Mission Control: 
Inventing the Groundwork of Spaceflight (University Press of Florida, 2015). 
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one of the Mission Control Center’s most crucial aspects: the innovation of Mission 
Control itself. In the early 1960s, new communications technologies and high-speed 
computer processors made the creation of this high-tech ground control station possible. 
Its design assembled technologies which enabled men to tackle real-time control of space 
missions. After the initial forays into space undertaken during the Mercury missions, 
NASA administrators recognized the need for a more technologically sophisticated 
mission control center to support the Gemini and Apollo programs. They knew that 
computers, displays, and communications equipment would be critical components of the 
new center, but they did not have any (unclassified) existing model on which to base its 
design. NASA delegated this task to contractors, primarily Philco Western Development 
Laboratories.4 
Philco employees conceived of the space, prioritized layout, and preserved a 
hierarchy from the previous center.5 Philco’s design resulted in the most famous iteration 
                                                 
 
4 For the sake of readability, I use “Philco” to refer to the primary contractor in the design of 
NASA’s Mission Control, even though this designation is not completely accurate. Philco was an 
electronics company that was acquired by Ford in 1961, leading to the new name of Philco-Ford. Soon 
after, the Western Development Laboratory was created as a division within Philco-Ford (Philco-Ford 
WDL) that fulfilled Ford’s desire to win aerospace-related contracts in the 1960s. When NASA contracted 
Philco-Ford WDL to design the Mission Control Center in Houston, a subdivision of Philco-Ford was 
created to support the project—Philco Houston Operations—although documentation for the initial design 
refers to the contractor as Philco-Ford WDL. To further complicate this business history, in the late-1970s, 
Philco-Ford and its subdivisions were renamed Ford Aerospace. Philco employee of almost 20 years (1965-
1983), John Abbitt, articulated the confusion in his memoirs: “In 1975 the corporation changed its name to 
Aeronutronic Ford and in 1976 to Ford Aerospace & Communications Corporation (FACC). Philco 
Houston Operations (PHO) was transferred from WDL to the Engineering Services Division, and we 
became Space Information Systems Operations (SISO), replacing the PHO name but still belonging to Ford 
Motor Company!!” He did, however, also note that “During all these management name changes the local 
operation was essentially autonomous, while fitting into the overall financial structure of the corporate 
staff. Little notice of these changes was required by NASA (our customer), at least during my tenure.” 
Unpublished memoirs, Life and Times of Colonel Charles W. Abbitt, United States Air Force, Retired (1 
March 2001), 30; 21. 
5 This paper does not privilege the “genius” architect or scientist as the creator of command 
centers, and rightfully so: in the age of Big Science, the lone inventor had largely disappeared. More often, 
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of a particularly mid-century technology: the global Control Center. The MCC in 
Houston, filled with consoles and computers and displays of real-time data, became 
iconic. It was reproduced by both military and civilian operations, from American 
defense headquarters to casino surveillance rooms. Historians have neglected the roles 
that contractors have played (and currently play) in the American space program. NASA 
has long been one of the largest customers of the American aerospace industry, creating 
demand for, and to a certain extent subsidizing, aerospace companies.6 The history of the 
Mission Control Center allows for a number of previously ignored connections to be 
recounted. High-profile contractors designed a center that would not only be functional 
but would wow onlookers both domestically and abroad. 
The First Mission Control 
Christopher “Chris” Columbus Kraft, Jr., best known as Flight Director during the first 
decade of the agency’s activity, is often credited with the design of NASA’s control 
centers.7 The first American room that was dedicated to tracking space capsule 
movements was called the Mercury Control Center (MCC), and it was built in a former 
photography warehouse at what is today the Kennedy Space Center in Cape Canaveral, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
teams of people worked together to create new technologies, and that was certainly the case for the massive 
technology of the command center. This remains, however, a story about people. 
6 The aerospace industry’s dependence on the federal government has been examined by a number 
of authors. For example, see Ann Markusen, et al., The Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military Remapping of 
Industrial America (New York: Oxford University Press: 1991). 
7 Kraft, however, credited the Philco and IBM teams for the design of Mission Control Center in 
Houston. Henry C. Dethloff, Suddenly, Tomorrow Came: A History of the Johnson Space Center (NASA 
SP-4307, 1993), 86. 
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Florida in 1959.8 Kraft recalled in his memoirs that he did not know who started calling 
the room mission control, as “MCC had meant Mercury Control Center to us, but mission 
control was okay, too. It had a nice ring to it.”9  Kraft had strong ideas about the proper 
layout and functionality of this room. He did not want the command center to be a site of 
mere passive surveillance, but instead the space needed to allow people to actively 
participate in the missions and remotely support flights.10 Kraft and his operations team 
considered the types of consoles they would need, including: an environmental systems 
console, which would be monitored by a flight surgeon; a systems console to be watched 
by an engineer; a communications console, whose operator would relay all messages 
between the MCC and a capsule (which would most likely be manned by an astronaut); a 
console from which to keep track of the worldwide network of remote sites, to be 
monitored by someone from the Department of Defense; a console to monitor the rocket; 
a flight director’s console; and a procedures console, which was the “hall monitor” and 
kept track of every procedure for every console in the configuration. Kraft noted that this 
last position would later be filled by his “alter-ego,” or right-hand man (even though he 
would be physically located on Kraft’s left side).11 
Sensitive to the needs of bureaucracy, Kraft noted that additional consoles would 
be needed, even if they were not directly related to flight operations.  Each operations 
director would need a place, as would senior officials from the Department of Defense, a 
                                                 
 
8 Interview with James M. Satterfield by Robert B. Merrifield, 13 March 1968, 5; Chris Kraft, 
Flight: My Life in Mission Control (New York, NY: Plume, 2002), 87. 
9 Kraft, 124. 
10 Ibid., 100; Ground control of the vehicle was not possible in the Mercury Control Center. Once 
the capsule was launched, ground control could only communicate with the vessel. Dethloff, 55. 
11 Kraft, 100-101. 
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public affairs officer, and contractors. All of these positions would work together to 
remotely monitor—and eventually control—spaceflight from a central location. A 
separate, adjacent command center was responsible for recovering the capsules.12 After 
dedicating so much careful thought to the design of Mercury Control, Kraft was 
understandably angered when rocket guru and German émigré Wernher von Braun said 
that ground control of a space flight was a “dumb idea.” Kraft recalled that if von Braun 
had said that phrase one more time, he might have punched him.13 This disagreement 
underscores the originality of Kraft’s ambition for ground control of spaceflight. 
 
Figure 2. The Mercury Control Center at Cape Canaveral utilized design principles later used in Houston. Source: 
NASA 
 
                                                 
 
12 Ibid., 102. 
13 Ibid., 103. 
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To supplement the consoles, contracted employees from Philco and Western 
Electric designed and built the huge, front wall display for Mission Control in Florida. It 
was a large map of the world, which tracked a capsule’s progress as it was detected by 
different tracking stations around the globe. Kraft was initially skeptical of its utility. He 
recalled, “It was a beautiful display. I understood what it was for, but I still thought it was 
superfluous.” He quickly changed his mind, however, admitting that “[t]he map was 
filled with vital information. The graphic format made it easy to grasp. A Mercury 
capsule symbol moved along the sine wave, or ground track. I knew instantly where it 
was.”14 Flight controller, and later Flight Director, Gene Kranz remembered the map in 
somewhat less glamorous terms, recalling watching a “toylike spacecraft model, 
suspended by wires, mov[ing] across the map to trace the orbit.”15 
 
Figure 3. This tracking icon, shaped like a Mercury capsule, was used to indicate the position of the spacecraft on the 
front display board in the Mercury Control Center. It is now in the collections of the National Air & Space Museum in 
Washington, DC. Source: NASM 
 
                                                 
 
14 Ibid., 133. 
15 Kranz, 22. 
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For the Mercury program, NASA was dealing with simple, one-man spacecraft. Once in 
space, there were no extravehicular activities (or “spacewalks”), nor any maneuvering, 
guidance, or rendezvous. The missions of Gemini and Apollo would require all of these 
tasks.16 And even Project Mercury’s relatively simple orbital missions, such that of John 
Glenn, first American in orbit, necessitated constant updating of equipment and 
procedures. The communications system was particularly limited, as there was no global 
voice network at the time; remote monitoring sites took up to fifteen minutes to respond 
to Mercury Control Center queries.17 The upcoming Gemini missions would demand 
more technologically complex monitoring, and the system would have to be completely 
retooled. NASA engineers and contractors recognized that off-the-shelf electronics gear 
would be insufficient to control future missions.18 They would need to custom-design an 
entirely new control center, and a cornerstone of this upgrade would be the computer 
system. 
The deficiencies of the Mercury Control Center computer further underscore the 
problem. The machines that ran the system at Cape Canaveral were actually located 
hundreds of miles away, in an IBM building on Washington, DC’s Pennsylvania Avenue. 
Tracking data was sent north from Florida, the computers in DC processed trajectories, 
then sent this information over telephone lines back to the Cape, and finally the 
information was available for display on the control center’s plot board. Glynn Lunney, 
                                                 
 
16 NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project, Oral History Transcript, Glynn S. Lunney 
interviewed by Roy Neal, Houston, Texas, 9 March 1998, pp. 12-26 – 12-27. 
17 Gene Kranz, Failure Is Not An Option: Mission Control From Mercury to Apollo 13 and 
Beyond (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 70. 
18 Dethloff, 85. 
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the Flight Dynamics Officer at Mercury Control, allowed that he found it “a relatively 
crude system.” There were not any television screens to display telemetry data, only 
mechanical meters.19 For the new center, this outdated meter system would be 
transitioned to a digital computing schema. This proposed upgrade worried some 
operators. NASA controller Rodney “Rod” Loe recalled that NASA men who had 
worked on Mercury felt more secure with viewing data on meters, because they were 
“hard meters, and the meters had limits, you could set [them]. You [could] pull a tab 
down, and then if the needle got above that tab, you’d get a red light.” This physical 
interaction with the consoles was important to its operators. As Loe explained, with 
digital computers, “Here was another piece of equipment that could fail, that would be 
between us and the spacecraft, and would cause us to lose data.” It was a concern that 
paralleled those of pilots transitioning to instrument flying—users needed to learn to trust 
the computers. To ease the transition, when computers replaced the meters in the later 
control center, data was displayed on digital representations of meters. Operators later 
admitted that it was silly to have the computer depict data on graphical meters, but it 
illustrates why the transition to a digital format was not an obvious choice.20 
 
                                                 
 
19 Glynn S. Lunney interviewed by Roy Neal, NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project, 
Houston, Texas, 9 March 1998, pp. 12-11. 
20 T. Rodney “Rod” Loe interviewed by Carol L. Butler, NASA Johnson Space Center Oral 
History Project, Houston, Texas, 30 November 2001, pp. 1-2; A great source for the exacts of the transition 
to Houston can be found in the in-house magazine, the Roundup!, which are archived online at: 
http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/history/roundups/roundups.htm. For example, one article details how a Gemini 
simulator went on display at the old Mercury Control Center after the move to Houston, thus initiating 
public exposure to these spaces of control. “‘Old MCC’ At Cape Refitted with Gemini Mission Simulator,” 
The Roundup! 8 January 1964. 
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Moving to Houston 
The change from meters to digital displays exemplifies the scope of changes needed 
within the Mission Control Room to support the next decade of planned NASA missions. 
The number of upgrades required was too large to implement within the existing space in 
Cape Canaveral. Kraft noted, “To manage and control missions to the moon, we’d need a 
new and bigger center, along with changes still unknown in the worldwide tracking 
network.”21 In 1961, Chris Kraft, along with fellow NASA employees Dennis Fielder, 
Tec Roberts and John Hodge, initiated a study to determine the location for a new 
command center.22 After rejecting a move to the Goddard Space Flight Center, due to that 
facility’s small size and managerial conflicts, Kraft and his team looked to other potential 
sites. NASA administrators required that the location include: “access to water 
transportation by large barges, a moderate climate, availability of all-weather commercial 
jet service, a well established industrial complex with supporting technical facilities and 
labor, close proximity to a culturally attractive community in the vicinity of an institution 
of higher education, a strong electric utility and water supply, at least 1000 acres of land, 
and certain specified cost parameters.”23 Houston fit the bill on almost all of these counts, 
and it surely did not hurt that it was located within Vice-President Lyndon Johnson’s 
home state of Texas, as well as in the congressional district of Albert Thomas, the 
chairman of the body that oversaw NASA’s budget.24 The city of Houston 
enthusiastically welcomed the space agency and was particularly pleased that local firms 
                                                 
 
21 Kraft, 144. 
22 Dethloff, 85. 
23 Ibid., 36; 38. 
24 Dethloff, 41; Kranz, 81. 
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received 29 of NASA’s 32 subcontracts for the design and construction of the site.25 On 
19 September 1961, NASA announced that a new “spaceflight laboratory” would be 
located in Houston on 1000 acres of land that was donated to the government by Rice 
University (another 600 acres were purchased to give the site direct access from the 
highway).26 Gene Kranz later admitted that he initially thought that the control center 
should have remained near the launch site in Cape Canaveral, but it was convenient to be 
located near a feeder university like the University of Houston, from which NASA could 
recruit young people with technical training in subjects like cryogenics and computers, 
and who lent a “youthful exuberance” to the workplace.27 
                                                 
 
25 Stephen B. Oates, “NASA’s Manned Spacecraft Center at Houston, Texas,” The Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 3 (January 1964), 370. 
26 Dethloff, 33; 48. 
27 Eugene F. Kranz interviewed by Roy Neal, NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History Project, 




Figure 4. Overhead view of the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston. Source: NASA. 
 
The Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC), as NASA officially named the complex, 
was built about 28 miles south of downtown Houston, close to the shore of Clear Lake, 
which provided access into Galveston Bay.28 Within the 1600-acre site, NASA built 
Building 30, which housed the Mission Control Center, in November 1964.29 This three-
story structure consisted of (1) a Mission Operations Wing, (2) an Operations Support 
Wing, and (3) an interconnecting Lobby Wing. The Mission Operations Wing was built 
by the Army Corps of Engineers and a general contractor, ETS-Holden-Galvin. The 
                                                 
 
28 Kraft, 171. 
29 “Real Property Record – Buildings,” from “MCC History Notes.pdf,” JSC History Office. 
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Corps of Engineers selected the architect and construction firms. Their choice—the Texas 
firm Brown & Root and the designer Charles Luckman of Los Angeles—received a $1.5 
million design contract for the center.30 Once the building’s exterior structure was in 
place, the interior space was ready to be outfitted with computers, communications links, 
and consoles. 
To meet Gemini mission requirements, the new Mission Control Center needed 
real-time data displays. Flight controllers would be stationed at consoles, as they had 
been at the center in Florida, at which they would receive critical mission information via 
computer screens. This space was officially named the Mission Operations Control Room 
(MOCR), and there were actually two of them: identical and located on the second and 
third floors of Building 30.31 These Flight Control Rooms (or FCRs, pronounced 
‘Fickers’) were where flight controllers got information from personal console computer 
displays, or from projected displays on the wall at the front of the room, where they 
would work “feverishly at their consoles, headsets in place.” The third floor FCR was 
primarily designated to monitor the Department of Defense payloads, but either space 
could be used as NASA’s manned spaceflight mission control, or two missions could be 
conducted simultaneously.32 These innovative spaces, each approximately 100,000 square 
feet, housed the people who directed America’s space program. These rooms became 
commonly known among the public as “Mission Control.”33 While the accomplishments 
                                                 
 
30 Dethloff, 48. 
31 “MCC: Mission Control Center,” from “MCC History Notes.pdf,” JSC History Office. 
32 “NASA Facts: Mission Control Center,” from “MCC History Notes.pdf,” JSC History Office. 
33 In NASA and Philco documentation, it is also referred to as the Integrated Mission Control 
Center (IMCC). The name is shortened for both brevity and adherence to common usage. 
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of the Mission Controllers have been well-documented in popular media, its origin story 
has remained largely untold. Its construction was, in fact, an investment in innovation on 
the part of NASA, one that should be largely credited to the contractors who created a 
control room for the future. 
Remembering the Contractors 
Prior to the construction of Building 30, NASA hired two contractors to design the 
computer system and operational layout of Mission Control. In 1962, IBM was awarded 
the Real Time Computer Complex (RTCC) contract to build a complex digital command 
system which could control the Gemini spacecraft, its target vehicle Agena, and the 
Apollo craft. The final design consisted of five IBM 7094 IBM main processors using a 
customized IBM operating system. This system processed “telemetry, trajectory and 
command data. The data was routed to recorders, meters, and the digital-to-TV 
displays.”34 Also in 1962, Philco-Ford was contracted to perform a development study for 
“Manned Space Flight Operation Control and Support” in Houston. Primarily a human 
engineering study, it explored how data processing and display systems, which would be 
powered by the underlying IBM architecture, would work together in a holistic way that 
promised missioned success.35 Philco may seem an odd candidate for designer of 
NASA’s Mission Control Center, but the company—once a pioneer in early radio and 
television products—had changed hands and focus by the 1960s. Philco had begun 
                                                 
 
34 Letter from Robert D. Legler to John Getter titled “Responses to Questions About Historical 
Mission Control,” 7 April 1997, from “Facts About MCC.pdf,” JSC History Office. 
35 Transcript of oral history interview with Walter LaBerge, conducted at behest of NASA, 31 July 
1968. Walter edited the transcript and sent it to Robert B. Merrifield at the Manned Spacecraft Center on 4 
December 1968, 1. Courtesy Philip LaBerge. 
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cultivating aerospace contacts Ford Motor Company acquired the enterprise in December 
1961.36 A former employee speculated that Ford’s acquisition of Philco was a marketing 
ploy meant to cultivate a high-tech image to sell to the well-funded space program.37 
Regardless of the company’s motivations, the strategy worked. In 1963, Philco-Ford 
Western Development Laboratories was awarded the NASA contract for the design, 
development, implementation, maintenance, and operation of the Mission Control Center 
in Houston (MCC-H). This contract required that Philco-Ford WDL establish the Philco-
Ford Houston Operations (PHO), which would be awarded further contracts for 
maintaining and upgrading the center in the following years.38 In 1965, for example, 
Philco replaced almost 400 black-and-white scanners with color televisions in Mission 
Control.39 
                                                 
 
36 Carlos A. Altgelt, “A Brief History of Philco,” accessed 2 November 2012 at URL: 
http://www.oldradio.com/archives/hardware/philco.htm; Early history available in William Balderson, 
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37 For My Children, the unpublished memoirs of Walter LaBerge (1996): 131. Courtesy Philip 
LaBerge. 
38 Ray Loree, “MCC Development History,” 1990, p. 1, from “Ray Loree MCC History.pdf,” JSC 
History Office; “Contractual History of Major Implementation and Operations Milestones,” 10 January 
1985, from “Contractual MCC History.pdf,” JSC History Office. 
39 Press Release, Ford Motor Company, “Philco Corp. – Mission Control Center in Houston – Dr. 
W. B. LaBerge,” no date, Ford Motor Company LaBerge Presentation press release no date.pdf. Ford 




Figure 5. Photo signed by Chris Kraft sends best wishes to Walt LaBerge. Courtesy: Philip LaBerge 
 
So much support was needed, in fact, that a headquarters for Philco Houston 
Operations was built near the Manned Spacecraft Center, which accommodated 
approximately 500 employees.40 Philco advertisements from the time detailed visions of 
the future as a time when many tasks would be automated by computers and processes 
would be visualized on gigantic television screens.41 NASA directors, such as Chris 
Kraft, held the same sort of vision for their Mission Control, although they insisted that 
responsibilities be delegated to particular flight consoles in the same way that they had 
                                                 
 
40 Press Release, Philco Corporation News Department, 17 March 1965, Philco Mission Control 
Center Facts and Figures press release 3-17-1965.pdf, Ford Motor Company Archives. 




been at the Mercury Control Center.42 It was Philco’s job to implement this vision in 
Houston. The project was spearheaded by Philco’s program director for the design of the 
MCC, Walter “Walt” LaBerge. Born near the north side of Chicago in 1924, he was 
inclined toward a liberal arts education, especially after covering sports for his high 
school newspaper, but his father convinced him that pursuing an applied science 
education at Notre Dame would be more prudent from a job security standpoint.43 
LaBerge went to the university in 1941 as a physics major, and also enrolled in Notre 
Dame’s ROTC (Reserve Officers Training Corps) program. In July 1943, due to the 
escalation of the Second World War, he and his classmates became full-time Navy 
seamen. Upon graduation with a bachelor of Naval Science degree in January 1944, 
LaBerge was commissioned and sent to active duty. After the war, he returned to Notre 
Dame to finish his Bachelors of Science degree in physics, and due to the opportunity 
afforded by the GI Bill, he decided to pursue a PhD in the field. After completing his 
graduate work, and due to his Naval Reserve status, he relocated to the Naval Ordnance 
Test Station, China Lake in the middle of the Mojave Desert. Walt noted in retrospect 
that jobs were lean, as physicists were not yet in high demand, as they would be after 
Sputnik ushered in the space race.44 While at China Lake, Walt co-invented the 
                                                 
 
42 For an impressive detailing of the functions of every console during the Apollo setup, see Lee 
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Sidewinder heat-seeking air-to-air missile, for which he received much acclaim, and 
which brought him to Philco-Ford.  
 
Figure 6. Walt LaBerge poses in front of an SR-71 Blackbird. Courtesy: Philip LaBerge. 
 
Philco Research Laboratory in Philadelphia was contracted to manufacture the 
production version of the Sidewinder guidance unit. In 1957, the head of the Philco team 
asked LaBerge if he would be interested in joining him in a new Philco venture in Palo 
Alto, California; the company had recently received a contract from Lockheed in 
Sunnyvale that necessitated a local presence. Walt decided to leave government service 
and try his hand at a management position in the private sector. It was an exciting time to 
join the aerospace industry. In 1961, President Kennedy committed the nation to sending 
a man to the moon before the end of the decade, and the industry scrambled to design 
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rockets, spacecraft, and ground launch and control systems. To secure the contract for the 
design of the Mission Control Center for Philco-Ford, LaBerge cited the company’s 
impressive high-tech track record in a presentation given to NASA executives. He noted 
that Philco’s Western Development Laboratories had developed Courier, the first active 
repeater satellite; had performed classified work for the Air Force; and had constructed 
military antennas and telescopes as part of a military communications satellite system.45 
He recalled the atmosphere in which he gave the presentation as quite intimidating. 
“[Chris Kraft] and his staff were clustered around an auditorium built like a gladiator’s 
fighting pit,” he wrote in his memoirs. “It was so much so that I almost blurted out as I 
began my presentation the traditional ‘We who are about to die salute you.’”46 Joking 
aside, LaBerge thought in retrospect that the selection officials at NASA chose Philco 
because they were convinced that the contractor could meet deadlines and would be easy 
to work with. The resulting contract was worth $33.8 million out of the total MCC cost of 
$100 million.47 
LaBerge was named the general operations manager of Philco’s Houston 
operation, for which he headed a task force which included scientists, engineers, 
technicians, and administrative personnel. He had a difficult time recruiting for this 
venture, probably because, as LaBerge admitted, “[Houston] was thought to be about the 
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world’s worst place to live.”48 NASA had the same problem; the hurricane-prone, humid 
area lacking in cultural amenities did not entice recruits. It soon became apparent that 
Walt’s team was not large enough to complete the “low-tech, manually intensive” work 
of wiring connectors to computers to consoles and then making and verifying “literally a 
zillion connections.”49 Further, the Philco team initially did not have good relationships 
with IBM, the Real Time Computer Complex contractor. Walt mused that the computer 
company had a superiority complex and did not appreciate being subcontractor to 
Philco.50 It was Philco’s decision, however, that the RTCC used a five IBM 7094 
configuration for Mission Control, instead of opting for its own systems, which resulted 
in a $36 million dollar contract for Big Blue.51 James “Jim” Satterfield, an aerospace 
technologist for NASA, concurred that “[IBM] sure didn’t want anybody like Philco 
telling them what to do.”52 It was necessary to cultivate a professional working 
relationship, however, as the computers and the display systems needed to be integrated. 
The project moved along after a slow start, and the Philco team soon was responsible for 
constructing one of the most iconic control rooms in American history.  
While LaBerge’s administrative acumen led to the successful completion of the 
Mission Control Room, other men played large roles in the technical design and 
implementation of technologies within the space. One was Otto G. Schwede, a German 
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scientist brought to the United States after the Second World War as part of Project 
Paperclip. Born in 1912, Otto Schwede was one of 12 German scientists—primarily 
aircraft, rocket, and missile specialists—brought to work at the Naval Air Missile Test 
Center in Point Mugu, California in 1947. Schwede became Technical Director for the 
Range Instrumentation department there, and filed a number of patents during the 1950s, 
including the Angular Discriminating Ocular Device, an Engine Fuel Flow Regulator, 
and an Isotope Separator.53 By 1960, all of these émigrés had left Point Mugu either to 
start their own companies or to work in private industry.54 Along with fellow Paperclip 
Theodore Sturm, who had headed the Guidance Division at Point Mugu and had worked 
on the V-2 program in Germany, Schwede founded an industrial research laboratory, the 
Electronic Systems Development Corporation in Ventura, California. The company 
focused on special purpose digital and analog computers, solid state electronic devices, 
liquid rocket engine control malfunction protection systems, and other instrumentation 
and control systems. One former employee recalled that Schwede and Sturm were 
“brilliant guys.”55 With his credentials, is no wonder that Schwede was recruited by 
Philco to be Chief Engineer in Houston, responsible for designing the technical aspects of 
the Mission Control Center. LaBerge referred to Schwede as “a “crusty old German 
Paper Clip” while also asserting that he “truly enjoyed and trusted Otto, but most 
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everyone else feared to work with him because of his unbridled competence.”56 
Schwede’s work for Philco is preserved in the comprehensive technical reports that he 
prepared for NASA, which showcase the Philco team’s design choices. 
 
Figure 7. Proposed model of the MCC produced by Philco. Source: NARA. 
 
The first report in a series of eight prepared for NASA by Philco in 1962 focused 
on what facilities would be required within MCC. The company considered the needs of 
the room in great detail, giving thought to demands involving power, structural integrity, 
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air-conditioning, noise levels, and personnel access to equipment.57 With this foundation, 
the next document considered how equipment would be integrated to support Gemini and 
Apollo. Particular attention was paid to display consoles, data processing systems, and 
communications requirements.58 Displays were a crucial component, as they provided the 
interface between mission personnel and the systems, and they needed to convey 
information as quickly as possible so that a console operator could react to the data. 
Philco determined, out of numerous display formats such as text, graphs, diagrams, and 
clocks, that alphanumeric text would be optimal in most situations. Drawings, however, 
were determined to be more effective for displaying flight paths and maps; although 
“written language is now one of man’s most indispensable tools of communication, it is 
not necessarily the simplest or most efficient means of representing thoughts.”59 
Designers aspired to be as flexible as possible with displays while also staying 
within a reasonable budget.60 A second major decision with regard to the display system 
was the amount of information that should be shown on console screens, as the human 
eye can only observe so much data at one time. Thirdly, Philco considered what 
information should be visible on the group displays in the front of the room, which were 
ten feet high and totaled 60 feet in width, and to what extent this information should 
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replicate or supplement data available at consoles.61 The Philco team thought that the 
group display was advantageous for a number of reasons, including: allowing the group 
to efficiently coordinate its efforts, reducing the amount of equipment needed, providing 
operational reliability through its redundant nature, and providing a feeling of continued 
participation to temporarily idle operators.62 The console displays, however, also had their 
advantages. These screens could display specific information needed by a particular user, 
and the displays could be changed without disrupting the work of others.63 Every decision 
was considered from the standpoint of guaranteeing mission success. 
Modernized communications were an essential part of the control room. Colonel 
Charles “Chuck” Abbitt had spent a portion of his US Air Force career as the Department 
of Defense chief who coordinated the Mercury missions. In 1963, a flight surgeon 
grounded him for glaucoma in both eyes, and Abbitt applied for disability retirement at 
the age of 43. The Air Force only offered 30 percent of his retirement package, so when 
Abbitt visited Walter LaBerge in Houston and was offered a job, he took it. Abbitt’s new 
position was manager of the Ground Operations Support System (GOSS) unification 
project for Philco Houston Operations, pending Abbitt’s retirement from the Air Force.64 
Abbitt’s assignment as manager of the GOSS project was to maintain successful 
communication with the different actors involved in a space flight. These players 
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included astronauts aboard spacecraft, as well as operators at worldwide tracking stations, 
launch facilities, and launch and recovery control complexes.65 These spaces would be 
integrated by a communications network, with the Mission Control Center serving as the 
focal point. The arrangement of these systems required consensus between the various 
contractors involved. According to Abbitt, there was “much bickering” between Univac 
(the communications contractor), IBM (the computer contractor), and Philco (the lead 
contractor) about whether or not the center would be ready to control Gemini IV. Philco 
wanted to err on the side of caution, but Chris Kraft decided to make the center prime—
that is, the primary control space—for Gemini IV. The mission was a success, especially 
because it included an American astronaut’s first spacewalk.66 LaBerge recalled that 
Abbitt did an excellent job of making the various contractors “mesh in a fruitful way.”67 
Functioning together, display, communications, and data monitoring systems resulted in 
an integrated command center. Philco workers deliberately understated their role as 
technical management, as “actual control of the manned spacecraft…rests ultimately with 
the astronauts.”68 
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Figure 8. The MCC-H came online as the primary control center for Apollo 4. Source: NASA. 
 
Building a Legacy for NASA 
Center personnel needed to be able to predict all possible contingencies and provide 
solutions in the event that plans changed or equipment malfunctioned. If, for example, the 
spacecraft crew were responsible for rendezvous with another vehicle, it was the job of 
ground support to “provide the crew with the necessary information regarding the status 
and attitude of the target vehicle, and the required maneuvers necessary to effect 
docking.”69 Along with this responsibility, Philco listed almost 60 explicit tasks that 
Mission Control must monitor and complete during a spaceflight mission. The design of 
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the control center made these tasks possible. The Gemini program can be regarded as an 
intermediary set of missions in which tasks that would be vital to Apollo, such as 
rendezvous between two orbiting vehicles, were proven feasible. But it was also an 
essential program in its own right. Philco realized that the engineering feats of Gemini 
were no less important than the over-arching political aim of NASA’s organizational 
agenda: “Establish the U.S.A as the first nation to achieve manned lunar landing and 
return (alive).”70 In order to accomplish this goal, administrators and technicians at Philco 
knew that the system needed to be mission-specific while also having a flexible 
architecture that would enable trouble-shooting and on-the-fly fixes. Philco created an 
information flow plan to support the Apollo missions, based on NASA-expressed mission 
concepts. As in its assessment of Gemini, Philco asserted that the primary function of 
mission control was to “give as much responsibility as possible to the astronauts and the 
on-board systems” while remaining alert and ready to support the astronauts from the 
ground station.71 The Control Center was labeled a “major information source” for the 
completion of a mission. The MCC computer provided the ability to generate information 
based on tracking and navigation data from a spacecraft (or ephemeris, which is a table of 
coordinates of an orbiting body tabulated at constant intervals in time). This data would 
be sent to the Flight Dynamics Officer and other crew members to enable them to make 
mission-crucial recommendations, such as maneuver thrust, which was used to orient the 
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vehicle.72 This example illustrates that the MCC was a dynamic space whose design was 
created and implemented with almost every possible contingency considered. The Philco 
team’s integration of display, communication, and data-processing technologies within 
the Center made a manned mission to the Moon possible.  
In March 1965, Mission Control came online to serve as a backup for the Gemini 
III mission. In June 1965, MCC-H became the primary control center for all manned 
NASA flights. Chris Kraft was satisfied when the space was completed, noting that “[t]he 
Houston center was spacious, the computers were faster and had much more capacity, the 
modern intercom system worked, and we were surrounded by support rooms where 
bright young systems people kept us supplied with every detail we requested. The words 
control center now encompassed all of it.”73 The design drew inspiration from control 
centers of the past, but its high-tech components had necessitated novel interior 
architecture. While worldwide communications had been pioneered by the Department of 
Defense in construction of the North American Air Defense Command and DEW Line 
radar defense systems, most of this work was classified, so little experience of those 
systems was available to those who designed NASA’s control center. These types of 
innovations were left to NASA and their contractors. According to NASA’s official 
history, “Human spaceflight ‘drove’ a reformation and near revolution in the civilian 
sector of communications and computer technology.”74 Ford Motor Company recalled its 
accomplishment proudly: “The project transformed science fiction into reality, because it 
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meant that manned space activities would be conducted with full ‘Earth Control’—a big 
leap at the time.”75 NASA executive James Satterfield asserted that Philco’s ability to 
complete the contract was due to Walt LaBerge’s acumen as a technical administrator. 
Satterfield recalled that Walt “was a very smooth talker and a very competent technical 
person. I believe he could sell anybody anything if he set his mind to it.”76 
 
Figure 9. The MCC projected the face of celebratory victory after the feat of Apollo 11. Source: NASA. 
 
The Mission Control Room has been called the “most highly automated 
information correlation center in existence,” because of the vast amount of information it 
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received, organized, and displayed. Data included the heartbeats of astronauts, space-suit 
temperatures, and almost 300 other types of information related to spaceflight.77 In 1965, 
Philco Corporation reported that the Mission Control Center housed the largest assembly 
of television switching equipment in the world—larger even than commercial studios in 
New York City—as well as the “largest solid-state switching matrices of 20 megacycle 
bandwidth.” This system was driven by more than 1100 cabinets of electronics 
equipment, 140 command consoles, 136 television cameras, and 384 television receivers. 
According to Gene Kranz, “This room [was] bathed in this blue-gray light that you get 
from the screen, so it's sort of almost like you see in the movies kind of thing.”78 Ten-
thousand miles of wire connected this behemoth, with more than two million wire 
connections. All of this construction resulted in a highly sophisticated system that was 
capable of storing high-density, real-time data on server computers, which was then 
accessible to many different users via primitive client software.79 Philco developed a TV 
matrix that enabled operators to call one of up to 20 television stations for display on 
their console.80 John “Jack” Garman, who advised flight controllers during the Apollo 
missions and later served as a NASA executive, recalled the awe that the space inspired: 
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“So when you walked into mission control…what you saw down on the first floor, was 
all these big IBM mainframes with the spinning tape drives and the lights blinking and all 
that…It doesn’t mean anything to anybody today. That’s how computers work today, 
right? But in those days, if you spent your life in front of a keyboard typing punch cards 
and when the computer ran, you got it back on paper, to be able to see things happening 
on the screen in real time was absolutely awesome, particularly if you knew anything 
about computers.”81 
Another key feature of the Mission Control Center was redundancy. Every piece 
of equipment in the room had a spare or auxiliary. The Real Time Computer Complex 
housed five IBM 7094 computers, of which two were needed to coordinate a mission, and 
the remaining three could either operate as redundant spares or be used for training for 
future missions.82 The electrical power supply was backed up by diesel-driven generators, 
in the event that the Center lost electricity from Houston Light and Power.83 But even 
beyond the high-tech equipment and dazzling displays, the Mission Control Room 
expressed an intangible spirit that the work being conducted in this space was important. 
In Gene Kranz’s words: “…[It is] the room's atmosphere, it's the smell of the room, and 
you can tell people have been in there for a long period of time. There's enough stale 
pizza hanging around and stale sandwiches and the wastebaskets are full. You can smell 
the coffee that's been burned into the hot plate in there. But you also get this feeling that 
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this is a place something's going to happen at. I mean, this is a place sort of like the docks 
where Columbus left, you know, when he sailed off to America or on the beaches when 
he came on landing.”84 The space also held an odor of stale cigarettes, as smoking was 
not banned until 1987.85 
NASA scientist James Head III recalled that during missions, everyone in the 
control center was pumped up on adrenaline and oblivious to the outside world. “It’s like, 
there are just no windows,” he said, “so you can be in there for days and not know what’s 
going on [outside].”86 Unfortunately, there was unequal access to this awe-inspiring 
space. Women were not allowed out on the floor of the Mission Control Operations 
Room. Engineer Jeanne Crews recalled that she “spent many times on the Skylab 
experiments in the back rooms, and then if I’d walk in the elevator, there would be 
comments by the two people I referred to, like, ‘Well, it’s certainly good we keep women 
out of the Mission Control.’”87 Nor were the systems perfect; operators constantly revised 
the room’s features. For example, one NASA official recalled that “We had problems 
with people leaning over the consoles and touching buttons and switches, and so we 
wanted a cover on the command switches. We had a good idea, but people didn't know 
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how to do it, so guys would take the plastic home and cook them in the oven, and that's 
how we made the first ones. There was a lot of creativity by people like that.”88  
Further, Mission Control used a pneumatic tube system to carry hardcopy messages and 
printouts of the television displays.89 Hundreds of messages littered the floor after hectic 
shifts. As Gene Kranz remembered it, after one such day, flight controller officer John 
Llewellyn, “a former Marine, stood up, stretched, and in a voice for all to hear declared: 
‘I think I am back in the trenches again with my fire control team, surrounded by empty 
105 howitzer canisters.’”90 Despite these exceptions, the MCC was as technologically 
state-of-the art as possible, and its innovative qualities cannot be exaggerated. The MCC 
not only served to facilitate  NASA’s spaceflight goals, but its design aesthetic added an 
archetypal control center space to America’s cultural consciousness, as well as bolstered 
the prestige of the space program. 
With all of its press coverage, Americans came to identify Mission Control with 
the Gemini and Apollo spaceflight accomplishments between 1965 and 1972. Johnson 
Space Center historian Jennifer Ross-Nazzal rightly noted that “One of the most popular 
images was taken after the Apollo 11 crew safely returned home and features flight 
controllers celebrating the conclusion of the first successful mission to the moon.”91 After 
years of coming in second to the USSR, this space came to symbolize American 
technological and political might during in the Cold War. NASA’s sociopolitical purpose 
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was “civil offense.” The space agency attacked the Soviet Union with each successful 
mission in the war for technological supremacy, world recognition, and economic 
dominance.  
 
Figure 10. Much of the center’s original hardware served well into the STS years. Source: NASA. 
 
Given this triumphalist history, today many people feel elated at the thought of 
taking a visit to this historic site. As one journalist observed, “Some people are awed 
when they go to St. Paul's Basilica, others by visiting Disney World. To me, neither place 
holds a candle to the Johnson Space Center—this is the place where, 50 years ago, men 
and women helped execute the greatest engineering achievement in all of human 
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history.”92 Even John McCullough, head of NASA’s flight director office in 2011, could 
not help referring to Building 30 as a “cathedral of spaceflight.” A former flight director, 
in response, chuckled at the hyperbole but asserted that it was, indeed, a very important 
space: “When you take people’s lives in your hands, it’s a serious business. It’s a serious 
responsibility. And we do it in full public view.”93  
Concluding Remarks 
In 2011, NASA renamed Johnson Space Center’s Building 30 the Christopher C. Kraft 
Mission Control Center. Then JSC Director Michael Coats lauded Kraft in a speech: “He 
is a space pioneer without whom we’d never have heard those historic words on the 
surface of the moon, ‘Houston, Tranquility base here. The Eagle has landed.’ Those 
words effectively put Houston, and this building behind us, on the intergalactic map 
forever.”94 Gene Kranz similarly acknowledged Kraft’s contributions: 
I think Kraft’s name, Christopher Columbus, was entirely appropriate for this guy 
because he was the pioneer in Mission Control. He launched each one of the 
Mercury missions. But most important, he was the mentor, the teacher, the tutor 
for this first generation of young people who became known as Mission 
Controllers. He set the mold for everything that would be done thereafter; and in 
particular, he set the mode for the flight director and the flight director being able 
to take any action necessary for crew safety and mission success.95 
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Kraft certainly deserves the praise lavished upon him for directing NASA operations and 
supervising the landing of men on the Moon, among many other accomplishments. 
NASA, however, also owes debts to the contractors who imagined and implemented the 
high-tech systems that made the feats of manned spaceflight possible. What they created 
was an embodiment of a commitment to centralization coupled with high-technology that 




CHAPTER 3. The Most Secret Site Ever Publicized, HQ SAC 
 
Secrecy Classification: RESTRICTED 
 
 “The events of World War II clearly show us that the days of the slow moving war are 
gone. Air power has no regard for geographical barriers. – Distance holds no terror for it. 
– And the sun need not shine for it to operate. 
That was one lesson the past war taught us.” 
 
- Excerpt from a Speech by General Curtis E. LeMay 
Albany Hotel, Denver, Colorado, 16 March 1949.1 
 
 
“SAC’s vigilance—day and night, fair weather or foul—keeps 
us alive and free to pursue happiness as we choose.” 
 




The Strategic Air Command’s headquarters is a prime example of how a physical space 
encapsulated American response to the technological development of the atomic bomb, 
as its architecture represented the national policies of containment and deterrence. This 
narrative extends the analysis of Paul Edwards’ The Closed World by showing how the 
Cold War was actually a story of controlling the battlefield from a distance, and of not 
tactical, but strategic defense. Although billed as a secret site, the headquarters of the 
Strategic Air Command was never much of a secret. Popular American films brought 
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attention to the space. Sometimes they praised the creation of the subterranean HQ, such 
as in Strategic Air Command and A Gathering of Eagles—both Air Force-sanctioned 
films. At other times, as in the case of the satirical Dr. Strangelove: Or How I Stopped 
Worrying and Love the Bomb, movie producers had to muster a creative vision for what 
the headquarters looked like, as they were denied access to the site.  
 
Figure 11. The war room in Dr. Strangelove is an infamous portrayal of a Cold War space of control. Source: 
Columbia Pictures. 
 
Historian and former SAC KC-97 navigator and intelligence officer Bruce 
Franklin noted that, starting around 1949, “endless propaganda sought to convince the 
American people that they were living in peril of an imminent nuclear attack from the 
Soviet Union.” Within this context, some films portrayed SAC as an effective deterrent 
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that could retaliate if necessary. Kubrick, however, “saw that the subject was too bizarre 
for realism” and critiqued the absurdity of Mutually Assured Destruction in Dr. 
Strangelove.3 The point is that the Soviets knew about the existence of this space, and the 
US military wanted them to, because the command and control center was as much a 
signifier of the policy of deterrence as were long-range bombers. This was deterrence 
through architecture, and the headquarters’ design highlights the particular Cold War 
mentality of survival instinct mixed with paranoia and some (PR-manufactured) 
reassurance. 
The Strategic Air Command (SAC) adopted the motto “Peace is Our Profession” 
in 1957, as its global bombing force and sophisticated command center were meant to 
intimidate would-be attackers into holding back on an offensive strike. SAC’s mission 
was to “convinc[e] hostile nations of the futility of starting a global war.”4 After all, if 
nations starting using nuclear weapons, then the true value of nuclear weapons—their 
ability to deter war—would be lost.5 Thus, the Air Force’s commitment was to an 
“efficient global striking force” that would satisfy the role of a nuclear deterrent.6 
Another element was crafted to serve the same purpose: a modern, technologically 
sophisticated command and control center that could deploy bombers to their targets at a 
moment’s notice and withstand nuclear attack. Studying the creation of headquarters 
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SAC as a snapshot in time allows for a deeper understanding of how computing and 
communications technologies, coupled with Cold War imperatives, created an 
atmosphere in which the construction of a command and control center—one in which 
global actions and warfare could be conducted from a centralized, remote location—was 
possible.  Not only that, the center’s architecture symbolizes both the anxiety of the Cold 
War era and the belief that technology offered the solution to avoiding Armageddon. This 
was a time in which revolutionary technological change and revolutionary cultural 
change were inextricably linked.7 
Origins of the Strategic Air Command 
The Strategic Air Command was formally established on 21 March 1946 as one of three 
major US-based combat subcommands of the United States Army Air Force, the other 
two being the Tactical Air Command and the Air Defense Command.8 The Strategic Air 
Command was a particularly influential subcommand because it was assigned control of 
the Air Force’s arsenal of nuclear weapons, a role formally assigned to it on 1 May 1946. 
As the arsenal grew over the years, so did the strength of SAC. The nation’s store of 
nuclear weapons had increased significantly by 1951, to 650, and grew at a quickened 
pace, with an arsenal of 5,450 nukes available in 1957.9 In October 1946, SAC moved 
operations from Bolling Field in Maryland to the neighboring Andrews Air Force Base, 
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tasked with conducting global offensive operations.10 Within two years, defense officials 
were scouting for a new location for SAC headquarters—one further away from the 
nation’s capital, which was considered a prime Soviet target. The Secretary of the Air 
Force, Stuart Symington, decided upon Offutt Air Force Base, just outside of Omaha, 
Nebraska, due to its “midcontinent location, good runways, large hangars, and 
comfortable offices, [and]…vital advantage of public support.”11 While long-time 
Commander-in-Chief SAC Curtis LeMay is often credited with insisting on a move away 
from Andrews, in his memoirs, he asserts that the decision to relocate had already been 
decided prior to his arrival at his post at SAC.12 
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Figure 12. Outside of Offutt Air Force Base, a billboard displayed the motto of the Strategic Air Command, “Peace is 
Our Profession.” Source: US Air Force. 
 
Figure 13. A memorial bench outside of the Strategic Air & Space Museum in Ashland, Nebraska displays the motto of 
the Strategic Air Command. Source: Author’s photograph. 
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On 9 November 1949, SAC headquarters relocated to Offutt.13 The site in the 
center of the country soon became obsolete in an era of ICBMs, although the generally 
low-population density in southeastern Nebraska probably still made a strong case for the 
location.14 This meant that in the event of a direct attack only SAC personnel and a few 
hundred civilians would face elimination. This obviously did not ease the fears of 
residents of the region. Fallout shelter programs intensified. The Office of Defense, Civil 
Defense negotiated a contract with the University Extension Program at Lincoln for 
courses in radiological monitoring and in “Community Fallout and Shelter Management” 
in order to facilitate fallout shelter procedures.15 Administrators struggled to design 
shelters in the case of nuclear attack. One summarized his exasperation when he wrote, 
“Part of our dilemma is due to the fact that we do not know exactly what we are facing 
and how much of it we may have to face. It is somewhat like trying to provide a suit for a 
man whose size, weight and measurements you do not know—but you still have to 
provide a suit just the same.”16 
 
                                                 
 
13 Alwyn R. Lloyd, A Cold War Legacy, A Tribute to the Strategic Air Command, 1946-1992 
(Missoula, Montana: Pictorial Histories Publishing Company, Inc., 1999), 119. 
14 “By the time SAGE became fully operational in 1961, SAC bases were unprotectable [sic] 
anyway (because of ICBMS), and SAGE control centers would have been among the first targets destroyed 
in a nuclear war.” Paul N. Edwards, The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold 
War America (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 110. 
15 Request for Quotations from the Office of Civil Defense to the Board of Regents of the 
University of Nebraska at Lincoln March 1964, University Archives Special Collections University of 
Nebraska-Lincoln. Subject Files, to 1974 A – Civil D. Series No. 24/1/5 Box No. 1. Folder Civil Defense, 
1963/1964. 
16 W.A. Ross “The Role of School Personnel in Civil Defense,” 15 November 1950, University 
Archives Special Collections University of Nebraska-Lincoln. RG#05/15/01 Office of the Chancellor 




The Face of SAC: General Curtis Lemay  
Lieutenant General Curtis LeMay became Commanding General of Strategic Air 
Command on 19 September 1948, and was promoted to General on 29 October 1951. In 
April 1955 his title changed to Commander-in-Chief Strategic Air Command 
(CINCSAC).17 His tenure at SAC is seen by many Air Force historians to be the 
Command’s “golden age.”18 Depicted by some as trigger happy (indicated in the 
nickname “Bombs Away” LeMay), and by most as stubborn and authoritarian (evidenced 
by another nickname, “Old Iron Ass”), LeMay was the face of the Strategic Air 
Command for ten years, and his image continues to be inextricably linked with SAC. It is 
a portrait of a seasoned general who demanded perfection from those under his 
command, delivering orders with a cigar constantly between his teeth. One historian 
described him as a “man who wears a cigar like a cocked revolver. The fragrance of 
choice Havana leaf is always about him, a burnt masculine perfume.”19 The cigar served 
an addition image-making purpose. Due to prolonged exposure during flight at high 
altitude, LeMay suffered from Bell’s palsy, a type of facial paralysis. He smoked cigars 
to mask this condition.20 
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Figure 14. General Curtis LeMay directed SAC during its “golden age.” Source: USAF. 
 
The depiction of LeMay as a bomb-happy general à la General Buck Turgidson in 
Dr. Strangelove, eager to launch a pre-emptive strike, is not without basis. Its origins 
predominately lay in a damning statement attributed to LeMay in his autobiography. In 
this book, Mission With LeMay, written by himself and MacKinlay Kantor, he is quoted 
as saying that he wanted to bomb North Vietnam “back into the Stone Age.” This one 
sentence crystalized an image of LeMay in the minds of many Americans, much to his 
dismay. LeMay later said that his co-author had misquoted him, and he had actually said 
that the US had the capability to bomb North Vietnam back into the Stone Age, but this 
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statement either came too late or people had already hardened their opinions about the 
general.21 One Air Force historian condemns this portrayal: 
There are some who decry General LeMay as a megalomaniac who wanted to 
start World War III, but this is blatantly false. These pundits and historians claim 
that LeMay would exit his underground command post in Omaha to state “bomb 
‘em back into the stone age” and then retreat into his bunker. Some academicians 
hale [sic] those who demonize LeMay and unfortunately those who attempt [to] 
rewrite history in such a manner have little or no concept of what America and the 
free world was up against, or have an agenda of their own.22 
 
The debate will surely continue, but as long as quotes such as the following exist, but his 
own words belied his position as a peacekeeper. In a speech given to the Omaha Chamber 
of Commerce in 1948, he said that 
we must be ready to project American Air power to the skies of our enemy, 
destroy his sustaining resources and thereby prevent him from bringing the war to 
our country. Our targets will be the vital industrial complexes of his homeland, 
his critical materials, and the will of his people to sustain a major war.23 
 
As for the second common depiction of LeMay—that he was a tough man to work for 
and demanded perfection from those under his command—plenty of evidence exists to 
support this claim.24 In fact, he was brought to SAC for his dedication to detail and 
heavy-handed management style. When Curtis LeMay took the helm, SAC was in poor 
shape, mostly due to postwar demobilization and ineffective leadership. In the year 
before he was stationed at SAC, only two of 11 groups were ready to conduct operations, 
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crews were not trained, and aircraft were grounded.25 The small fleet was manned by 
poorly trained men who consistently failed in bombing competitions. In 1948, Senator 
Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) asked celebrated aviator Charles Lindbergh to evaluate the 
state of SAC’s facilities and methods. In his report, Lindberg asserted that crews were 
inadequately trained, living conditions were poor, and that the fleet was undermanned.26 
LeMay endeavored to remedy these shortcomings. He insisted that SAC achieve 
intercontinental range by supporting construction of the B-36 “Peacekeeper,” a piston 
engine bomber built in 1949 by Convair, and he encouraged the development of efficient 
aerial refueling for medium-range bombers.27 He was also committed to improving 
training and procedures, which after his initial inspection he found sorely deficient. 
LeMay recalled in his autography: “Soon after I went to Offutt some of the newspapers 
and magazines quoted me, while on a tour of SAC bases, as saying, ‘Today I found a 
sergeant guarding a hangar with a ham sandwich.’ I was quoted correctly. That was par 
for the course in SAC at the time.”28 
Operations improved slowly but surely. In 1948, sixty close-calls and minor 
accidents occurred per every 100,000 hours flown, and there were also injuries on the 
ground.29 To improve these figures, LeMay implemented checklists, and by 1950 SAC 
had the lowest accident rate in the Air Force.30 Yet there was still much room for 
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improvement. A RAND study in 1952 by Albert Wohlsetter stated that SAC’s forward 
bomber bases would be “easily annihilated by a surprise first strike.”31 The Strategic Air 
Command in the mid-1950s was far weaker than many people might have imagined. In 
1953, “SAC had only three combat ready wings, no accurate target intelligence, 
personnel turbulence, maintenance problems, inadequate overseas basing, and an aging 
bomber force.”32 Thankfully for SAC, the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb in 1949 
and the Korean War provided catalysts for an increased Air Force budget, and LeMay 
was able to move forward with his plans to revitalize the force.33 By 1955, SAC had 
almost 200,000 men and 2,800 aircraft stationed all over the world, ready to retaliate 
against the USSR. LeMay had secured 1,200 B-47 jet bombers, and pilots had logged 
more than a million hours of simulated combat flight.34 But there was still one addition 
that LeMay deemed necessary to making SAC an elite, modern deterrent force: a 
command and control headquarters. 
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Figure 15. View of Building 500, SAC headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base. Source: USAF. 
 
As early as 1950, LeMay cited the need for a new command post, but Air Force 
budget limitations continued to push back the date for its construction.35 Thus his 
operation remained for quite a few years in the original HQ SAC, a space that did not 
evoke the authority that one would expect from the epicenter of an elite military power. It 
was located in a vacant World War II Glenn L. Martin bomber plant that once produced 
B-26s and B-29s. LeMay recalled that, when he arrived in Nebraska, “There wasn’t much 
to Offutt except for a big bomber plant and a cockeyed runway ending in a steep bank.36 
LeMay insisted on constructing a new headquarters because, as one historian astutely 
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noted, “By themselves, of course, bomber and missile assets would achieve little in the 
absence of adequate command and control facilities.”37 In his autobiography, LeMay 
asserted: “We simply had to have a Headquarters and Control Center whereby we could 
be in instantaneous control of SAC bases scattered all over the United States and 
elsewhere in the world. And be in instantaneous touch with every plane we had in the 
air.”38 Yet LeMay encountered obstacles selling this need to the Air Force, which in turn 
had to justify the expense to the Secretary of Defense, the Bureau of the Budget, and 
Congress. 
The type of building he was requesting also created problems. LeMay firmly 
believed that the control center needed to be built underground, but the Truman 
administration said it would be far too expensive, so LeMay relented and solicited bids to 
build the center above ground. Then, in 1953, the Eisenhower administration halted 
construction and reviewed the project. Their assessment was, “How stupid can you get in 
this day and age, building a headquarters above ground? Don’t you know that you ought 
to be below ground?”39 Development eventually went ahead with construction of a 
headquarters that was partially above ground and partially below. Lieutenant General 
Francis H. Griswold, former vice commander of SAC, remembers an additional 
important detail. As told to historian Thomas Coffey in a 1983 interview: “LeMay was 
indeed frustrated in his efforts to procure a new headquarters. For six years, Congress and 
the Air Force had been throwing out plan after plan. And the outlook was bleak.” One 
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day, however, Griswold and LeMay got together and one of them said, “‘Let’s not call it 
a headquarters. Let’s call it a control center. No congressman’s got enough guts to say 
SAC can’t have a control center.’ And sure enough, the next year we got it into the 
budget.”40 
Building Headquarters SAC 
Construction began on the “Pentagon of the West” on 15 April 1955, with a tight 
completion deadline of little more than two years. The building’s 500,000 square feet of 
floor space required 14 acres of asphalt tile, its slab foundation required 30,000 yards of 
concrete, and it was air-conditioned by a 2,200 ton refrigeration system.41 Another huge 
component of the construction project was the drilling of a well 2,200 feet deep to 
provide the center with its own water supply.42 The Omaha area was well-served by this 
construction project, which poured more than $8 million into the local economy, 
augmenting Offutt Air Force Base’s preexisting annual payroll of almost $18 million.43 
The Omaha-based architectural firm Leo A. Daly was contracted to design the building. 
The firm was initially established in 1915 to specialize in church architecture. During the 
war, Leo Daly, Jr. joined his father’s firm and secured military work designing air bases. 
Leo Daly urged his father to get into government work, but his father grumbled that there 
was “too much red tape.” After his father’s death in 1952 and with the younger Daly’s 
inheritance of the firm, within years the business became “military and highways.” Leo 
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A. Daly began to specialize in “comprehensive architecture,” offering services from 
design and engineering to site selection and interior furnishing.44 Thus, the firm had the 
experience needed to design SAC’s new headquarters, which came with a price tag of 
almost $9 million.45 The underground structure was one of the first “hardened” facilities 
in the United States, meaning that both people and equipment would withstand anything 
but a direct hit by a high-yield nuclear weapon.46 Headquarters construction was 
completed on schedule, and on 26 January 1957 staff and equipment moved into Building 
500, otherwise known as HQ Strategic Air Command.47 
Building 500 was composed of two interconnected structures—an above-ground 
three-story administrative building, described by one historian as “completed in bland 
late-fifties style…like something from a typical Midwestern college campus,” and a 
three-level subterranean headquarters.48 The command post, along with its 
communications and computer equipment, was housed in the underground facility. To 
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enter this area from the above-ground headquarters, one went through a tunnel eight-feet 
in diameter, with two-foot thick reinforced concrete walls, descended a concrete ramp, 
and approached a set of seven by seven foot steel doors, which served as the gateway to 
the command and control center.49 If SAC were to have gone to war, these blast- and gas-
proof steel doors would have slammed shut, sealing off SAC operations, leaving it to 
operate on its emergency power system, well water supply, and other stored supplies.50 
The walls consisted of hardened reinforced concrete two feet thick; there were two ten-
inch thick intermediate floors, and the roof varied in thickness from two to four feet.51 
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Figure 16. In the subterranean headquarters, men on cherry-pickers updated walls of vital statistics, such as fleet 
locations. Source: NARA. 
 
Forty-six feet underground, the Commander-in-Chief Strategic Air Command 
(CINCSAC) and his battle staff monitored massive wall maps and plotting boards 
running along a 264-foot wall that were updated constantly with the location and status of 
all aircraft in the fleet worldwide.52 Before being replaced with video screens and 
projectors, the boards were updated manually by personnel in cherry-pickers, “making 
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the setting more theatrical through its frontal suspended lighting and drawn curtain.”53 
Computing technology was state of the art: an IBM 704 crunched numbers and supported 
the communications links which “permitted near-instantaneous contact with the forces at 
its disposal, with the National Command Authorities in Washington and with other major 
USAF commands.”54 Northwestern Bell, in conjunction with AT&T, was contracted to 
engineer the communications facilities for the subterranean command post. Lieutenant 
General Francis H. Griswold, vice commander of SAC, stated, “Communications is the 
basis of the war deterrent strength of the Strategic Air Command. It would be impossible 
to control and deploy a modern strategic air force without some effective means of 
communicating with its various elements.”55 An observer’s balcony overlooked the main 
floor, and provided a space from which the CINCSAC and his battle staff could monitor 
controllers on the lower level, manning desks and electronic consoles filled with lights, 
switches, and telephones.56 
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Figure 17. A few of the original phone consoles from HQ SAC are now on display at the Strategic Air & Space 
Museum in Ashland, NE. Source: Author’s photograph. 
 
Phones served as the primary means of receiving information and directing 
orders, and their roles were distinguished by colors. The notorious red phones put 
personnel in touch with every bomb wing, tanker wing, and (later) missile launch 
center.57 Next to these phones were banks of indicator lights, which allowed operators to 
acknowledge receipt of orders.58 In addition to the red phone, the Primary Alerting 
System that linked SAC to its bomber bases (and later missile sites), there were also: gold 
phones providing unsecured lines to the Pentagon, over which would come the order to 
go to war; black phones which encrypted a voice was sent from one end of the line and 
decoded at the other; gray phones that linked to other global SAC operations; blue phones 
connected to the command of the North American Air Defense Command; pink phones 
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used for normal, direct-dial calls; and white phones were part of the internal Offutt base 
system.59 
Maintaining communications in the control room was considered of the utmost 
importance. LeMay insisted on conducting frequent tests of the system’s potential 
vulnerabilities. In response to such tests, he received recommendations that radio be used 
in place of landlines in emergencies, and that existing landlines be re-routed around 
“potential target areas,” which were implemented.60 Beyond testing existing systems, 
LeMay was eager to implement new technology in the control room. To juggle both 
voice and text communications, a 607A manual switchboard was installed by Western 
Electric, an isolated dial PBX for internal communication that did not connect with any 
facilities outside of the center was installed, and teletype machines that could process 100 
words per minute were utilized. In no small addition, the command center was outfitted 
with fax machines, consoles to monitor long distance lines, and a multi-channel radio 
system for relay of information between control sections and plotters. This intranet 
necessitated more than 735 miles of wire in just one room.61 
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Figure 18. Plotting boards were replaced by projection screens by 1965, when this photo was taken. Source: Air Force 
Research Historical Agency 
 
In 1955 LeMay solicited bids from television manufacturers to provide a direct 
visual link between SAC and NORAD.62 Benjamin W. Chidlaw, commander in chief of 
the Continental Air Defense Command, similarly saw the benefit in using television to 
display data. In a letter to LeMay, he wrote, “I have been interested in TV for this 
command for some time…I believe that color TV is the only practical means of depicting 
a true televised air situation of the North American Continent as it is displayed in the 
[command center], because the types of plots, radar installations, and other important 
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details are shown in [a] variety of colored paints, lights and crayons.”63 Chidlaw assured 
LeMay that he would keep the requirements of SAC in mind while investigating a move 
to this type of system, and further upgrades were implemented over the years. 
The Strategic Air Command headquarters epitomized a utilization of advanced 
technology, and through LeMay’s dedication to efficiency and maintenance of a global 
network, it projected an image of rationality and military strength. 
The Power of SAC as a Deterrent 
From this headquarters, LeMay promoted the mission of SAC: to deter war. As one 
historian notes, “The threat of nuclear annihilation to enforce peace may be a paradox 
but, in effect, it amounts to putting an unacceptable price tag on war as a forcible means 
of spreading Communism. Keeping the price tag unacceptably high [was] the constant 
concern of SAC. It [was] a formidable task.”64 Because SAC’s deterrent mission was 
inherently psychological, SAC not only spent time training its crews and preparing them 
to go to war within minutes, they also openly demonstrated their capabilities to their 
enemies, such as in Operation Big Stick, in which SAC flew a mass fleet of B-36 
bombers to the Far East.65 One historian asserted that indeed, “SAC flexed its muscles 
regularly to hone its skills and to provide a show of force for the Soviet Union lest it 
believe that the West had lost its resolve and was an easy mark.”66 SAC aviators 
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participated in bombing competitions, made record-setting long-distance flights—such as 
the circumnavigation of the globe by the B-50A Lucky Lady, and mastered the art of 
aerial refueling.  
SAC also used its participation in the Korean War as an instance to showcase its 
“prowess at bombing,” and its involvement in this conflict led to a doubling of the 
number of active bomber units.67 Indeed, SAC might have been the “most efficient and 
far-reaching fighting machine ever created—in order to ensure that there [would] be no 
fighting.” While the situation was readily acknowledged to be similar to living under the 
sword of Damocles, the presence of SAC ostensibly achieved its goal (World War III 
never occurred) and its technical sophistication appeared to assuage the anxiety of the 
American people, at least in Nebraska.68 In 1958, SAC was “hailed” at a reception in 
Omaha as a “warm and friendly neighbor and as the organization which has employed 
cold efficiency to contain the threat of Russian aggression.”69 Yet given the economic 
benefits Omaha received as a result of the installation, it is unsurprising that local citizens 
had nothing but praise for the Strategic Air Command. One reporter noted that “it’s a 
novel companionship. It is a union of Nebraska’s oldest town with one of the capitals of 
the space age.” He quoted the mayor as saying that “SAC means a lot to us. There is no 
doubt it means a lot to the economy of the town.”70 Curtis LeMay was confident that 
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citizens across the nation similarly felt a debt of gratitude to SAC, even more so than to 
the other branches of the armed forces. He asserted: “By the middle 1950s, the power, 
efficiency, and publicity of SAC had become so impressive that in the public mind, this 
relatively new organization, less than ten years old, overshadowed not only the rest of the 
Air Force but the Army and Navy as well. Could the Army or Navy protect us against 
Russian atomic bombs? Could the Army or Navy deter Russian aggression by threatening 
to retaliate? No one thought so. Only the atomic umbrellas of SAC had the power to 
frighten the Soviets and thus prevent war.”71 
In popular media, however, SAC’s ability to effectively deter war and LeMay’s 
effectiveness at the helm were susceptible to criticism. The prime example is Stanley 
Kubrick’s 1964 film Dr. Strangelove: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the 
Bomb, which satirizes the theory of mutual assured destruction, the nuclear strategy 
executed by SAC. The Strategic Air Command is depicted as lacking effective fail-safe 
procedures and portrays a general (a thinly-veiled Curtis LeMay) as a war-mongering 
hothead who orders a pre-emptive strike on the USSR.  LeMay, however, did not react 
with public outrage at the depictions of either himself or of SAC in this dark comedy. He 
dismissed the film, writing in his autobiography: 
Do not fail to recognize, however, that the people in the Command have been 
grateful for interest and coverage awarded them by the press, nationally and 
internationally. It would seem now that the world at large is more familiar with 
operations and growth of SAC than with any other part of the United States Air 
Force or any other air force. SAC became a blanket, a bulwark. It was winning the 
Big War—the One Which Didn’t Have to Be Fought—purely because of the 
existence and might of SAC. Even the circulation of certain novels and the 
presentation of motion pictures which maligned the organization or offered an 
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entirely false picture of what went on within our structure, could not undermine 
the solid confidence which, I’m glad to say, the bulk of civilian population has in 
SAC.72 
 
Despite this rhetoric, it is difficult to believe that LeMay was not angered by mockeries 
of his command and the suggestion that SAC was not in complete control of its nuclear 
arsenal. On at least one occasion, he publicly pronounced his distaste for SAC’s 
representation in Dr. Strangelove: “This emphasis on positive control is one of the least 
understood, and most important features of the entire command and control structure of 
SAC. Many of its officers still bear scars left by a popular novel, and later a movie, of 
some years back. The widespread public acceptance of the fictitious exaggerations of ‘Dr. 
Strangelove’ has been a traumatic experience for SAC, and still clouds its relations with 
the outside world.”73 LeMay also made appeals to the Air Force, asking for them to limit 
publications editorializing about the Command. In a 1955 letter to Major General John A. 
Samford, LeMay wrote, 
Newspaper and magazine articles continue to ridicule, criticize, and condemn the 
security system under which we operate…The need is obvious for immediate 
positive action to improve the management of our public information program 
and deny the Soviets as much information as possible regarding our air weapons. 
The more we are able to deny them information, the more we reduce the accuracy 
and precision of Soviet counterplanning.74 
 
We will probably never know if this plea was truly motivated by national security 
concerns; perhaps it was primarily driven by embarrassment, or by a bit of both. 
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Those sympathetic to the mission of the Strategic Air Command tend to cite 
public misconceptions about positive control being deleterious to SAC’s image. Historian 
of the Air Force David Anderton cites one officer as saying that, “If we really had been 
dumb enough to operate [as they did in Strangelove and in Fail Safe]…Then the authors 
would have done us, and their country, a great service by pointing it out. But they were 
just 180 degrees out of phase.” In his enthusiastic history of SAC, Anderton writes that 
he hesitates to retell the plot of Strangelove even in order to debunk it, “for fear it will be 
used once again, out of context.”75 SAC publications further dismissed the possibility of a 
Dr. Strangelove scenario: 
But in all the automation, all the computerisation [sic], all the science-fictional 
appearance of the control command post, one factor remains constant. The vital 
messages originate from people. There are no pre-formatted computerised [sic] 
‘go-codes’ that could be triggered into action accidentally. Positive controls are 
everywhere, at every step along the route of war messages. ‘Dr. Strangelove’ was 
a movie; but SAC’s positive control of its command structure is real.76 
 
These anecdotes provide evidence that SAC was highly image-conscious, and its 
image-making was frequently linked to depictions of its underground command center. In 
contrast to the Cold War military spaces described in Paul Edwards’ The Closed World, 
SAC headquarters was not a secret space. In fact, it was “one of the most visible military 
buildings in the world. The Commander in Chief frequently hosted presidents and 
congressional leaders, as well as luminaries from the entertainment world.”77 Images of 
the headquarters and its operations permeated the media in both popular and Air Force-
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created films, neither of which would have been released if such imagery truly held the 
potential to compromise national security.  While Dr. Strangelove may have satirized 
nuclear strategy, the war room in that film is both austere and technologically 
sophisticated, which reflects both Hollywood’s imaginings of the space and reinforced 
this image of SAC in the mind’s eye of the global public. Air Force educational films 
were also widely distributed. They showed images of controllers at work on complex 
consoles, large screens filled with data, and rows of bombers ready to take flight, 
projecting the image of an efficient military force ready to strike.78 These films were 
produced as much for the American public as they were for military commanders in the 
USSR. SAC commanders readily acknowledged that their operation was under scrutiny, 
both domestically and from aboard, and kept up-to-date on how the Command was 
depicted to the larger public. Some engineers even used language based on this 
recognition, such as using the term “Hollywood hard” to describe a space that visually 
appeared reinforced but was not truly hardened.79 SAC’s presence in popular media 
shows how the Air Force wanted to let the world know—and especially leaders in 
Russia—that it was technologically sophisticated, efficient, and ready to retaliate. As Dr. 
Strangelove exclaims, “The whole point of the doomsday device is lost if you keep it a 
secret!” And while bombers and missiles served as deterrent forces, the command and 
control center also played a significant role in combatting the possibility of Soviet 
aggression.  
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This headquarters was so envied that other commanders requested that their air force 
bases be outfitted with their own control centers, albeit on smaller scales. Major General 
George W. Mundy requested one for himself at Barksdale Air Force Base, and requested 
that Curtis LeMay offer his support, to which LeMay replied tepidly that the AF budget 
for the fiscal year had already been submitted, and sent Mundy back to the drawing board 
with requests for more specific designs.80 The creation of this space became a part of 
LeMay’s legacy and one of his greatest accomplishments during his tenure at SAC, but 
he was not to remain at this command indefinitely. Soon after the move into the new 
headquarters, when LeMay gave a speech at Air University in February 1957, 
He sounded as if he realized that his own days at SAC were numbered. He had 
been there eight and a half years, a long time in any command, and he had 
undoubtedly heard new rumors of a shift in the making. Perhaps it was for that 
reason he made the opening of the new SAC headquarters (or “control center” as 
he and Griswold dubbed it) an occasion for a big celebration at New Year 1957. It 
had taken him a long time to get that headquarters built, but by God, he had 
managed it before his departure.81 
 
LeMay left SAC for the position of Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force in 
July 1957 and remained in this position until 1961, when he was made the fifth Chief of 
Staff of the United States Air Force, a post he held until 1965. 
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Figure 19. A contemporary view of the Curtis LeMay Building looks much as it did forty years ago. Source: Air Force 
Space Command 
 
In March 1962, the Air Force awarded a $1.4 million contract for the modification 
of the SAC control center and work began in the same month. The project, involving all 
three subterranean floors, involved extensive modification of the facility and a major 
revision of electrical wiring in order to accommodate new computing and 
communications equipment.82 In the 1990s, author Tom Clancy quipped that an upgraded 
command post was built because “Hollywood’s rendition of such rooms was better than 
the one SAC had originally built for itself, and the Air Force had decided to alter its 
                                                 
 
82 The History of Fort Crook, 1888 [and] Offutt Air Force Base, 1976, Published by the 3902d Air 
Base Wing, the host unit at Offutt Air Force Base. Borrowed from the Creighton University Alumni 
Memorial Library in Omaha, Nebraska, 97. 
 
93 
reality to fit a fictional image.”83 Given events such as the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, being only 46 feet below ground and unable to withstand a direct 
hit no longer seemed acceptable. Headquarters SAC was re-designated a “soft” as 
opposed to a hardened site. The Kennedy administration saw this as a liability and began 
construction of two hardened command posts, both in mountains: the Alternate National 
Military Command Center in Pennsylvania and NORAD’s Combat Operations Center in 
Cheyenne Mountain.84 
The Strategic Air Command’s response, as it could not build a mountain around 
itself, was to maintain a constant airborne Combat Operations Center. The aircraft used 
was the Boeing EC-135C, flown by pilots and crews from the 2nd Airborne Command 
Control Squadron, of SAC’s 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing. Starting in 1961, these 
aircraft, codenamed Looking Glass, flew in random circles above Offutt Air Force Base 
in eight hour shifts. “The airborne communications systems duplicate[d] many of the 
ground-based ones, and [were] tied directly to the primary alerting system, to North 
American Air Defense Command, SAC’s underground command post, USAF’s 
command post, and to the National Military Command Center.” These planes were 
outfitted with sophisticated communications links, teletype machines, and launch control 
systems that could fire Minuteman missiles.85 Yet Looking Glass and HQ SAC would 
soon become artifacts of another era, while decentralized military command and control 
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became the dominant architecture. Its limited secrecy and visibility point to competing 
interests specific to the Cold War. That is, there was value in both promoting the site as a 
stronghold and in protecting the true extent of its technological advances.    
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CHAPTER 4. NORAD’s Combat Operations Center  
 
Secrecy Classification: CONFIDENTIAL 
 
"A strange game. The only winning move is not to play. 
How about a nice game of chess?" 
 
-War Operation Plan Response (WOPR), 
Supercomputer in Wargames (1983) 
 
 
The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) Combat Operations Center 
(COC) inside Cheyenne Mountain embodies Cold War deterrence policy, and the history 
of its construction and design showcases how engineers and operators transitioned from 
manual systems to complex, computer-driven architecture. Automated command and 
control during the 1950s set the stage for how and why the COC was constructed and 
utilized. Not all commentators weighing in immediately approved of the technocratic 
solution, and they emphasized caution when moving toward automated systems. For 
example, while acknowledging the military’s need for automatic equipment to gather and 
process information, author Thornton Read asserted that “there are serious dangers in 
looking to technology as a substitute for good organization, clear policies, and conceptual 
understanding.”1 Yet military leaders could not ignore how innovations in 
communications and computer technology were changing the face of warfare in the 
twentieth century. Writing in 1960, one Air Force pundit asserted that the branch was 
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“riding the wave of what some call ‘the electronic revolution’” where instantaneous 
communications are necessary for “modern-day control of our weapons […] to facilitate 
complex decisions.”2 Writing in 1959, Air Force Captain William M. Mack noted that the 
recent “aerospace revolution” had made the design and construction of ground facilities 
as important as the development of weapons such as missiles.3 After all, these weapons 
were useless if they could not be controlled.  
Indeed, creating command and control systems and proper spaces to house them 
was a pressing military concern during the Cold War. This was due to both utilitarian 
military imperatives—identifying attackers and being prepared to retaliate—and to more 
abstract goals, such as projecting the image of American power. One systems designer 
observed in 1965 that “[a]utomated command and control has become extremely 
fashionable in recent years, achieving some appeal as a military status symbol.”4 The 
Combat Operations Center was revolutionary, not evolutionary. This change was driven 
by the Cold War arms race, which spurred both rapid technological development and its 
implementation in military systems.  According to political scientist Paul Bracken, the 
late 1950s was a time when “the military may have absorbed more technological change 
in a shorter time than any other organization in history.”5 
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The necessity for new, technologically advanced command and control systems 
created widespread concern in engineering communities. Reports and evaluations of what 
we now call “systems engineering” (a term also used by contemporary actors) 
proliferated in an effort to correct any then-current command and control system flaws, as 
sites often “went live” without benefit of being tested. Designers also created guidelines 
and templates for how systems should be constructed in the future. While they concerned 
themselves with the development of these sites, the United States government promoted 
architecture to project images of technological superiority. The Combat Operations 
Center within the Cheyenne Mountain Complex was the archetype of Cold War systems 
engineering. As historian William J. Astore eloquently described it, this “Cold War 
citadel” was meant to “corral and contain our nuclear fears” while also serving as a 
“repository of our technological dreams and a response (however feeble) to our 
technological nightmares.”6 Indeed, while the construction of this space accomplished a 
technological feat, its symbolism is just as historically important. 
                                                 
 




Figure 20. View of tunnel entrance to the Cheyenne Mountain Complex. Source: NORAD. 
 
What is NORAD? 
The Ogdensburg Declaration of 18 August 1940, which outlined a plan for mutual 
defense, marked the beginning of a joint United States and Canadian commitment to 
defense of the North American continent.7 After World War II, the alliance strengthened, 
and in response to the Soviet bomber threat, the United States and Canada constructed the 
Pinetree radar network in 1951 (completed in 1954), the Mid-Canada Line (or McGill 
Fence) in 1954 (300 miles north of Pinetree and completed in 1957), and the Distant 
Early Warning (DEW) Line in 1955 (constructed 200 miles north of the Arctic circle). 
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This radar defense network gave North America two to three hours of warning in the 
event of a bomber attack.8 Its primary functions were to prevent destruction of the 
Strategic Air Command bomber force by surprise attack and reduce Soviet capability to 
attack North American population centers.9 Quite a few Canadian historians and political 
scientists are retrospectively critical of these joint projects, and depict the United States 
as imposing its ambitions onto its northern neighbor.10 According to the most vocal of 
these scholars, Joel Jockel, “no sooner had the Second World War ended in Europe and 
the Pacific than the Canadian government was confronted by pushy US airmen intent on 
erecting in the Canadian Arctic what many critics called a Maginot line of the north. As 
early as 1945 Canada seemed in danger of swiftly becoming, because of its location 
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the world’s next Belgium.”11 
Hyperbole or not, the decision to integrate air defenses in the postwar years did 
pose problems for Canadian leaders who were concerned about sovereignty. Beginning in 
1954, study groups in both countries examined the possible issues involved in monitoring 
radar lines, and gave their recommendations to military and political leaders. Three years 
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later, a satisfactory agreement was reached, and in September 1957 the United States and 
Canada established the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) at Ent Air 
Force Base in Colorado Springs. This structure would be headed by an American 
commander-in-chief (CINCNORAD) and a Canadian deputy commander. Although these 
positions can be held by either nationality, this configuration has always been the case. 
These commanders would be responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States 
and to the chief of Canadian Defense Staff. The Command would include subcommands 
from the US Army, the US Naval Forces, the Air Defense of Canada, and others.12 
Canadian scholars again call attention to the imbalances in this alliance. According to 
Jockel, the fact that NORAD shared its commander, its headquarters, and its operations 
center with a purely US command was another form of “divided authority.”13 The US 
command he is referring to is the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD), created 
in 1954 from Air Force Defense Command, which shared the space at Ent AFB with 
NORAD and was responsible for US responsibilities outside of NORAD’s jurisdiction, 
such as delivery systems for atomic weapons.14  
During the early years of the Cold War, NORAD’s job was to watch the skies for 
suspicious objects, warn the Strategic Air Command and others of any observations, and 
defend against an attack from Soviet bombers carrying nuclear weapons to North 
America. NORAD had surface-to-air missiles and fighter interceptors at its disposal in 
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the event that it needed to intercept bombers. NORAD was tasked with intercepting an 
incoming threat; massive retaliation was the job of the Strategic Air Command. In a 
hypothetical attack scenario: the DEW line radars would detect unidentified planes 
approaching via a polar route, it would broadcast this information to NORAD’s Combat 
Operations Center, SAC bombers would be alerted, forward-based inceptors would be 
dispatched to confirm the identity of the plane, and if it were found to be an enemy, the 
fighters would destroy it.15 
By the time this process was configured, however, the Soviets had launched 
Sputnik, and NORAD’s mission was no longer to defend against bombers, but against 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Much as Curtis LeMay recognized the need 
to shield the Strategic Air Command’s headquarters (by burying it underground), 
NORAD’s first CINCNORAD General Earle E. Partridge requested that “the Air Staff 
consider an underground location for the COC [command operations center] from which 
its personnel could, by using computers, oversee the decentralized air defense battle and 
assume control of ICBM defense when the threat developed.”16 Thus, air defense systems 
buildup in the postwar years, along with the development of ICBMs, facilitated the 
creation of computer-oriented command and control systems, as well as reaffirmed the 
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perceived need for hardened sites.   
 
Figure 21. On the NORAD crest the blue air, yellow land, and turquoise oceans signify the three environments in which 
defense could take place. Silver wings symbolize the armed forces and military strength, the sword points north to the 
shortest distance to the potential aggressor (the USSR), and the two yellow lightning bolts portray NORAD’s 
instantaneous striking power. This image encapsulates NORAD’s motto: DETER, DETECT, DEFEND. Source: 
NORAD 
 
 Going Into the Mountain 
After the 1958 construction of SAC’s underground command center and its redesignation 
as a “soft” site that would not survive a direct nuclear weapon hit, two commissions 
reviewed the need for a hardened site for military command operations.17 One was the 
Winter Study, which was composed of two dozen panels and more than 100 participants 
drawn from both the military and industry; the other was the Partridge Study, ordered by 
defense secretary Robert McNamara and headed by NORAD officials. Both commissions 
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reached the same conclusion: command centers should be “hardened” to survive a direct 
hit by a nuclear warhead. They asserted that this could be done either by locating them 
deep underground, or by making them airborne, like Looking Glass.18 
 
Figure 22. The excavated mountain interior. Source: Henry W. Hough, NORAD Command Post: The City Inside of 
Cheyenne Mountain (Denver, CO: Green Mountain Press, 1970). 
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Prior to its move into Cheyenne Mountain, NORAD’s Combat Operations Center 
was not only “soft” but completely unprotected. It was located in above-ground cinder 
block buildings in Colorado Springs, and all communication was done over AT&T 
telephone lines that were not designed to withstand an attack. In fact, according to one 
historian, “a few hand grenades could have blacked out the nation’s entire warning 
system.”19 In March 1959, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to relocate the NORAD 
Command Operations Center to inside Cheyenne Mountain. Land was soon purchased 
and the access roads to Cheyenne Mountain were completed. After a slight delay, when 
the project underwent further review, in 1960 the Air Force approved plans and requested 
funds from the Department of Defense. The Air Force also directed its Systems 
Command to proceed with a systems design study, which included authority to solicit 
proposals from the MITRE Corporation and the Systems Development Corporation on a 
structure for the internal command and control system.20 
While plans went forward, debate existed over whether it was really worth the 
cost to harden sites. According to political scientist Paul Bracken, 
The theory behind the ‘soft’ design for command and control was that the purpose 
of all of these systems was to get warning in order to launch a nuclear attack. In 
the 1950s, there were no plans to fight a limited or controlled nuclear war. War 
plans were posited on a single massive salvo of weapons. The assumption in the 
United States was that the military command posts had no function after they 
launched their missiles.21  
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Indeed, if NORAD’s true ambition were to deter war, then any attack against North 
America would mean that it had already failed its mission. This outlook did not resonate, 
however, with those who optimistically believed that a limited war could still be fought, 
such as civilian planners at the RAND Corporation. They argued that not only was it 
imperative that military installations be moved into hardened sites, but that plans to locate 
NORAD inside of Cheyenne Mountain needed to be re-evaluated, as the current design 
would not protect it against a direct hit. To make the site truly hardened, RAND planners 
argued, the structure needed be located underneath the mountain instead of inside of it. 
They were overruled, however, and although NORAD was built “harder” than before 
(able to withstand 500 to 1,000 psi), it would not survive a direct assault. 
Cheyenne Mountain is a subordinate triple-peaked landmark eroded from the 
Precambrian Pikes Peak batholith. 22 It was chosen for its granite composition and its 
proximity to Colorado Springs and Fort Carson, which enabled relatively quick and 
cheap completion.23 The Combat Operations Center’s location on the east slope of 
Cheyenne Mountain and its orientation were determined by the presence of the best 
granite to “permit free-standing arch-roof chambers capable of withstanding the effects of 
a nuclear weapon detonation.”24 
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Figure 23. A worker poses within the 1400-foot tunnel. Source: Marian Talmadge and Iris Gilmore, NORAD: The 
North American Air Defense Command (New York, NY: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1967). 
 
The underground facility was designed and engineered by Parson, Brinkerhoff, 
Quade, and Douglas in three phases: (1) excavation, (2) construction of steel buildings in 
chambers, and (3) installation of electronic equipment in the buildings. The Army Corps 
of Engineers oversaw the first two phases, and the Air Force the third. Utah Construction 
& Mining Company won the contract to excavate the site with their low bid of 
approximately $6 million and a completion schedule of 365 days. Excavation started in 
July 1961, but was completed a little behind schedule because 95 modifications to the 
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original contract raised the cost to more than $12 million and pushed the completion date 
(for this phase) back to June 1964.25 Meanwhile, the Bureau of Mines used this project as 
an opportunity to study large-size, controlled blasting techniques, and the hollowed-out 
granite was used to fill in a nearby canyon to make a parking lot for the facility, creating 
another postwar landscape.26 
 
Figure 24. Massive blast doors could be opened within 30 seconds. Source: Marian Talmadge and Iris Gilmore, 
NORAD: The North American Air Defense Command (New York, NY: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1967). 
 
After excavation, work began on the construction of the Complex. The chamber 
that houses the group of buildings lies at the intersection of two tunnels. The weakened 
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rock between the tunnels would not support a concrete dome roof, so the designers 
shaped the chamber as a concrete sphere pierced by the tunnels. 27 The entrance tunnel is 
60 feet high and stretches 1,400 feet into the mountain. Located at the end of this tunnel 
is the entrance to the building complex: two huge steel-blast doors, each more than three 
feet thick and weighing more than twenty-five tons, set in concrete pillars fifty feet apart, 
and which could be opened or closed hydraulically in thirty seconds. For further 
protection, the doors were encased in seventeen-foot-thick concrete collars, and the two 
access tunnels were placed so that if a nuclear blast swept down one tunnel, it would go 
straight on through and out the other one. Beyond these doors was a “windowless city” in 
a 4.5-acre grid of excavated chambers and tunnels. Eleven alternating green-and-yellow 
free-standing, steel buildings—which did not make contact with their granite enclosure—
were linked by passages. Eight of the buildings were three stories tall, the others were 
one and two stories, and all together they provided 200,467 square feet of floor space.28 
(More buildings were added in later years.) The building shells were made of three-
eighths-inch continuous welded steel plates and were supported by steel frames. 
Although aluminum or other light-weight metals would have been cheaper and easier to 
use, steel was the material deemed best to withstand a nuclear blast.29 
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Figure 25. Fifteen buildings provided more than 200,000 square feet of floor space. Source: Henry W. Hough, NORAD 
Command Post: The City Inside of Cheyenne Mountain (Denver, CO: Green Mountain Press, 1970). 
 
All of these buildings rested on massive steel springs (more than 900 total), each 
made from 3-inch diameter steel rods and weighing one-thousand pounds, which would 
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work as hydraulic shock absorbers in the event of an explosion or an earthquake.30 Also 
designed in light of a doomsday scenario, blast valves in concrete bulkheads protected 
water and sewer lines and air portals, and diesel engines produced electrical power, fed 
by a fuel reserve that could keep the complex running for about 30 days.31 Engineers 
encountered a major problem when they needed to devise a way to remove heat created 
by power-generating equipment. One solution was to store water underground to provide 
a heat sink, but engineers chose instead to provide cooling towers in the protected area 
that use filtered air from outside of the mountain to absorb the heat. While this scheme 
required more air, it needed less water, and this advantage outweighed that of any other 
solution.32 Other unexpected engineering challenges came up throughout the construction 
process, and engineers concocted solutions on an ad hoc basis. 
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Figure 26. The buildings rested on more than 900 steel springs, meant to absorb the shock of an earthquake or nuclear 
explosion. Source: Henry W. Hough, NORAD Command Post: The City Inside of Cheyenne Mountain (Denver, CO: 
Green Mountain Press, 1970). 
 
Once the buildings were constructed inside the mountain, it was time to fill these 
spaces with the electronic equipment necessary to make this site the nerve center from 
which NORAD might provide instant alert warnings to the Strategic Air Command, to 
the governments of the United States and Canada, and to civil defense posts throughout 
these nations. Writing in 1967, one journalist called the computers powering NORAD’s 
command and control system, “probably the Western world’s most important military 
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data processing installation.”33 Yet it was not quite that glamorous. The system was 
composed of three standard commercial digital computers, Philco 2000/212s, and as the 
design was frozen in 1963, the computers were outdated by the time the post began 
operation. The system’s ability to process information, however, remained impressive. 
On 21 November 1960, the Air Force assigned the MITRE Corporation the task of 
designing the system that would network the Combat Operations Center, with Burroughs 
Corporation as system contractor.34 The resulting infrastructure provided a constant 
stream of information to the CINCNORAD and his battle staff, including data from: the 
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS),35 the Distant Early Warning (DEW) 
line and coastal radar networks, picket planes and ships, and other information sources 
and field commands. The system was designed so that the NORAD commander could 
view a large group display, measuring 12 by 16 feet, with data aggregated from smaller 
console displays operated by his staff. 
To create the large display, information was first assembled on the console 
displays. Then, this data (in three colors: red, green, blue) was photographed as three 
adjacent frames on a roll of 35-millimeter film, and these pictures were projected through 
color filters and a lens system so that they were superimposed on the screen. Under battle 
conditions, the group display could be updated every 14 seconds but typically would be 
updated every minute or so, and under low-threat circumstances it was only updated 
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every five minutes. While the process might sound cumbersome, the lack of a real-time 
group display was not considered a serious problem, as the battle staff could instantly 
alert the CINCNORAD to any significant events that appeared in real time on their 
consoles.36 
The Bell System provided communications systems for the command post, with 
its priority being to ensure the survivability of the system. Engineers achieved this by 
building redundancy into the structure and by developing automatic route restoral plans. 
“The result,” according to a Bell publication, “is a self-healing system that instantly 
detects changes in transmission status and rapidly adjusts to new conditions by automatic 
switching.”37 The COC was truly a command and control center of the future, filled with 
advanced and occasionally autonomous modern electronics. By the time of its completion 
in 1966, the Combat Operations Center had cost $142.2 million from R&D through 
construction through test operations of the equipment.38 
Unlike other underground headquarters, such as that of the Strategic Air 
Command, the Combat Operations Center closely resembled a massive fallout shelter. It 
was a far larger space and employed more people who worked longer shifts. In addition, 
the Combat Operations Center was but one element of this facility. Due to the bunker 
nature of the Cheyenne Mountain Complex and long hours spent by workers within the 
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space, this structure was designed not only to withstand attack, but to allow people to live 
comfortably within it for prolonged periods of time. Thus, necessary amenities, such as 
dedicated space for leisure and ample food provisions were available so that residents 
would not simply survive being locked within these buildings in the event of nuclear 
attack, but they would enjoy a suitable quality of life. These comforts improved the stress 
of day-to-day-operations as well. There were sleeping rooms with three-decker bunk 
beds, a dining hall (with “heat ovens [that] can cook ten-ounce steaks in thirty seconds!”), 
a small hospital facility, a pharmacy, and a dental office. Other comforts included 
television and radio hookups, movies, and a library.39 Despite these amenities, the reality 
of working inside the mountain was, according to one Air Force lieutenant, “decidedly 
unglamorous,” as there was no natural light and the air circulation system was noisy. 
Although, he continued, tongue in cheek, “Exposed pipes and cables gave the mountain a 
style that might be termed ‘early industrial chic’—one you sometimes see echoed today 
in high-end lofts and dance clubs.”40 
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Figure 27. Battle staff worked on a lower level while commanding officers surveyed operations from the second tier.  
Source: Marian Talmadge and Iris Gilmore, NORAD: The North American Air Defense Command (New York, NY: 
Dodd, Mead & Company, 1967). 
 
While these spaces may not have evoked great awe, the Combat Operations 
Center (COC) created an impressive atmosphere of austerity. Within this space, the 
NORAD commander-in-chief was located on the center level of the three-dais command 
post along with the director of the COC, the command director, an assistant operating the 
command and control system, and three technicians handling communications and 
displays. Above the CINCNORAD, on the third level, the intelligence watch officer was 
monitoring the Intelligence Data Handling System, along with members of the Civil 
Defense National Warning Center, and officers of the Federal Transport Agency and the 
Canadian Department of Transport. The lower level was manned by other members of 
NORAD battle staff, including commanders of the Canadian Forces Air Defence 
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Command, the US Air Force Air Defense Command (ADC), the US Army Air Defense 
Command (ARADCOM), and commanders of Navy forces.41 These operators observed 
the influx of overhead monitoring data at consoles and also via the group display to 
understand global events in real time. Again, the amount of data and its means of 
transport to the COC were innovative. 
Writing in 1967, NORAD “officer-wives” Marian Talmadge and Iris Gilmore 
marveled at how data taken at distant locations could be displayed in the COC without 
ever having gone through a human operator: “Some of these systems are so fast that they 
work in what scientists call ‘real’ time—that is, faster than the human brain can 
experience…The man-made intelligence that functions in the depths of giant Cheyenne 
Mountain appears to work with an assurance that is almost superhuman.” They were sure, 
however, to remind their readers that “the human brain…is still necessary. This cannot be 
pointed out too often. In addition to the electronic logic of the computers, the human 
brain must make final decisions. It still takes human fingers to punch the buttons which 
control North America’s defense.”42 This insistence underscores how hypothetical 
failures of complex command and control systems, such as a computers gaining 
autonomy and ushering in nuclear Armageddon, became a cultural trope for nuclear fear, 
as reflected in films from Colossus: The Forbin Project in the 1960s to Wargames and 
The Terminator in the 1980s.43 While Talmadge and Gilmore did not work inside the 
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mountain, according to a 1970 publication, sixty-six women were employed at the 
command post at jobs such as computer operator, space analyst, secretary, stenographer, 
and telephone operator. According to one contemporary male writer, they referred to their 
workplace as “The Cave” and “d[id]n’t mind being dubbed ‘cave women.’”44  
 
Figure 28. The depiction of the NORAD Combat Operations Center in the movie Wargames was decidedly more 
glamourous than the actual post. Source: United Artists. 
 
Architecture of Deterrence 
The cornerstone of Eisenhower’s New Look national security policy, and the foundation 
upon which NORAD rested, was deterrence as a military strategy, borne of the creation 
of weapons against which we had (and have) no defense. The power of deterrence 
strategy does not lie in the military’s ability to defeat an adversary, but instead lies in a 
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military’s capacity or potential for violence. During the Cold War, the most effective 
weapons became those that could influence behavior or achieve bargaining power. In 
other words, strategic forces are instruments of threat, coercion, and intimidation rather 
than of military muscle.45 Given this definition of a weapon of deterrence, the NORAD 
Combat Operations Center was a strategic weapon in and of itself; this semi-hardened 
installation was meant to deter the enemy through its mere existence.46 When Americans 
summoned a mental image of the North American Air Defense Command, they 
envisioned the tiered workstations and theater-size screens of the COC in Cheyenne 
Mountain. As Talmadge and Gilmore succinctly wrote: “NORAD is the cave-like 
command post” [emphasis added].47 This arrangement has become synonymous with 
technological sophistication, and has served as a template for any space that wants to be 
associated with efficiency and efficacy. As the central, visible hub of North America’s air 
defense system, NORAD’s high-tech Combat Operations Center provided a symbol that 
soothed the fears of citizens while at the same time being poised to initiate massive 
retaliation. Of course, our “deterrent depends on what we would be capable of doing if 
war came.”48 This capability was predicated on the construction of technologically 
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sophisticated command and control centers, such as the Combat Operations Center, from 
which responses would be launched.49 
 
Figure 29. The plan for the Cheyenne Mountain complex details water reservoirs, fuel reserves, and access routes. 
Source: Merwin H. Howes, Methods and Costs of Constructing the Underground Facility of North American Air 
Defense Command at Cheyenne Mountain, El Paso County, Colo. (Washington, D.C.: US Department of the Interior, 
Bureau of Mines, 1966). 
 
Fictional accounts of computer-initiated nuclear holocaust have permeated 
American popular culture since the end of the Second World War, and NORAD has 
figured prominently in many of these tales. Despite popular conceptions that the Combat 
Operations Center was a secret military installation, that has never been the case. As with 
Headquarters SAC, the existence of the COC was highly publicized by the US military—
indeed, it only had deterrent value if the enemy knew of its existence. In a 1970 
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publication meant for the general public, published as a color catalog with large print and 
plenty of pictures, an author gives full details about the construction of the post within 
Cheyenne Mountain, descriptions of the spaces inside, and provides operations reports to 
the reader. The author himself even wonders, “Why does NORAD tell so much about 
itself?...The answer lies in the philosophy and aims of deterrence.” Indeed, NORAD’s 
Combat Operations Center played a significant role in the military strategy of “strategic 
dissuasion.”50 Another example of how NORAD publicized itself and its new command 
post is the Department of Defense’s creation of a number of informative videos about 
NORAD that highlight the space as a symbol of destructive capability. In one video, an 
image of the COC is displayed as a voice proclaims, “This is NORAD.”51 And if these are 
not evidence enough that the Cheyenne Mountain site was heavily publicized, the 
Combat Operations Center has been open to public tours since at least the early 1970s.52 
NORAD has become synonymous with Cheyenne Mountain. 
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Contributions to Systems Engineering 
Making the Combat Operations Center function required a significant engineering effort, 
and it served as a testbed for the MITRE Corporation’s concepts in systems engineering. 
A system is defined as an integrated assembly of interacting elements designed to 
cooperatively carry out a predetermined function.53 Systems engineering as an 
independent, defined, and organized discipline was developed during the twentieth 
century. In fact, it was not until the 1940s that systems engineering started to become 
professionalized, and as late as the 1960s, its exact definition was still a matter of 
dispute.54 A general consensus existed, however, that systems engineering held qualities 
in common with operations research, namely: engaging in the analysis of complex man-
machine systems; the utilization of multi-discipline teams; and an emphasis on the 
“whole system” being something more than the sum of its parts.55 Systems engineering, 
however, focuses on hardware construction, whereas operations research examines how 
machines are used in practice. 
The catalyst for the increased attention given to systems engineering was the 
drastic rise of automation following World War II. Ralph E. Gibson, director of the 
Applied Physics Laboratory in 1961, wrote in that same year that “[s]ystems engineering 
is an activity forced on us by the demand for more and more automatic devices” and that 
“the design and engineering of systems is a laborious enterprise which mankind has 
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brought on itself in its tireless striving for a better standard of living [through 
automation].”56 If a better standard of living included heightened national security, then 
Gibson was correct. The large, complex weapons systems and defense networks of the 
Cold War certainly contributed to the rise of the field of systems engineering. One of the 
earliest formalizations of systems engineering, in fact, was penned by the Department of 
Defense for contractors bidding to develop its weapons systems.57 Along with the growth 
of the field of systems engineering came increased interest in what we would today call 
human factors or ergonomics. When designing both machines and spatial placement of 
machines in a system, human factors specialists would consider how to best fit the 
machine to the human, rather than the human to the machine, as had been the dominant 
practice prior to the Second World War. Both systems engineers and human factors 
specialists evaluated the hardware and practices of the NORAD Combat Operations 
Center. Their findings are indicative of the embryonic state of these fields in the 1960s, 
and offer insight as to how these new specialists believed that command and control 
systems should be designed going forward. The development of these control systems 
significantly promoted the professionalization, visibility, and prestige of these disciplines 
in the United States. 
The MITRE Corporation designed the NORAD system using data acquired from 
previous command and control experiments, such as those conducted by the RAND 
Corporation’s Systems Research Laboratory in the early 1950s, instead of conducting 
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new research in its MITRE-ESD Systems Design Laboratory. MITRE personnel did, 
however, conduct an evaluation of the deployment and testing of the NORAD COC on 
site.58 The resulting report examined the experiments, exercises, demonstrations, and tests 
that were conducted in the NORAD COC in order to make the system operate at optimal 
performance. Observers hoped to “arrive at some conclusions regarding the utility of 
exploratory experiments and systematic testing in evolving large-scale information 
systems of the type discussed.”59 System testing began with an analysis of the prior 
manual systems that provided the basis for the automated system, then moved into an 
experimental facility to study the efficacy of console locations and man-machine 
interactions, as well as the operability of computer programs.60 Finally, over the course of 
seventeen months, the system was stressed by simulating hypothetical war conditions and 
operators were required to perform demonstrations of potential actions that might take 
place in the Combat Operations Center.61 
According to the report: “The lack of documented procedures and the consequent 
difficulty in developing operator proficiency capable of exploiting system potential, were 
considered serious deterrents to the achievement of system operating levels which would 
permit valid and reliable measures of operator dependent system performance.”62 In other 
words, it would be impossible to know what the systems were capable of if the operators 
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did not know what they were doing. For the most part, however, the observers admitted 
that “[d]espite situational factors, a partly installed system, programming problems, and 
an abruptly cancelled schedule of experiments, the objectives of experimentation were 
realized in limited form” resulting in: a developmental concept of system operations; a 
working system; a concept of simulation for the system; trained experimental system 
operators; estimates of data handling capabilities; and resolutions of command post 
design.63 Recommendations for future systems testing in similar sites included: a separate 
facility for testing; extensive documentation plans for experiments; early development of 
simulation technology; the additions of a systems engineer to troubleshoot issues found 
during tests and a simulation supervisor to ensure the credibility of the simulation; and 
implementation of a phased approach to system evolution.64 Not surprisingly, the systems 
engineer stressed the necessity of systems engineering in the testing process. 
The NORAD COC was seen as a proper site in which to implement rapidly-
developing knowledge from the field of human factors engineering. The postwar 
development of plan and position indicators (PPIs), the familiar radar display in which a 
radius sweeps around a circle, laid the groundwork for new man-machine systems that 
could be studied for human factors improvement.65 Centers such as the Beavertail 
Laboratory at Johns Hopkins studied factors involving the efficient operation of PPIs in 
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the late 1940s.66 As air defense systems increased in complexity, so did the number of 
considerations to be taken into account by human factors specialists. By the time of the 
construction of the Combat Operations Center, not only were individual machines being 
evaluated with human needs in mind, but entire systems composed of these machines 
went under study. The MITRE Corporation contributed to this growing field as well. In a 
report written for the Air Force, David R. Israel at the MITRE Corporation provided an 
overview of systems engineering and human factors considerations that should be made 
when designing command and control systems. Such factors included the way that men 
and machines interacted, and how a system could be designed to accommodate future 
change and growth. He noted the difficulty in evaluating complex, real-time systems 
prior to their implementation.67 He also conceded that only statistical or probabilistic 
models could be used in systems engineering, as human behavior is unpredictable. 
Therefore, the performance of a system that incorporates humans cannot be computed 
deterministically. 
He described some potential engineering pitfalls and made suggestions for 
systems design; a large component of his suggestions was to take human operators into 
account during the engineering process.68 One device he noted for improvement was the 
display console, a machine that was upgraded or replaced at a slower pace than 
contemporary computers because there were few off-the-shelf units available. Israel 
asserted that “there are few systems in which the user is satisfied with his display 
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console.” Common complaints included the inability to view alpha-numeric characters 
and irritating screen flickers. In order to remedy these shortcomings, Israel insisted that 
designers should use a standard console design (this would also allow for rapid 
replacement of broken consoles), weigh the benefits of alpha-numeric display against 
cost, and monitor ambient lighting to reduce reflections on the screen.69 He also 
suggested that more attention be paid to the degree of automation in the system, and to 
consider the costs and complexities of automation against the needs of human operators.70 
Some tasks are better suited to automation due to human shortcomings (such as delayed 
reaction time and inability to process large amounts of data simultaneously) than others, 
and vice versa; however, to automate certain complex tasks might require such massive 
amounts of time and resources that a human operator might be preferred. 
This is only a brief introduction to and early example of what has become a vast 
literature on human factors engineering. Its inclusion here is to underscore the significant 
engineering developments catalyzed by the creation of modern command and control 
rooms, demonstrated here by the tie between the NORAD COC and the MITRE 
Corporation. Command and control environments initiated extensive study of the design 
of complex systems as well as increased the number and type of man-machine 
interactions available for study.    
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Since the time of its construction, the Combat Operations Center’s physical attributes, 
missions, and technologies have changed. For example, the Space Defense Center moved 
into the mountain in 1967, buildings were added, the COC’s systems hardware was 
updated over the years, and NORAD became the North American Aerospace Defense 
Command in 1981. This snapshot of NORAD’s Combat Operations Center at the time of 
its construction emphasizes the historical importance of this site as an architectural time 
capsule, a politically charged artifact of deterrence theory, and a catalyst for the 
development of burgeoning fields in engineering.      
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CHAPTER 5. Espionage from the Blue Cube 
 
Secrecy Classification: SECRET 
 
“The adversarial machines face each other, as they always do, with one watching, the 
other listening. That is the nature of space reconnaissance.” 
 
–Burrows, Deep Black, 224 
 
 
Inveniemus Viam vel Faciemus 
 We will either find a way or make one. 
 




The Air Force Satellite Test Center in Sunnyvale, California is the most secretive of the 
spaces examined here, although it hid in plain sight. The Satellite Test Center (STC, 
pronounced “stick”) was established in 1959 on what became an Air Force Station, from 
which Lockheed contractors and Air Force and CIA personnel directed spy satellite 
programs throughout the Cold War. Most famously, this command post supported and the 
activities of the National Reconnaissance Program for the then-black National 
Reconnaissance Office. This space shares many features with those discussed in previous 
chapters, including: (1) a similar command center architecture and aesthetic, (2) its 
creation and operation were driven by Cold War imperatives, (3) details of the new 
technologies implemented in its center and its programs were tightly under wrap, and (4) 
the construction of its systems was predicated on the development of key technologies, 
such as launch vehicles and sensors in this case. Yet its disproportionately high level of 
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secrecy does make the STC a unique case study. It is the only space here that was utilized 
by an agency whose existence would remain classified for decades (the NRO); it is the 
only space in which the CIA possessed any explicit directional oversight; and its walls 
were deemed so secret, that when it was eventually closed, its buildings were demolished, 
burying its secrets underneath crushed concrete panels in the dead of night. 
 
Figure 30. One of the few photographs of a control center in Building 1001 of the Satellite Control Facility, 1961. 
Source: Historical Overview of the Space and Missile Systems Center, 1954-2003, History Office, Space 
and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles, CA, 2003. 
 
Yet the STC was not entirely secret. American newspapers speculated on the 
activities conducted at the STC (spy satellites) and many of them were correct (spy 
satellites). The STC was very secretive about the particulars of its activities; its 
windowless buildings suggested both fear of and fortification from espionage. In the age 
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of the ICBM, it no longer made sense to create underground facilities. One massive block 
was painted Air Force Blue and was visible from a proximate freeway. The message was 
clear: “Yes, we’re here and we’re watching you.” The building’s clear affiliation with 
surveillance operations served as a deterrent, a strategy similar to those implemented by 
other command posts. While the STC buildings were constructed of concrete, unlike HQ 
SAC and the NORAD COC, they were built above ground (at least more than 100 feet of 
them were). The Satellite Test Center buildings looked “hard” but were not promoted as 
“hardened” against nuclear attack as were other spaces. Instead, the spy satellites were 
the objects that were hardened against physical attack or electronic jamming. The new 
strategies were to create redundancy on the ground and to protect objects in space.  
Few studies in aerospace history have concentrated on satellite ground facilities. 
This is an oversight, as “What stays on the ground is at least as worthy of study as what 
goes into space.”1 The places from which space-based technologies are monitored and 
controlled are in many ways more influential and crucial to national defense than are the 
air- and spacecraft they observe and control.  Ground facilities do not just launch 
satellites into orbit and collect data. Operators need to keep the satellite properly 
positioned. Spacecraft tend to wander, and they need human observers with command 
capabilities to ensure that they are positioned in a way to, say, take an overhead 
photograph of the Soviet Union. This was an ambition of the most well-known program 
conducted from the Satellite Test Center, Corona. Code-named Discoverer, between 1959 
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and 1972, Corona satellites completed 145 successful missions, capturing photographs of 
more than one billion square miles of the Earth’s surface. 
 
Figure 31. The California State Historical Preservation Office unsuccessfully attempted to add the STC site to the 
National Historic Register in 2010, which would have consisted of six interconnected “contributing resources”, 
buildings 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004, 10031, and 10032, and two “non-contributing resources” buildings 1015 and 1025. 
Source: Anne Jennings and Allison S. Rachleff, “California State Historic Preservation Office, Historic American 
Building Survey, September 2010. 
 
 Spy Satellites in America 
As early as the 1940s, the potential for using artificial satellites for overhead 
reconnaissance was moving from science fiction into the realm of possibility. It was 
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Major General Curtis E. LeMay, in fact, deputy chief of staff for R&D for the Air Force, 
who first directed Douglas Aircraft’s R&D Group (which later morphed into the RAND 
Corporation) to start investigating satellite development. The Strategic Air Command 
identified needs for overhead reconnaissance, such as: learn “exactly where SAC targets 
were, what kind of explosives would be necessary to ‘take them out,’ how they were 
defended (including radar coverage), and what the terrain was like on the approach to 
targets and along the way out.”2 Photomapping had the potential to answer these 
questions and more, so SAC solicited a study from RAND. The 1951 RAND report, “The 
Utility of a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaissance,” was the “first, detailed report in the 
evolution of satellite command and control. RAND took a major step by stating the 
technical and engineering possibilities for a reconnaissance satellite employing television 
techniques for data readout to ground stations.”3 
Yet satellites were not under construction with any great enthusiasm in the United 
States. Programs existed, but there was not any outward urgency. Some notable early 
events in the creation of an American spy satellite program include the Air Research and 
Development Command’s (ARDC) 1954 establishment of Western Development 
Division (WDD) in southern California, which would develop Weapon System 117L 
                                                 
 
2 William E. Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security (New York: Random 
House, 1986), 84, 65. The Strategic Air Command, however, would not govern the nation’s satellite effort. 
According to historian Arnold, there were concerns “that operation of WS-117L by SAC might ‘embarrass 
the United States in future international negotiations concerned with space sovereignty.’ America’s 
declared space policy called for ‘peaceful uses of space,’ so placing the nuclear SAC in charge of a major 
U.S. space program seemed politically unwise” (Arnold 79). 
3 Arnold, 13; 15. 
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(WS-117L), also known as “Pied Piper.”4 Lockheed’s Missile and Space Division was 
also awarded a contract to develop ways of gathering signals and photographic 
intelligence for WS-117L.5 The project conducted reconnaissance satellite studies from 
1954 to 1957. In 1957, the WDD was redesignated the Air Force Ballistic Missile 
Division. It attempted to prioritize programs for satellite espionage, such as Corona 
(satellite optical reconnaissance), Samos (a rival to Corona) and Midas (an early, yet 
failed attempt at creating a system of infrared early-warning satellites). The WDD would 
later be responsible for the development of the Thor Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile 
(IRBM), which first launched from Cape Canaveral in 1957.   
Beginning in 1956, overhead surveillance was mostly handled by U-2s or long-
range bombers. While these missions were dangerous and satellite reconnaissance was an 
obvious alternative, military coffers were instead directed into development of ICBMs.6 
Eisenhower had approved the use of bombers and high-altitude balloons in the early 
1950s for intelligence-gathering, but these craft were vulnerable to anti-aircraft artillery 
and fighter-interceptors. The CIA requested designs from aerospace manufacturers for a 
new craft that would not be as susceptible to attack. The solution came from within a 
company that had not been solicited for a design. Kelly Johnson at Lockheed’s Skunk 
                                                 
 
4 As known as Advanced Reconnaissance System. For more WS-117L information, see 
“Historical Report: Weapon System 117L, WDD HQ, ARDC, 1956, #273 on nro.gov, and “Chronology, 
WS 117L Background,” 10 Oct 1961, among many, many other declassified documents on this program. 
5 Ibid., 5. 
6 For more information about the U-2 program and its technical specifications, see “Short 
Historical Explanation, WS 117L, Discoverer, Sentry and Midas Chronology, 1946-1952,” 27 Sept 1959, 
269, nro.gov. Anne Jennings and Allison S. Rachleff, “California State Historic Preservation Office, 
Historic American Building Survey, Level II-Type Documentation, US Air Force Satellite Test Center 
(Onizuka Air Force Station) City of Sunnyvale, Santa Clara County, California,” Department of the Air 
Force, Headquarters/Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment, Lackland Air Force Base, 
Texas, September 2010, DRAFT, 6-7. 
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Works (the alias of the company’s Advanced Development Projects division) submitted 
his proposal for the U-2, which is basically a glider with a jet engine and a panning 
camera in its belly. It was a slow craft and visible on radar, but it compensated for these 
deficiencies with its high-altitude capability. The U-2 was able to cruise at heights of 
more than 70,000 feet, out of the reach of Soviet surface-to-air missiles and interceptors 
(at least for a time). Codenamed Project Aquatone, U-2 production was approved by 
Eisenhower in November 1954. A joint AF-CIA project, this aircraft had great successes 
flying along the borders of the Soviet Union, eventually completing 24 successful 
missions. 
Eisenhower had wanted to conduct aerial reconnaissance covertly to avoid 
provoking Soviet leaders. Unfortunately, the U-2 was never a stealthy aircraft, and they 
were detected on radar as soon as their overflights began. While Soviet leaders knew 
about U-2 surveillance and expressed outrage, there was little they could do about it. 
Their missiles could not hit the U-2s nor could their interceptors reach their altitude. This 
was until May 1960, when a surface-to-air missile explosion knocked down the U-2 of 
Gary Powers over Soviet airspace. While Eisenhower attempted to push the cover story 
of the flight conducting a meteorological study, the Soviets had recovered film from the 
plane—not to mention its pilot—and the jig was up. Soviet overflights ceased and the U-
2 continued its missions over places with less sophisticated air defense systems. 
Eventual cessation of overflights was not unanticipated. The U-2 was not 
promised to be the end-all in reconnaissance aircraft. In addition to not being stealthy, the 
U-2 would never have been able to photograph all of the Soviet Union, and it could not 
return to high-priority targets for fear of establishing a pattern that would make 
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interception more likely.7 Given these drawbacks, even before the Powers incident, CIA 
director Richard Bissel had commissioned a study to determine the characteristics for a 
reconnaissance aircraft that could not be shot down. The investigation determined that the 
new craft would need to be supersonic and have a small radar cross-section. For this 
purpose, again, Kelly Johnson at Skunk Works designed the A-12 (codename Oxcart), 
which briefly operated with the CIA before the Air Force’s version, the SR-71, assumed 
responsibility for reconnaissance activities in East Asia. In the following years, SR-71s 
operated out of Kadena Air Force Base on Okinawa, Japan, flying missions over Laos, 
North Vietnam, and North Korea.  
Airplanes were not destined, however, to continue conducting reconnaissance 
over the Soviet Union. The successful 1957 launch and orbit of Sputnik made satellite 
research and development top priority, and having cameras in space, rather than aboard 
aircraft, was strongly pursued. The US responded by reviving the Army’s Project Orbiter, 
now called Explorer, and the Explorers program launched the first American satellite in 
1958. The Air Force followed suit and put projects Samos and Midas back on the fast-
track with healthy budgets. Eisenhower created the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA, later DARPA) and NASA in 1958. The Air Force, however, became the only 
branch allowed to launch space boosters, giving it a de facto monopoly on space, and this 
was exactly what the Air Force had been lobbying for: getting space under its 
jurisdiction. Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White is often credited with, if 
not coining, popularizing the term “aerospace” in an effort to make Air Force dominance 
                                                 
 
7 Burrows, 103. 
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in the skies and beyond seem both obvious and inevitable. In the 1959 edition of Air 
Force Manual I-I (AFM I-I), United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, writers used 
“aerospace power” in place of the previous term “air power.”8 The Air Force proceeded 
to independently contract with Convair to build Atlas (the first operational American 
ICBM), then Thor (an IRBM by Douglas) and Titan (a larger missile built by Martin). 
These Air Force vehicles were used to launch satellites for the National Reconnaissance 
Office.  
The National Reconnaissance Office, a top-secret entity created in response to the 
limitations of aerial reconnaissance and the national security imperative for a space-based 
reconnaissance program, oversaw the Corona missions.9 One historian called the creation 
of the NRO the “most important bureaucratic innovation to come out of the Eisenhower 
administration where overhead reconnaissance is concerned.”10 James Killian Jr., then 
president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, believed that Corona needed 
oversight by a new civilian, secret organization. Polaroid CEO Edwin H. “Din” Land, a 
                                                 
 
8 Arnold, 39; Air Force Space Systems Development Program, AFBMD Headquarters, Air 
Research and Development Command, 1959, 54, nro.gov 
9 Since the records of the NRO began to be declassified in the 1990s, a number of historians have 
skillfully provided the history of this super-secret organization. For an early history of the NRO see Gerald 
Haines, “The National Reconnaissance Office: Its Origins, Creation, and Early Years,” in Dwayne A. Day, 
John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell, eds., Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites 
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998), 143-156. Also see, Matthew L. Hughbanks, 
National Reconnaissance Office: Past, Present, Future Concepts Paperback (Research Paper from Air 
University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 2006). Jeffrey Richelson is a prominent author in this field. 
See Jeffrey Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 
1989), esp. 26-29; Richelson, American Espionage and the Soviet Target (New York: William Morrow and 
Company, Inc., 1987); Jeffrey Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. Keyhole Spy Satellite 
Program (New York: Harper & Row, 1990 (here Richelson describes the value of Keyhole-gathered 
intelligence up through the Bush administration); Jeffrey Richelson also wrote about the surveillance 
activities of America’s Cold War nemesis in Sword and Shield: Soviet Intelligence and Security Apparatus 
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1986). Corona records were declassified in 1995. 
10 Burrows, 135. 
 
137 
scientist heavily involved in the early Corona missions, also encouraged President 
Eisenhower to create this overseeing body.11 On August 25, 1960, Eisenhower approved 
the creation of the NRO “amid great secrecy and after several months of debate within 
the White House, the CIA, the Air Force, and the Defense Department.”12 The NRO was 
then established by acting CIA director General Charles Cabell in September 1961.13 
Meanwhile, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara made the NRO responsible for the 
National Reconnaissance Program, which included Corona and Samos. The following 
year the DoD and the CIA signed an agreement that the NRO would be headed by a 
Defense Department civilian designated by the Secretary of Defense, in an effort to 
appease interservice rivalries. These arrangements changed over the years in expectedly 
complicated ways, but the NRO still managed to get things done. According to one 
historian, “A certain amount of conflict between the Department of Defense and 
Intelligence Community is an inherent part of the NRO’s history, and remains a challenge 
for running the organization today. It will not go away because it is driven by a budget 
that is inevitably finite, and differences in organizational priorities, which are themselves 
inevitable and which also change over time.”14 
                                                 
 
11 Jennings and Rachleff, DRAFT 6-7. 
12 Burrows, 135. 
13 Berkowitz. Its missions were largely influenced by the recommendations of the Purcell Panel 
Report, a reconnaissance report commissioned by the CIA which, among other things, suggested 
developing a drone-variant of the A-12 (the failed M-21/D-21) and lauded the accomplishments of Corona. 
See Purcell Panel Report, 3 July 1963, 1B0029, nro.gov 
14 Berkowitz, 343-344. There is a plethora of excellent existing secondary literature on the history 
of the National Reconnaissance Office, particularly the massive 1973 multi-volume set written by Robert 
Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance. While I do not cite it often directly, it has been the basis for 
many of the more recent works cited, and despite its ink-stained redacted pages, it still holds high value as 
an early history of these programs. Robert Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume I – 
Corona, National Reconnaissance Office, 1973. Note that other historians have mined the Robert Perry 
 
138 
When the NRO was created, the Air Force was no longer in command of 
reconnaissance satellite programs. The Air Force provided launch and tracking support, 
but was removed from handling the actual intelligence gathered. The NRO’s 
representatives at the Satellite Test Center most likely had their offices in the Technical 
Director Room of Building 1001.15 According to satellite historian Arnold, 
“The U.S. space program now had three branches: one concerned primarily with 
space science and political prestige (NASA); one, with military support missions 
(the defense department); and one, with reconnaissance operations (the NRO). 
Later presidents and secretaries of defense formally endorsed these divisions, 
which largely remain in effect today.”16  
 
There were a few contenders for early reconnaissance satellite systems.17  The Air 
Force and the CIA focused on developing imagery intelligence (IMINT), while the Navy 
investigated gathering signals (SIGINT).18 For imagery, Project Corona held special 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
histories of the NRO and of the Corona program in particular, describing all the launches and the 
technology in its not being called Discoverer because the cover story was not working when it when fully 
undercover in 1962 and so Ill footnote these secondary sources for those who are interested in the details, 
and instead here focus on the buildings and the secret site of operations. 
15 Jennings and Rachleff, FINAL, 13.  
16 Arnold, 74. 
17 For a tie back to the Strategic Air Command and to NASA: The RAND Corporation warned the 
Air Force in the 1950s that if they wanted clear photographs—that is, ones of something other than clouds--
from overhead recon satellites, they would need accurate meteorological data of the areas over the Soviet 
Union. The of creating and orbiting meteorological satellites fell to the newly formed NASA, but NRO 
officials (Under Secretary of the Air Force and NRO director Joseph V. Charyk, felt that their programs—
notably Tiros—weren’t developing quickly enough to meet national security needs, so Charyk lobbied for 
an interim meteorological satellite program that would meet the needs of the NRO. This program also 
fashioned the technology and flight operations for what would become the polar orbiting, low-altitude 
national weather satellite administered by NOAA (26-37). These satellites would be launched and 
controlled by the Air Weather Service’s Air Force Global Weather Control located in Headquarters SAC. 
See R. Cargill Hall, A History of the Military Polar Orbiting Meteorological Satellite Program (Office of 
the Historian, National Reconnaissance Office, 2001), 118. 
18 Grab (Galactic Radiation and Background—its cover) was the first SIGINT (electronic 
intelligence collection) satellite (basis for which was Navy’s Vanguard). It was later replaced by Poppy and 
its NRO records were declassified in 1998. Many NRL engineers went to NASA (Goddard) in 1958 but 
others stayed and formed the Satellite Technologies Branch, which became the Naval Center for Space 
Technology. Grab detected signals from air defense radars over the Soviet Union and transmitted them to 
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promise. Corona’s origins are found in the WS-117L program. In December 1957, the 
WS-117L program was broken up to focus exclusively on film recovery, inheriting a 
system from Project Genetrix, a program that photographed Soviet territory using 
balloons that had ended in 1956.19 The Corona program necessitated a home base from 
which to begin conducting operations, and it made sense to initially set up shop near the 
existing infrastructure at Lockheed Missiles and Space in northern California. 
A Home for the Satellite Test Center 
The Sunnyvale site would be completely unfamiliar today. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the Sunnyvale economy was agricultural, and the landscape rural and 
filled with wheat fields and orchards. Beginning in the First World War, the Joshua 
Hendy Iron Works and the US Army Air Corps’ Moffett Field brought some 
industrialization to the area, but workforce numbers at these places significantly declined 
in the years after World War II. In response, the City Council annexed surrounding land 
and provided space for industrial development, marketing itself in national newspapers 
such as The Wall Street Journal. By 1952, ten companies had relocated to Sunnyvale and 
the city was expanding its housing and services to accommodate the influx of new 
residents. A few years later, Lockheed Missiles and Space Division became one of these 
newcomers; the mild climate and proximity to Stanford served as selling points, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
ground control centers in friendly territory, revealing the location and capabilities of each Soviet radar 
installation. Grab 1 launched by Thor Able Star on 22 June 1960, becoming first successful recon satellite 
(220). Others came later, such as Poppy. See Bruce Berkowitz, The National Reconnaissance Office at 50 
Years: A Brief History, Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance, National Reconnaissance Office, 
2011, Kindle Edition. 
19 Donald Steury, A Tribute to the People of the Air Force Satellite Control Facility: The National 
Security Impact of Its CORONA Satellites, Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance, National 
Reconnaissance Office, Chantilly, VA, 2007, Kindle Edition. 
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Lockheed purchased a 275-acre tract of land adjacent to Moffett Field. Despite these new 
industries, Sunnyvale remained largely rural and undeveloped. This changed with the 
creation of the Satellite Test Center. Its construction was instrumental in shifting the 
long-term economic mainstay of the area from farming to high-technology. It is not too 
bold to claim that the Air Force and the CIA—along with the preexisting Lockheed 
complex—built the foundation upon which the area’s path toward Silicon Valley was 
paved. 
The early operations of the Air Force Satellite Control Facility began at a field 
office of the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division of the Air Research and Development 
Command at the Lockheed Missile and Space Division facility in Palo Alto in 1958. This 
group was responsible for getting a Thor IRBM into orbit and for supporting an “Aero-
biomedical program” that would support manned spaceflight ambitions, and the facilities 
were provided by Philco-Ford.20 In 1959, the Air Force activated the 6594th Aerospace 
Test Wing (successor to the 6593rd Test Squadron), the first unit tasked with military 
satellite operations.21 Working closely with Lockheed Missiles and Space Division and 
the CIA, the 6594th Air Test Wing first worked in Palo Alto, staffed by the Field Test 
Force: one Air Force lieutenant colonel and one Lockheed engineer.22 
These operations soon moved to the Lockheed-designed Interim Development 
Control Center within the Lockheed complex, where controllers completed operations 
                                                 
 
20 Jernigan, 4. For more on the move to Sunnyvale, see Erica Schoenberger, The Cultural Crisis of 
the Firm (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1997). 
21 Redesignated 6594th Test Wing (Satellite) on 15 Jan 1960. Reassigned to Space Systems 
Division (of Air Force Systems Command) on 1 Apr 1961. Redesignated as 6594th Aerospace Test Wing 
on 1 Nov 1961. Discontinued on 1 Jul 1965. See “6594th Aerospace Test Wing” brochure, #853 on nro.gov 
22 Arnold, 48. 
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using a 100-bit-per-second teletype circuit, a phone line, and a 60-bit-per-second secure 
teletype circuit.23 Data came from various locations around the globe to the primary 
control center, including from three remote operating locations (Edwards, Chiniak, 
Annette Island) and from five tracking stations (Annette Island, Chiniak, Kaena Point, 
New Boston, Vandenberg). The 6594th Air Test Wing also operated the 6594th Launch 
Squadron, which assisted with satellite launches at Vandenberg Air Force Base, whose 
location on the northern Pacific and close to the jet stream was ideal for launching 
vehicles into polar orbit.24 Permanent facilities for a command and control center, 
however, had not yet been acquired or constructed.25 
The Air Force decided to locate its satellite control center in Sunnyvale due to the 
proximity of Lockheed, which supplied a number of engineers, and due to the availability 
of land, which was scarce at the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division headquarters in Los 
Angeles. Thanks to Lockheed, operations at Sunnyvale had a “decidedly nonmilitary 
flavor” and the operation “ran much more like a corporate undertaking than a military 
one, reflecting the influence of Lockheed and its partners.”26 In June 1960, the Air Force 
purchased about 12 acres in the southeast corner of Lockheed’s massive property, 
including Lockheed Building 100 (the interim station), for the price of one dollar. The 
                                                 
 
23 Ibid., 117. 
24 Anne Jennings and Allison S. Rachleff, “California State Historic Preservation Office, Historic 
American Building Survey, Level II-Type Documentation, US Air Force Satellite Test Center (Onizuka Air 
Force Station) City of Sunnyvale, Santa Clara County, California,” Department of the Air Force, 
Headquarters/Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, 
September 2010, DRAFT, 9. 
25 Arnold, 71. 
26 Arnold, 65. Note that the Air Force did have jurisdiction, despite the strong influence of 
Lockheed. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on 6 March 1961 reassigned air force direction of field 
operations “including operations in Sunnyvale, a step beyond merely supervising the contractor’s work” in 
DoD directive 51.60.32. (Arnold, 87). 
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command rooms of the Satellite Test Center are located within a cluster of eight buildings 
that were built between 1959 and 1984 on this site. Even though it was only an official 
name for a very short period in its organizational history, “The acronym STC continued 
as the distinction between the operational nerve center of the AFSCF network and the 
facility as a whole at Sunnyvale.”27 The nerve center of the STC was Building 1001, the 
Development Control Center. In 1960, operations continued in an interim Satellite 
Control Room within Building 1001 while the new control room was under construction 
in another part of the building. Building 1001 also housed administrative and planning 
facilities, a weather forecasting station, a cafeteria, and other amenities. By early 1961, 
all satellite control operations had moved to into Building 1001, and the site overall was 
named Sunnyvale Air Force Station. By March 1961, the control room could support up 
to three satellites at the same time using two CDC 1604 computers.28 It dedicated most of 
its resources to the Corona program.  
In 1963 the STC supported the Vela program, satellites which were designed to 
detect nuclear detonations.29 From 1962 to1964 the STC also supported the Defense 
Meteorological Satellite Program. Most significantly, however, the Satellite Test Center 
supported more than 50 Corona satellites whose film accurately mapped all twenty-five 
                                                 
 
27 Roger A. Jernigan, “Air Force Satellite Control Facility: Historical Brief and Chronology, 1954-
Present,” AFSCF History Office, 1989, 82. The eight buildings are: 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004, 10031, 10032, 
1015, and 1025; I focus on the two buildings mainly responsible for command and control functions: 1001 
(original control center) and 1003 (the Blue Cube). Note: the 1982 creation of the AF Space Technology 
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personal website: http://www.kadiak.org/af_track/bob_afscf_index.html 
28 Jernigan, 5-7. 
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of Moscow’s long-range missile sites as well as identified China’s growing nuclear 
capabilities.30 Corona satellites took pictures of the Soviet Union from low-Earth orbit 
and then dropped physical canisters of film back to Earth for mid-air recovery of the 
“satellite recovery vehicle” (SRV) by a C-119J “Flying Boxcar” twin-boomed cargo 
aircraft.31 With the canister recovered, the cargo plane would fly to Moffett Naval Air 
Station in Sunnyvale, then to a Lockheed facility to be opened, and then delivered the 
film in an unmarked container to Eastman-Kodak’s Hawkeye Facility in Rochester for 
developing. Finally, the processed film was delivered to the CIA’s National Photographic 
Intelligence Center (NPIC), as well as to other unnamed beneficiaries of this 
intelligence.32 Yet it is worth mentioning that the Corona program was, as one writer has 
noted,  
rooted in the burgeoning west-coast aerospace industry—the list of contractors 
involved in the program is a roster of west-coast industry leaders, including 
Lockheed’s famous ‘Skunk Works.’ CORONA’s operational elements also 
resided on the west coast—only the intelligence functions were elsewhere. 
Vandenberg Air Force Base, on California’s rock-bound coast north of Los 
Angeles, launched the satellites, supported by Sunnyvale Air Force Station. 
Remote tracking stations dotted the coast from Kodiak, Alaska to Point Mugu, 
California. The Air Force Satellite Control Facility controlled the satellites when 
they were in orbit. The C-119Js of the 6593d Test Squadron (Special) trained at 
                                                 
 
30 Jennings and Rachleff, DRAFT, 18-20. 
31 Note that the SRV was rigged to sink with 72 hours if the canister was not retrieved to avoid it 
falling into enemy hands. Jennings and Rachleff, DRAFT, p. 6-7; 14. For information on film recovery 
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Edwards Air Force Base—although they moved to Hawaii in time for the first 
recovery operation.33 
 
The CIA thought that Corona would soon be made obsolete by programs with 
more efficient transmission capabilities. For example, Samos was currently under 
development and would transmit images via television. Corona was so successful, 
however, that the program continued for more than a decade. From 145 successful 
Corona launches, 165 film capsules were recovered, encompassing four increasingly 
high-resolution photo systems (KH-1 through KH-4A and KH4B) until it was 
discontinued in 1972, when the first electro-optical imaging system became operational.34 
Success only came after much trial and error. As with most early space efforts, 
Corona faced challenges. Its first dozen missions failed due to problems like faulty 
launch vehicles and recovery system malfunctions. The thirteenth mission succeeded, 
launched on a Thor rocket in February 1959 from Vandenberg AFB, but it was not 
carrying any film. It did, however, prove the efficacy of operational elements, such as the 
launch complex, tracking and control stations, the Lockheed Missiles and Space Division 
computer center, and the film recovery force. Work at the STC’s Building 1001 proved 
particularly successful; the center provided processing and tracking data for determining 
                                                 
 
33 Steury. 
34 The totals of launched and “successful” Corona satellites are inconsistent in available literature. 
Some say that from 1959 to 1972, 95 out of 121 launches were successful. Others say that the numbers are 
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flight status using a Remington-Rand 1103 computer along with a telephone and teletype 
network.35   
Corona, operating under codename Discoverer 14 (KH-1 9009), which was 
ostensibly gathering scientific data considering biological effects of the space 
environment on mammals, performed the first successful satellite photoreconnaissance 
mission in August 1960.36  It was a 1700-pound satellite coupled with a 300-pound 
reentry capsule, and it circled the Earth every 94.5 minutes at almost 18,000 NM per 
hour. Historian Arnold describes the tension in the command center during this 
achievement: 
At the windowless Satellite Test Center, Col. Alvin N. Moore, commander of the 
6594th Test Wing (Satellite), along with high-ranking air force commanders and 
Lockheed engineers, kept a close vigil on the vehicle. Information from the 
tracking stations at Vandenberg, Alaska, New Hampshire, and Hawaii and at sea 
from the USNS Private Joe E. Mann poured into the center by voice and 
teletype.37 
 
Its canister returned more than 3000 feet of film, which was more than the entire U-2 
program had amassed to date. The satellite had imaged 1.65 million square miles of 
                                                 
 
35 “Discoverer I: System Test Evaluation Report,” Lockheed Missile and Space Division, 
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Sunnyvale, CA, LMSD-445138, 20 April X, approved by Lt. Col. USAF 
Charles G. Mathison, 13-14. 
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Soviet territory.38 Scholars of the Corona program note the program’s ‘firsts’ in space 
technology, such as: 
first photoreconnaissance satellite; first recovery of an object from space (and first 
mid-air recovery of an object from space); first mapping of Earth from space; first 
stereo-optical data from space; and first program to fly more than 100 missions in 
space. In all, some 120 of the 145 CORONA missions were complete or partial 
successes. CORONA resulted in the exposure of over 2.1 million feet (almost 400 
miles) of film and took over 800,000 photographs. CORONA photographed a 
total land area of 557 million square miles.39 
 
Corona’s ultimate triumph was in dispelling the myth of the missile gap. In 1959 and 
1960 National Intelligence Estimates had the Soviet Union in possession of as many as 
300 operational ICBMS, but Corona imagery showed that there were only twenty-five.40 
In January 1963, a secure circuit was activated between the STC and the Pentagon 
which facilitated immediate information relay between the agencies and branch offices, 
notably those of the NRO. Also around this time, US satellite programs became 
classified. The CIA noted that Soviet Officials quoted US newspapers as sources for 
                                                 
 
38 Once again, I would like to acknowledge the existing literature, particularly these volumes that 
were released soon after the declassification of many NRO documents: Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, 
and Brian Latell, eds., Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites (Washington, D.C.: 
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(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997). Also see his earlier effort: Guardians: Strategic 
Reconnaissance Satellites Hardcover – July 1, 1991. Other historical documents because declassified over 
time, such as this one in 1997: Frederic C.E. Oder., James C. Fitzpatrick, Paul E. Worthman, The Corona 
Story (Sunnyvale, CA, 1988). You can also go straight to the primary sources themselves, mostly available 
on nro.gov. For example, Memo for Dr. Flax from William A. Tidwel, 9 Feb 1968, 1B0010; “History: 
Corona Program,” 2C0024, nro.gov 
39 “Introduction” Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell, eds., Eye in the Sky: The 
Story of the Corona Spy Satellites (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998), 7. This volume 
contains a chapter on the Soviet counterpart to Corona, named Zenit. Peter A. Gorin writes in “Zenit: The 
Soviet Response to CORONA,” that the programs shared many similarities…and differences. The 
existence of this contemporaneous analog underscores my assertion that the Soviets knew that Americans 
were launching spy satellites, if for no other reason that they were pursuing this technology as well. 
40 Steury, 174; Interesting sidebar: In the 21st century, archaeologists use declassified Corona 
images to uncover sites. While modern aerial photography can provide higher resolution, these images go 




information about US satellite programs. Even though a lot of the information in the 
newspapers was deliberately misleading, they did depict an accurate picture of US 
capabilities, so CIA officials decided to classify further missions. Even Corona’s cover 
story—Discoverer—faded to black after the launch of Discoverer 38 in 1962. Its program 
was simply designated an internal number—Program 162.41 Satellites were launched but 
unexplained to the press, the term ‘Keyhole’ began to designate satellites, and Corona 
satellites were retroactively designated ‘KH.’ The site itself also became increasingly 
high-security. After February 1958, Eisenhower had ordered the Air Force to stop 
publicly pursuing their film recovery effort, and to instead continue their work secretly 
under the auspices of the Central Intelligence Agency.42 This was not an easy order to 
follow. While the government wanted this program to go black, the Air Force leaked 
details of its operations anyway because it wanted to promote its accomplishments, which 
underscores the newness of this endeavor: young project leaders were trying to find their 
place in a complicated hierarchy. The Air Force had asked ARPA to declassify certain 
                                                 
 
41 Richelson, America’s, 65. “The new secrecy meant oblivion for the Air Force film To Catch a 
Falling Star. The film, which had been made on an unclassified basis for public release, was a documentary 
concerning the effort to recover Discoverer capsules from space. Four hundred ninety-seven prints of the 
film were made and sent to the Air Force Media Depository to await public release, but in light of the new 
secrecy restrictions the film was withdrawn overnight. In addition, public information officers were 
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was a classified effort for training purposes.” Richelson, America’s, 53. Historian Burrows speculates that 
while Eisenhower had a relatively open system, Kennedy changed it to top secret to avoid escalation and an 
arms race, as well as to protect arms control negotiations. In addition, like Eisenhower, Kennedy did not 
want to taunt Soviet leaders because he felt that it might invite an attack on American spacecraft (or worse). 
Perhaps most practically, the blackening would attempt to hide the administration’s enormous 
reconnaissance budget and prevent constant Air Force-CIA bickering from becoming public knowledge 
(Burrows 132-134). 
42 Berkowitz, 244-245. “While attention in Washington focused on problems with the booster and 
the space vehicle itself, preparations for recovering the film capsules were underway. Corona inherited its 
film recovery system from Project GENETRIX, a program from photographing Soviet territory with 
drifting balloons,” which had ended in 1956 (94). 
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details of WS-117L, which the ARPA director denied because he did not want to invite 
international political debate over the use of reconnaissance satellites. The Air Force 
ignored the director’s order and publicized its activities in press releases and magazine 
articles. President Kennedy was frustrated by the non-compliance and “according to one 
staffer, apparently ‘every time the Air Force put up a space shot and any publicity was 
given to it, he just went through the roof.’”43 
 
Figure 32. An aerial view of Building 1001 in 1959 shows the beginnings of what would become a large complex. 
Source: Onizuka AFS 
 
The Satellite Test Center succeeded in its duties in large part due to its 
sophisticated communications systems. Its computers fed information between 
controllers at their stations in Sunnyvale as well compiled data from ground tracking 
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stations. Descriptions of the space are similar to those of other Cold War spaces of 
control: 
The test controller—the operator who sent commands to the satellite—and the test 
director—the expert on all on-board systems—had closed-circuit televisions 
screens, push-button communications panels, and two-way headsets all feeding 
them information. Other consoles recorded the communications. Twenty-six 
television cameras showed the plotting boards for the satellite and reentry capsule. 
Incoming and outgoing messages on the teletype systems and various 
combinations of voice conferences kept the test crews informed and up-to-date. 
Viewgraph screens showed current weather conditions over the recovery site, 
maps, plots, and everything else the operators needed to know.44  
 
In the very few photos available of the STC’s Mission Control Centers, the configuration 
looks much like its NASA and military counterparts. Operators face a row of eight 
projection screens that would display information such as satellite positions on maps, 
weather conditions, and orbital attitudes. Above the space, much as in HQ SAC and the 
Combat Operations Room, there was a balcony from which Air Force, CIA, and 
Lockheed higher-ups could observe the lower floor, as well as the displays. While these 
control rooms were built above-ground, it did not mean that there was no concern about 
security leaks, and precautionary measures were taken to ensure secrecy, such as 
covering the walls of the control room in acoustical tile to prevent espionage.45 
At tracking stations, the facilities were not quite as advanced. One operator at 
Kodiak reported that computer systems were not installed at the tracking stations until 
1964, when they received Control Data Corporation computers (CDC-160As)—one for 
tracking and the other for telemetry—in addition to equipment manufactured by Philco 
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Ford. Each computer had a memory of 48K, equivalent to one of today’s compressed 
Web images, and the data line to California was 2400 bits per second, the minimum rate 
at which small file transfers were possible.46 The STC was linked to tracking stations by 
voice, data, and teletype circuits. These circuits also connected the STC to the Recovery 
Control Center in Hawaii—which was responsible for retrieving film canisters—during 
launch, orbiting, and recovery. During these operations, the “Mission Controllers” at the 
STC used the voice call sign “Dice.”47  Tracking station operators analyzed and 
interpreted most of a satellite’s data. It was from Sunnyvale, however, that controllers 
actually directed the satellite.48  
The Air Force Satellite Control Facility, a larger, umbrella body which now 
contained the Satellite Test Center, was established in 1965. Due to the increased 
responsibility given to the STC, the Air Force decided to implement a “Mission Control 
Center” concept that would disperse control centers throughout the complex instead of 
just having a single control room. Building 1001 was reconfigured starting in 1966, but 
the original Satellite Control Room remained unchanged, continuing to serve as the 
control room for Corona. The MCCs included 
a control console with seven twenty-channel television monitors, remote 
controlled 35mm projectors, secure and non-secure telephones, and time display 
units. In 1965, the Satellite Test Center logged more than 20K hours of satellite 
flight support and by the next year this number was up to almost 30K hours. In 
1965 the STC supported approximatively 14 satellites; in January 1967, the STC 
                                                 
 
46 Bib Siptrott, “Miscellaneous Tracking Station Information, 
http://www.kadiak.org/af_track/bob_misc.html, accessed 16 June 2015 
47 Bob Siptrott, “CHAPTER 1: GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AFSCF,” Air Force Satellite 
Control Facility, accessed 6 June 2015, http://www.kadiak.org/af_track/bob_afscf_index.html : (1-1). 
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supported 31 satellites per day, and by June that number was 44 and was only 
expected to increase.49 
 
Further upgrades to the facilities continued under the auspices of the Air Force’s 
modernization effort, the Multiple Satellite Augmentation Program, which required that 
the STC be upgraded to support multiple missions and that tracking stations become 
identical in their technical capabilities.50 While the STC supported the Samos and Midas 
programs in addition to Corona, the Satellite Control Room in Building 1001 was only 
designed to support one orbiting satellite at a time. Prior to the upgrade, the launch and 
orbiting sequences had to be configured so that there would not be any overlap.51 New 
systems made this workaround no longer necessary. Communications systems throughout 
the STC were also upgraded, including: “installation of a semi-automatic teletype switch, 
which provided near real-time capabilities, and the installation of high-frequency, high-
power radio station. The switchboard capacity was also increased to 1000 lines.”52 Four 
computers were added for a total of six CDC 1604 computers, and connections between 
the STC and tracking stations were reinforced. Building 1002 was planned by Kaiser 
Engineers, which had existing connections to Sunnyvale-based Hendry Iron Works. 
                                                 
 
49 Ibid., 23. 
50 Things monitored, generally (1) 100-200nm short lifespan, short pass, low-altitude, more 
monitoring in each revolution (2) medium-altitude, 200-1000nm, one year+ monitoring duration, 10-20 min 
pass (3) about 10nm+ high-altitude, very long missions, less frequently serviced, perhaps geosynchronous 
vehicles have constant contact (4) ballistic missiles and suborbital test vehicles, short periods obviously, 
supported by tracking stations (5) “other” orbital vehicles such as the Shuttle. See “Air Force Satellite 
Control Facility,” by Space and Missile Systems Center, produced by Aerospace Audiovisual Service: 
Military Airlift Command, F1-D1369/009 /detachment 1369th S-3580 AVS, Los Angeles, CA, Los Angeles 
AFB YouTube user, estimated 1980, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZX9cq3_vgkI 
51 Jennings and Rachleff, FINAL, 16. 
52 Jennings and Rachleff, DRAFT, 22. Note that the key difference between say, NASA 
operations, and inability to work in real-time with satellites, was that it wasn’t a life or death scenario in the 
latter case. However, the loss of any national security information was a worry. Also loss of very expensive 
equipment a concern, perhaps more so than the PR fiasco of losing an astronaut, depending on how 
cynically you feel toward the federal government 
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Construction of Building 1002 was completed in late 1962, constructed in an “L” shape 
that anticipated the later addition of another “L” to result in a rectangular building with 
an interior courtyard. Building 1002, connected to Building 1001 by a hyphen, provided 
much-needed administrative spaces, such as offices, libraries, and conference rooms. 
Around this time, Kaiser Engineers also made additions to and upgraded HVAC and 
plumbing systems in Building 1001.  
Building 1003, the “Big Blue Cube”  
Building 1003, the “Blue Cube,” was just that: a massive, windowless box painted a pale 
“Air Force Blue” surrounded by three parabolic dish antennas that fed data into the center 
from remote tracking stations. This building is another artifact of deterrence, a bold 
structure that proclaimed that its residents were prepared to defend the nation from within 
its walls. It was also a decoy; its display and association with military activities drew eyes 
upon it, and perhaps that was the intention of its builders. The letters “AFSCF” 
emblazoned on its side designated its attachment to the base, and it was easily visible 
from neighboring freeways 237 and 101, not to mention from overhead. Its distinct 
architecture instigated years of speculation as to the exact activities conducted within the 
building. According to a local reporter, “The mystery only burnished the legend.”53 
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Figure 33. The Blue Cube, Building 1003, under construction in 1968. Original photograph source: Onizuka AFS. 
Annotated by Jennings and Rachleff. 
 
In the mid-1960s, the Air Force decided that it would operate the Manned 
Orbiting Laboratory—a proposed military space station—from Sunnyvale rather than 
from NASA Mission Control in Houston, which greatly expanded responsibilities of the 
Satellite Test Center. The idea behind the Manned Orbiting Laboratory was that a Titan 
III booster rocket would carry a modified Gemini B capsule attached to a space 
laboratory into orbit. Astronauts would conduct military reconnaissance and scientific 
experiments, as well as assess man’s suitability to living and working in space. This 
project required a ground facility that could house large mainframe computers, and C.F. 
Braun & Company drafted plans for the Blue Cube in 1966. Air Force funds were 
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appropriated to acquire additional land from Lockheed and construction began in 1968. 
Contemporary San Jose Mercury News articles correctly speculated that the Blue Cube 
and other additions were to support the Manned Orbiting Laboratory program. These 
articles also emphasized that activities at the Blue Cube would be top secret, initiating 
years of public fascination with the site.54 The 1969 DoD cancellation of the Manned 
Orbiting Laboratory briefly halted work on the building, but construction soon resumed; 
the Blue Cube’s upgraded technological spaces would support other programs. 
Completed in 1969, the result was a 164,000-square-foot, windowless, pre-cast 
concrete-panel building painted sky blue, achieved at a cost of $8 million. The 104-foot-
tall building was technically four stories, because each floor had 25-foot-high ceilings to 
accommodate the mechanical and computing equipment required for conducting multiple 
missions. The building also featured a mezzanine in between the second and third stories 
that housed mechanical equipment, including electrical panels and massive air handling 
units. Later architectural historians noted that “The first story housed communications 
and crypto equipment, data distribution center, mechanical equipment and storage, and 
the second story housed four CDC 3800 computer rooms and a tape library.” Three 
Mission Control Centers (D, F, M) were located on the third story, which supported high 
and low-orbit satellite programs as well as ballistic programs. The fourth floor had offices 
for field detachment and training as well as three additional known Mission Control 
Centers (B, C, D) which supplemented those still in Building 1001. Types of mission 
support included: flight planning, on-pad shuttle and payload examination, tracking, 
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telemetry, controlling craft in altitudes above 400 NM, and interfacing with the crew 
during satellite deployment and retrieval.55 Next door, newly constructed Building 1004 
housed twelve 75- kW 1000 horsepower Solar Aircraft Company gas turbine generator 
sets, creating a two-story power plant at a cost of almost $10 million. It provided all the 
electrical and mechanical power required to support Buildings 1001 and 1003.56 
Over time, more decision-making became centralized at the Blue Cube, as 
tracking stations became increasingly automated. Its operators played prominent roles in 
the STC’s support of DoD missions and the NRO’s reconnaissance efforts, as well as in 
the Apollo lunar missions and, much later, in the designs and launches of Navstar (GPS) 
and the Space Shuttle.57  
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Figure 34. The console configuration within the Satellite Test Center evokes images of other control centers, namely 
NASA’s Mission Control Center. Source: “Air Force Satellite Control Facility,” by Space and Missile Systems 
Center, Los Angeles AFB YouTube user, estimated 1980, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZX9cq3_vgkI 
 
Upgrades to the Satellite Test Center 
In 1981, a mission control center on the fourth floor of the Blue Cube was reconfigured 
to support the Shuttle program. This was a significant upgrade. “The new mission control 
console had seven television monitors on which the operators could select any one of 
twenty separate telemetry channels, all coming into the complex in real time, thanks to 
the space-ground link subsystem modification.”58 Walls were removed to make some 
Mission Control Rooms larger, and other spaces were divided with partitions. Other walls 
were repainted, new tile and carpeting was installed, and a sophisticated security system 





was implemented. New lock and alarms permitted access to only designated personnel.59 
Around 1982, a DoD data modernization program affected Sunnyvale facilities, which 
needed to upgrade to meet the needs of SDI (a Reagan-era proposed missile defense 
system), such as the Delta Mission 181 intelligence-gathering program. This update 
included a $500 million introduction of database-driven computer hardware and software 
to replace outdated systems. 60 
 
Figure 35. This graphic depicts the rudiments of how data arrived at the Satellite Test Center. Source: “Air Force 
Satellite Control Facility,” http://www.kadiak.org/af_track/bob_afscf_index.html 
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The STC’s relationship with NASA might seem incongruent given the civilian 
agency’s mission of peaceful and scientific uses of space. But the space agency has 
always been deeply tied to the American military.61 In fact, when the NACA was 
transformed into NASA in 1958, it was intended to ease Soviet suspicion of American 
spacecraft. Ever since, NASA, “a purportedly civilian body that was supposed to advance 
the peaceful uses of space while championing freedom of travel in it,” has often provided 
a cover for the activities of the Air Force and CIA.62 NRO and NASA operations and 
technologies have also overlapped, such as when NASA used NRO-developed earth-
imaging systems in its Lunar Orbiter camera.63 The STC likewise supported Space 
Shuttle missions, including the first mission flown by Columbia in 1981, as well as the 
fourth Columbia mission in 1985, which carried aboard a military payload (most likely a 
communications satellite). Most poignantly, the Blue Cube supported Challenger in 
1986, which tragically exploded after launch, killing its seven crew members. Challenger 
astronaut and mission specialist Lieutenant Colonel Ellison S. Onizuka had trained at 
Sunnyvale Air Force Station. The base was soon renamed Onizuka Air Force Station in 
his memory, and in 1987 a memorial to Lieutenant Colonel Onizuka was placed in the 
lobby of Building 1003.64 This relationship with the military was seen by many at NASA 
as a distasteful fiscal necessity: 
                                                 
 
61 The Air Force saw the primary differentiation between its own space operations and civilian 
(NASA) space aspirations, as the latter being interested in deep space, not in orbital, routine operations, 
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The old-timers at NASA had come to cherish the agency’s civilian orientation 
(though it had never been wholly free of military involvement, as was evident by 
the fact that the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo astronauts were all military 
officers). But there had not been money to go around for all of the space programs 
everyone wanted at the end of the sixties and into the seventies, so NASA had 
been forced to rely on Air Force funding for part of the shuttle’s development. 
There were some at the space agency who tended to think of their relationship 
with the Air Force as being roughly equivalent to that of an impoverished prodigy 
who is forced to live off the largess of a well-heeled but slightly unsavory host. 
But they took the money.65  
 
Arms control monitoring was another component of the work done at the Blue 
Cube.66 Systems operators ensured that the Soviets were adhering to arms control 
agreements, especially after Nixon took office in 1969, when there was an expectation 
that both sides would orbit these types of satellites, as explicitly articulated in the 1971 
SALT agreement. Classified NRO systems were responsible for distinguishing between 
large and small missiles, as well as for assessing the volume of Soviet missile silos. 
Around this time, senior officials in the Nixon administration considered publicly 
acknowledging satellite reconnaissance and the NRO, but decided against it.67  
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Figure 36. The Big Blue Cube was proximate to and highly visible from a number of busy freeways in Silicon Valley. 
Source: Lockheed 
 
Figure 37. This image shows the text “AFSCF” emblazoned on the side of the Blue Cube. Its operations were no 
secret. Source:  Jennings and Rachleff. 
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Beyond these broad contours, however, little is known about the exact activities 
that took place in the Blue Cube, or what it was like to work there. Historians and 
journalists have speculated as to the various contractors and tasks involved.68 One 
historian asserts that only contractors worked within the STC, no Air Force “blue-
suiters,” but Air Force personnel did work at the Blue Cube. They oversaw launching 
duties, but did not issue direct intelligence-gathering orders to the CIA-directed 
workers.69 Many of these details remain undisclosed. Even after the building was 
demolished, only anecdotes existed as to the interior landscape of Building 1003. One 
local newspaper quotes a former secretary as describing the interior doors as looking so 
similar that getting around was like navigating a maze. The same article provides 
nostalgic stories shared by engineers about how they used butcher paper and felt pens to 
predict timing when computer resources were unavailable, and the time when, after 
supervisors asserted that the Russians could see a manhole cover from space, whimsical 
employees wore hats that bore pictures of manhole covers.70 At a ceremony for the STC’s 
closure in 2010, General Sheridan only attested that the facility had supported 3.4 million 
satellite “operations,” but that "Much of the details of this work are still classified and we 
cannot talk openly about it, but…the operations conducted by the NRO from this site 
have made our nation a tremendously safer place to be."71 But for all of this talk of secret 
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operations, the space itself was not much more secret than the places examined in 
previous chapters.  
This Was a Known Space 
The ambitions of the STC’s flagship program, Corona—whether identified as Corona or 
as Discoverer—were public knowledge from the beginning.  The true nature of the 
Discoverer program was reported in the New York Times, Aviation Week, and elsewhere 
and the Kremlin had already suspected that these satellites were target-mapping. 
Within a week of the launching of Discoverer 17 on November 12, 1960, the 
authoritative Soviet journal International Affairs issued two warnings that were to be 
repeated on a number of occasions during the following three years: no matter what the 
spy satellites’ altitude (it mentioned Discoverer, Samos, and Midas by name and outlined 
their missions), their flights over Soviet territory were illegal, and the USSR had the right 
and means to bring down the orbiting intruders just as it had brought down Gary Powers 
seven months before.72 
While it was unlikely that the Soviets could have done anything, as they did not 
have anti-satellite capabilities, the response of the Kennedy administration was to avoid 
further provoking the enemy by making its spy satellite programs highly classified. Even 
Corona’s shade of black, however, was really only a dark grey, and both superpowers 
continued to embark on space-based reconnaissance. The NRO was in charge of 
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investigating Soviet anti-satellite and anti-ICBM capabilities.73 Meanwhile, lawyers and 
politicians proclaimed freedom of the skies as an inherent right for the United States. One 
law professor in 1963 wrote that “the right to know of warlike preparations within a 
closed society like the Soviet Union is essential to the security and even the survival of 
the free world and is therefore a legal right.”74 Beyond couching space-surveillance in 
terms that would make it more akin to self-defense rather than espionage, lawyers also 
noted haughtily that outer space is outside of any nation’s sovereignty and encouraged 
the Soviet Union to construct its own satellite system.   
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Figure 38. Stills from a video provide rare glimpse of what the interiors of the Satellite Test Center’s facilities looked 
like. Source: Stills from “Air Force Satellite Control Facility,” by Space and Missile Systems Center, Los 




Such dares were invoked with the knowledge that the USSR already had 
ambitions for its own system. America’s satellite reconnaissance network was not only 
concerned with investigating Soviet capabilities and maintaining diplomacy, but with 
guarding the STC’s own infrastructure. Historian Burrows, writing 1986, depicts the 
contemporary dedication to keeping Cold War secrets hidden: 
The opposition’s possession of accurate information regarding the true extent and 
full capability of this vast and intricate [intelligence] system, much of which has 
been engineered to be redundant for multiple coverage and backup capacity in 
case on element malfunctions, would amount to a decisive intelligence coup for 
the opposition and most probably a severe, if not fatal, loss for the West. U.S. 
intelligence would be practically deaf, dumb, and blind, and the nation would be 
commensurately vulnerable. It is for this reason that the system that does all of 
this watching and listening is so pervasively secret—so black—that no individual, 
including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the director of Central 
Intelligence, knows all of its hidden parts, the parts they collect, or the real extent 
of the widely dispersed and deeply buried budget that keeps the entire operation 
functioning.75 
 
Certainly, much secrecy was upheld. Americans knew, however, that there were secret 
military operations and that they involved launching cameras into space. So did Soviet 
leaders, who had easy access to the American newspapers, and their satellites could see 
American installations and confirm media reports.76 The National Reconnaissance 
Office’s efforts were known not only from media and espionage efforts; the Soviet Union 
was building its own satellite systems and expected its enemy to be doing the same.77 In 
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1959 a former Air Force Colonel argued that “war-fighting deterrence—deterrence based 
on an ability to prevail in a nuclear war—required secrecy and superiority. On the other 
hand, retaliatory deterrence—deterrence based on an ability to inflict severe damage in 
retaliation for nuclear attack—required openness about weapons and information 
systems.”78 
In the early 1960s, the existence of an American reconnaissance system could be 
inferred from political actions and reactions, such as when Corona and Samos satellite 
footage supplemented intelligence gathered by U-2s during the 1962 Cuban Missile 
Crisis. Kennedy acknowledged American reconnaissance capabilities when he warned 
Khrushchev to remove missiles from Cuba. Further, “To a certain extent each 
side…[came] to depend upon the other’s strategic reconnaissance apparatus, and 
especially the satellites, to validate its retaliatory capability.”79 The Cuban Missile Crisis 
provided a turning point in which war was narrowly averted through dual recognition of 
unambiguous technological prowess, as “The satellites substituted imagery for 
imagination and provided a realistic look at what the opposition had and did not have.”80 
The same can be said for the ground stations that controlled these systems. 
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Satellites could also be tools of diplomacy. For example, the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Space recommended that NASA photographs of foreign territory be 
released. That way, they argued optimistically, foreign leaders would be accustomed to 
having their territories observed, and they would concede that satellite imagery had 
potential for peaceful uses of space. The committee did not recommend, however, 
sharing the technological specifications of imaging technology. There was also 
discussion of sharing such photographs with Soviet leaders in order to call their bluff on 
missile holdings, but those opposed to such a bold move successfully argued that any 
revelations would have only resulted in increased countermeasures to surveillance, such 
as camouflage and concealment.81 
American reconnaissance satellite systems were not explicitly acknowledged until 
1978, when President Jimmy Carter confirmed that the United States used satellites to 
verify arms control treaties. The existence of the National Reconnaissance Office was not 
officially revealed until 1992, but its presence was known much earlier.82 In 1973, due to 
an error in a Senate Committee Report, the name ‘NRO’ was not deleted from a list of 
intelligence agencies that the committee had recommended should make their budgets 
public. In the following years, the Washington Post had a story about the NRO and 
information was published in Victor Marchetti and John D. Mark’s 1974 The CIA and the 
Cult of Intelligence.83 No doubt a large amount of information about the NRO had also 
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been discovered by this time through Soviet espionage efforts.84 But this does not limit 
the historical importance of the agency.  Using American spy satellites, the CIA and Air 
Force discovered massive underground command posts near Moscow, as well as 
dispelled the myth of the missile gap.85 These were key contributions to US intelligence, 
and American survival in the Cold War could have easily hinged on such information. 
 
Figure 39. The Blue Cube was demolished in 2014. This still was taken from a video captured by a private UAV 
equipped with a GoPro. Source: “Goodbye Blue Cube, Sunnyvale, CA,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YOwb49SQ-x4 
 
Concluding Remarks 
At the end of the Cold War, the Air Force began operating with more public 
transparency at Onizuka, even taking in visitors, with the hope of securing dwindling 
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DoD funding. The NRO was declassified in September 1992, and President Clinton 
signed an order that authorized the Director of Central Intelligence to declassify the 
Corona program in 1995.86 In 2011 a massive declassification occurred in celebration of 
the fiftieth anniversary of the NRO, revealing the Gambit program, which utilized a high-
resolution camera and began operations in 1963. After Gambit’s addition, Corona had 
focused on searching for targets, while Gambit concentrated on surveillance. The NRO’s 
most recently declassified system, Hexagon, replaced Corona in 1972, and these satellites 
combined the technologies of both Corona and Gambit.87 These revelations, however, did 
not halt the demise of the Satellite Test Center. The trend toward decentralization led to 
the subsequent dismantling of this facility. Such sites were rendered obsolete, and its 
years of service were soon relegated to Cold War history. 
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CHAPTER 6. Epilogue 
 
Washington DC residents love to complain about the Metro’s late, missing, or packed 
trains, its horrific accumulation of preventable accidents, and its appalling safety record.88 
One journalist took his indictment to the Internet and wrote a blog in which he sought to 
understand how this once-lauded public transportation system became so consistently 
unreliable. At first glance, upon seeing the control of the system, the Metro appears to be 
an advanced technological marvel. One journalist told the story of a 2014 recruit at the 
Metro’s Rail-Operations Control Center who was awestruck when he first saw the 
center’s digital plotting board depicting the locations of all of the trains in real time. 
“Wow, he recalls thinking. It looks like a miniature NASA mission control.” The 
recruit’s admiration for the system soured after he observed inadequately trained 
employees.89 The control center itself, however, had once again commanded respect, and 
in this case, the recruit’s immediate association was with NASA’s Mission Control 
Center. 
While anecdotal, this reaction seems common. The command and control center 
configuration from the 1960s remains a powerful image. For example, when most 
Americans envision NASA, they do not imagine NASA’s headquarters in Washington, 
DC; their mind’s eye shows operators at Mission Control in Houston as representative of 
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the organization that put men on the Moon. While military command and control centers 
had projected images of their spaces in years prior, NASA built the most public of these 
facilities, and solidified the command center architectural archetype in public 
consciousness.  
NASA, however, has strong ties to the military. As historian Maura Mackowski 
notes, NASA hardly had a degree of separation from military technologies or forces, as 
they hired, 
only military men as astronauts, disguise[ed] them as civilians, and launch[ed] 
them aboard civilian rockets that were based on military technology. The first 
man on the moon, Neil Armstrong, was touted as a civilian astronaut, but he had 
learned to fly courtesy of the US military in a school they called the Korean War. 
It was not until the very last Project Apollo mission in 1972, when geologist 
Harrison Schmitt landed on the moon, that a civilian with no military ties 
whatsoever flew for NASA.90 
 
An additional similarity is that the space program and American military branches 
utilized the same contractors and engineering firms. The sustained volume of federal 
support given to these companies in the construction of these spaces of control, in turn, 
was partially responsible for a larger shift in the economy toward dependency on high-
technology aerospace-related goods and services. Philco Ford is an example of one 
beneficiary that threads together the case studies examined here. By the 1980s, successor 
to Philco Ford, Ford Aerospace annually secured more than $1 billion in space and 
defense contracts and employed an increasing number of Ford’s overall labor force. Ford 
Aerospace provided parts and service to all four organizations examined here, from 
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custom electronic components and systems for NASA, to satellite operations support at 
the Blue Cube and its network of tracking stations. Other contractors provided hardware 
and software necessary to run the systems of the Strategic Air Command headquarters 
and the Combat Operations Center in Cheyenne Mountain, as well as contributed to 
systems for precision-guided munitions, or smart bombs, which would go to task if 
detection systems alerted radar sensors of an incoming attack.91 Today’s prominent 
aerospace companies, all of whom assisted in the construction of these systems, such as 
Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing, played roles in the creation of Cold 
War spaces of control. While a downturn in the defense needs of the 1990s instigated 
numerous mergers, these companies have weathered the storm and in the world of the 
post-September 11th attacks, have emerged stronger than ever. 
The fates of the spaces of control examined here are most strongly linked by how 
they showcase the movement away from the centralized headquarters as best practice. 
Each space became obsolete as decentralization and distributed networks became the 
accepted characteristics of a command and control super-structure. The question became: 
What to do with these relics? Perhaps they should be preserved as museums, artifacts of 
the Cold War, the embodiment of a particular way of thinking about the world that was 
no longer operational. Or they could be repurposed, with their missions limited or 
facilities home to new guard. Another alternative would be to completely demolish their 
architecture. 
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NASA Mission Control facilitated a number of spaceflight feats, but the agency 
as a whole suffered from budgetary limitations beginning even before the time of the 
Moon landing, never to return to its initial, generously funded heyday. By the 1990s, the 
once-revolutionary technology that supported Mission Control was outdated to the point 
that the entire center needed to be redesigned. In July 1995, an upgraded Mission Control 
center, which implemented the latest generation of cutting-edge technology, began 
operations. The Apollo-era MCC was set aside as a national historic facility, and tours are 
available through Space Center Houston, located in the Visitor’s Center of Johnson Space 
Center. 
The Strategic Air Command remained poised to launch a counterattack on the 
Soviet Union until just after the end of the Cold War.  As part of post-Cold War US Air 
Force reorganization, in 1992 SAC was “de-established.” Its personnel and equipment 
were distributed among other Commands, and the complex at Offutt Air Force Base was 
transferred to SAC’s successor, the newly created US Strategic Command (StratCom), 
whose duties include global command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR). US StatCom occupies Building 500, now titled the Curtis 
LeMay Building, and will continue to do so until its new home across the street is 
completed. Building 500 could no longer accommodate HQ StratCom’s computing and 
HVAC needs; the space suffers from constant fires sparked by inadequately cooled 
wiring, and from flooding due to the underground location and proximity to the Missouri 
River. The new StratCom command and control center will be able to withstand the 
radiation burst that accompanies a nuclear blast, and will be located underneath a 
concrete plaza, “inside a thick steel cube, encased in a concrete shell, beneath the surface 
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and surrounded by catwalks and scaffolding.” After StratCom moves to its new home, the 
Air Defense Command’s 55th Wing will take residence in the historic building.92 
The Cheyenne Mountain Complex could never be truly hardened. According to 
former Air Force lieutenant William J. Astore, who served in Cheyenne Mountain in the 
waning years of the Cold War, everyone working within the site knew that the operations 
could be taken out by a nuclear attack. “Our job,” he wrote in The Nation, “was simply to 
detect the coming nuclear attack by the Soviets and act quickly enough to coordinate a 
retaliatory strike—to ensure that the Soviet part of the planet went down—before we 
were obliterated.”93 This morbid mission continued throughout the Cold War, and 
necessary upgrades have been made to the computer systems well into the present. After 
the attacks of September 11, 2001, hundreds of millions of dollars of modernization work 
was done in Cheyenne Mountain, and in 2002, it became home to the newly created US 
Northern Command (NorthCom), established to provide command and control of DoD 
homeland defense efforts. Within less than a year, however, then-NORAD/NorthCom 
commander Navy Admiral Timothy Keating initiated the move of NORAD and 
NorthCom from Cheyenne Mountain to neighboring Peterson Air Force Base. He 
complained that the traffic between Peterson and Cheyenne Mountain was time-
consuming and that he should not risk being stuck in gridlock while attacks might be 
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hitting the homeland.94 He also asserted that moving operations to Peterson would save 
millions of dollars annually, although inspectors from the Government Accountability 
Office found no documentation to support this claim.95 NORAD spokesman Captain Jeff 
Davis asserted that NORAD just got too big for Cheyenne Mountain, while other sources 
cited changing priorities and ambiguous new objectives.96 
The Cheyenne Mountain location had proved itself increasingly valuable over the 
years due to its granite enclosure, which provides protection against electromagnetic 
radiation (EMP). Such radiation might come from a high-altitude nuclear test and has the 
potential to knock out communication systems, and Cheyenne Mountain is the “country’s 
single-best EMP-protected complex.” Despite concerns that the above-ground location of 
NORAD HQ at Peterson leaves the site vulnerable to attack, the move to Peterson was 
completed in 2008, and the Cheyenne Mountain Combat Operations Center was 
redesignated the “NORAD and USNORTHCOM Alternate Command Center.” This 
Center will continue to operate as a redundant command, appeasing fears about possible 
attack on the primary command center.97 Reports from 2015, however, indicated 
NORAD’s possible move back into the mountain, for the very reason that it offers EMP-
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protection, citing as evidence a $700 million federal contract for Raytheon to upgrade 
communications within the site.98 US Air Force classified operations currently occupy 70 
percent of the Complex. 
The Air Force deactivated the Satellite Control Facility in October 1987, creating 
four new organizations.99 A new satellite control center—the Consolidated Space 
Operations Center (CSOC, pronounced see-sock), which would eventually subsume the 
responsibilities of the Satellite Test Center—was constructed at Falcon AFB (now 
Schriever AFB) in response to concerns about Sunnyvale’s vulnerability to earthquakes 
and terrorism.100 As articulated by one historian, “Sunnyvale’s Big Blue Cube not only 
stands above a fault that is considered to be ripe for a major earthquake, but is also within 
bazooka and other weapons’ range of a busy thoroughfare.”101 Some operations remained 
at Onizuka Air Force Base, but the station was selected for closure by the Base 
Realignment and Closure Program in 2005, and the Air Force relocated Onizuka's 
remaining operational units to Ellison Onizuka Satellite Operations Facility 
at Vandenberg Air Force Base.102 The NRO officially removed its presence from Onizuka 
in 2007 and continues to operate from the Pentagon and a Chantilly, Virginia location 
with a budget of some $10 billion. After transfers were completed, Onizuka Air Force 
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Station was closed on 30 September 2010. The closing ceremony featured a color guard, 
a brass band, and was presided over by Lt. Gen John T. “Tom” Sheridan, commander of 
the Space and Missile Systems Center at Los Angeles Air Force Base.103 
The California State Historical Preservation Office unsuccessfully attempted to 
add the STC site to the National Historic Register in 2010, which would have consisted 
of six interconnected “contributing resources”, including the Blue Cube, and two “non-
contributing resources.”104 Historians at the Office asserted that the space they designated 
the Satellite Test Center Historic District was significant not only at the local but at the 
national level, and that reconnaissance efforts conducted at its buildings “represent the 
massive investment of the United States to combat the perceived threat posed by the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War.”105 For undisclosed reasons, the Blue Cube and many 
of the STC facilities were demolished in 2014. After the demolition, District Chancellor 
Linda Thor said the renovated site would be "very respectful" of the Blue Cube's 
historical significance, including a transfer of the memorial of astronaut Onizuka to the 
new facility, and it would repurpose the site’s blue tiles as a pathway. As of 2014, the site 
was slated for construction of a large annex to a local community college.106 
Speculation as to the demise of the Blue Cube circles back to the questions of 
how agendas can be built into architecture, and how secret any of these sites were meant 
to be. Perhaps, unlike the Museum-displayed, Apollo-era NASA Mission Control Center, 
few Americans would want to reflect on military Cold War command centers with a 
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quaint nostalgia, as time capsules of a national past. Or perhaps the Blue Cube’s 
technology and operations were more advanced than we could imagine, are still highly 
classified, and the building needed to be destroyed to protect its secrets. Leaving the 
public guessing probably does more for the aims of national security than does 
disclosure. The symbolic architecture and high-profile “secrecy” of the Blue Cube served 
the purpose of keeping people at home and abroad uncertain as to its exact activities, 
while simultaneously reinforcing an image that sophisticated, technological tasks were 
indeed being conducted to keep the populace safe. Its demolition may indicate that it was 
successful in this task, and that in a new era these centers are no longer necessary. 
Command centers, whether civilian or military, remain a distinct expression of 
Cold War culture, of an era confident in its ability to control the future.  In the twenty-
first century, we no longer feel that this is a realistic outlook, and struggle to find stability 
in a complicated world that is out of our control. No longer are there distinct physical 
markers of a protective structure. The new architecture of command and control is found 
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